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AN EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED
TO THE SEPARATION OF CENTRAL AMERICA
FROM SPAIN: 1808-1821

John R. Permesang, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1980

The separation of Central America from Spain in 1321 was,
unlike other similar occurrences, a peaceful event.

This thesis,

after presenting an historical overview, narrates certain happenings
in the area during the thirteen years prior to the gaining of
political independence.

Commencing with the Napoleonic invasion

of Spain in 1808, this thesis places special emphasis on political
changes in the Spanish Empire which were brought about through the
adoption of a liberal Spanish constitution in 1812.

In Central

America the new measures were opposed by a recently appointed
Captain-General who effectively frustrated any creole ambitions
towards having an enlightened government.

Eventually, however, the

re-promulgation of the 1812 Constitution and the presence of a more
pliable Captain-General did rekindle hopes for a better and more
responsive government.

Nevertheless, independence was declared

once the deteriorating Mexican situation made such an act inevitable.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In spite of geographical and L-.storical explanations, the
student of Latin American history must often grapple with the ques
tion of the lack of internal and external unity among the republics
of Central and South America.

Why these countries have chosen to

forge ahead as small, relatively powerless entities while at the same
time ignoring the advantages of unity is an intriguing question which
the scholar should often ponder.

For indeed, if undertaken in the

correct frame of mind, it can prove enlightening and helpful in under
standing the people in question.
There are of course, a variety of answers as to why groups of
people find it difficult to join harmoniously with their brothers.
Quite often racial, ethnic, or tribal problems exist as do numerous
cultural anomalies.

While admittedly difficult, it is only through

an extensive analysis that such difficult barriers can be eliminated.
Such an analysis is imperative though, for if a tranquil existence is
a principal objective of a society, it can only be achieved through
an understanding of its past.

For only by recognizing the actions of

its forefathers, can a society better anticipate future problems and
more properly guide its own destiny.
Oftentimes it is helpful to assess local causes of disunity
in the hope that they may prove applicable of other areas of stress
as well.

The following study will attempt to do this by using as an
1
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example that area once known as the Captaincy-General of Guatemala.
This same territory is now made up of the modern republics of Hon
duras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and a small part
of Mexico.
The present study does not propose to be all-encompassing.
Primarily, this is because many of the archives in Central America
have suffered greatly from wars and natural disasters.

At the same

time, there is a natural tendency among scholars to pay greater at
tention to regions with larger populations and land mass thus rele
gating the former Captaincy-General to a field only slightly re
searched.

Noticeably absent are works dealing with daily life, the

role of the lower classes, and the structure and responsibilities of
various governmental agencies.

One might also note the lack of com

prehensive studies on specific events or eras.

Questions, for ex

ample, still remain on el terror bustamantino, or Bustamante’s reign
of terror, and the political developments from 1320 up to independ
ence.

Thus, the field of Central American history today remains in

a state of imbalance.
Although this study concentrates on the thirteen years after
the Napoleonic invasion of Spain, it begins by offering an overview
of colonial development which includes sections on religious and
economic development.

Discussions on the educational system, the

press, and certain commercial institutions are also offered because
of their critical appearance just prior to the 1808 invasion.
By 1321, the tranquil colony of Guatemala had deteriorated
into a bubbling cauldron of confusion and petty factionalism.
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On

3

every scale, major and minor, it appeared that whatever political
integrity that was left would soon decay into a morass of localisms.
The present study addresses itself to examining certain important
factors extant during those particular years which are considered
precursors to independence.
Especially important was the convocation of the Spanish
Cortes, or parliament, in 1810 and the subsequent promulgation of a
liberal constitution two years later.

This event caused a number of

reprecussions in Central America of both a positive and a negative
nature.

For example, local and national elections were held for the

first time, and, with the hope of popular involvement, provincial
congresses were authorized as was freedom of the press, albeit on a
still restricted scale.

Unfortunately, a newly-appointed Captain-

General viewed the new reforms as an anathema.

When a rash of dis

turbances erupted, his iron-fisted measures only served to alienate
many levels of society while at the same time making the idea of
independence more acceptable to critical personalities in the colony.
Nevertheless, his harsh tactics were effective in maintain
ing a kind of grudging peace from the time of Fernando VII's return
in 1814 to his forced acceptance of the 1812 Constitution in 1820.
With the 1820 re-promulgation new developments surfaced in Central
America of which observers especially noted the growth of the dual
political parties supported by sympathetic newspapers.
As had happened earlier, Central America's future was again
modified by outside forces.

This time however, the impetus to change

came not from Europe but from the north in Mexico.

Just months after
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the declaration of Iturbide's Plan of Iguala, and the timely arrival
of a Mexican army, the Guatemalan province of Chiapas seceded from
the Captaincy-General and annexed itself to Mexico.

The secession

was provocation enough for the Captain-General in Guatemala City to
convoke a meeting of local dignitaries which met on September 15,
1821.

Shortly, and without provincial or any authentic public par

ticipation, Central America declared its independence from Spain on
that same day.
The above decisions did not, unfortunately, precipitate an
era of tranquility.

On the contrary, absolute political chaos re

sulted from the unleashing of the heretofore controlled restraints on
local and provincial animosities.

Old jealousies between the provin

cial towns and Guatemala City surfaced detrimentally, a situation
that was only aggravated when the decision was made to annex the
entire colony to Mexico.

Even further discontent was noted when

absolute autonomy was declared in 1823.

As before, both of these

important resolutions were made with a minimum amount of provincial
involvement.
Except for an epilogue which briefly describes the short
Central American union with Mexico, this study ends with the Septem
ber 15, 1821 declaration of independence.

The decision to stop at

this point was made simply because it was then that the official at
tachment to Spain ceased.

It was then that loyalties changed notice

ably with no further attempt ever being made to re-attach the former
colony to the Mother Country.
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A note in regards to the use of sources not written in
English is in order.

Because the works of a number of Central

American and Spanish scholars were consulted, it was decided for
consistency's sake to translate all quotations into English.

In

every case where the work was in Spanish this has been done by the
author.

Another problem that invariably seems to arise involves the

use of institutional and political titles.

Not only are there dif

ficulties in arriving at the English equivalents, but over the years
different authorities have come to use different titles for the same
entity and, unfortunately, the Spaniards followed the same practice.
In light of this, and until a convention meets to resolve the issue,
the author has made every effort to translate those titles into their
most literal English equivalent.

Exceptions to this rule will be

noted with such widely accepted terms as Cortes, Ayuntamiento,
Audiencia, etc.
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CHAPTER I I

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

In general, the growth of the colony of Guatemala was tran
quil and for the most part uneventful.

So far as the available

evidence suggests, there were few disturbances of note prior to 1808,
and those that did occur were apparently not oriented towards in
dependence.

Nevertheless, after that year the colony was subject to

a number of serious revolts of such a widespread nature as to sug
gest substantial discontent.

The sudden rise in the number of such

incidents indicates that the three centuries of Spanish rule had in
deed fostered problems which were profound and only thinly veiled.
To understand this situation and to place the panorama of Central
American independence in an historical perspective, it is necessary
to examine certain components of colonial life whose development was
critical to promoting an independence frame of mind among the Central
American leaders.

Political Development
Unlike her northern neighbor, Central America lacked many of
the rich pools of easily exploitable resources so common in New Spain.
Unaware of this, a surprisingly large number of persons vigorously
coveted the isthmus during the early years of the Spanish conquest.
In not finding the quick riches that they had anticipated, many left
for new horizons, leaving only the farmers, merchants, priests, and
6

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

bureaucrats to guide Central America's future.

Nevertheless, before

departing they had unknowingly established a political, religious,
and

economic

legacy that was to prove profoundly enduring.

At first representing only crude spheres of influence, the
territorial outlines of the republics extant in Central America today
were nonetheless visible as early as the 1520's.

Cortes' lieutenant,

Pedro de Alvarado, accompanied by the soldier-historian Bernal Diaz
del Castillo, was one of the first interlopers.

At first claiming

the entire isthmus for his own, he soon had to content himself with
1
that area which approximates present-day Guatemala.
Nicaragua was
carved out by Pedrarias who quickly instituted a reign of terror and
bizarre exploits which were long endured by the area's unfortunate
inhabitants.'’ Surprisingly,

the most sought after region was Honduras

where the Audiencia of Santo Domingo, the governor of Cuba, and Cortes
all claimed jurisdiction, a situation which was eventually cured
through royal intervention.

As such, the three major political divi

sions, Guatemala, Nicaragua,

and Honduras were formed whereas on a less

expansive scale, Costa Rica and Chiapas emerged through administra
tive decisions later in the sixteenth century.

El Salvador; however,

was destined to remain an appendage of Guatemala until 1786 when the
Intendency System was introduced.

3

^Ralpn Lee Woodward, Jr., Central America: A. Nation Divided
(New York: Oxford University PresTJ 1976), p. 2bl.
2

E. George Squier, Nicaragua (New York: Harper & Brothers,
Publishers, i860; reprint ed., New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1973), p. 161.
3
Woodward, Central America, p. 67.
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Cognizant of the confusion in authority and allegiances,
Spain authorized a number of early reorganizations.

Even so, it was

not until a 1567 cedula, or decree, arrived which established the
Captaincy-General of Guatemala that a durable and satisfactory ar
rangement was inagurated.

With a capital in the city of Santiago de

los Caballeros de Guatemala, it was to have complete jurisdiction
over all the territory from present-day Costa Rica to Chiapas.

Al

though technically subject to the Viceroy in New Spain, it was in
practice, more responsible to the crown.
The Captain-General was the highest, most powerful political
and administrative official in the colony.

His duties were many,

including the office of president of the Audiencia, or high court.
He decided upon conflicts in authority and judged whether they were
executive, judicial, Indian, or military in nature.

He was the in

spector-general of the entire legal system while at the same time
being the highest military authority in the colony.

Besides these

responsibilities, he was obliged to promote colonization, agriculture,
mining, and serve as the superintendent of public works and the Royal
Treasury.^
The most important administrative and judicial body in the
colony was the Audiencia.

Seated in Guatemala City and presided over

4
^
Robert S. Chamberlain, Francisco Morazan, Champion of Central
American Federation (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1950),
p. 9.
^Alberto Herrarte, La Union de Centroamerica (Tragedia y
Esperanza); Ensavo Politico-Social Sobre la Realidad de Centroamerica 2nd ed. (Guatemala: Centro Editorial del Ministro de
Educacion Publica, 1955), p. 99.
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by the Captain-General, it served as his advisory board and would
eventually evolve into a complicated legal institution.

At times re

ferred to as an Acuerdo or Tribunal Suprema, in the Captaincy-General
of Guatemala its central bureaucratic structure was comprised of four
oidores, or judges, and one fiscal, or attorney.
three categories of Audiencias:

Spanish law defined

the Virreinales, the Pretoriales,

and the Subordinados. Since Guatemala's Audiencia was established in
the capital of a Captaincy-General and because it was independent of
the Virreinales, it ranked as a Pretoriale.^

in general, it appears

that these august bodies conducted themselves honorably thus maintain
ing the good opinion of historians.7

In time, the Audiencias, whose

judges were royal appointees, evolved to the point where they exer
cised some legislative functions.

In one interesting example of early

checks and balances, they were responsible for conducting the CaptainGenerals' residencias, or investigations of the officials' conduct
while in office.
With the restructuring order of 1567, the territory was
divided into five provinces, Guatemala, Chiapas, Soconusco, Honduras,
and Nicaragua.

While Costa Rica was also recognized, its designation

was that of a gobierno, a rank somewhat lower than a province.

Ex

cept for Guatemala, which was under the authority of the CaptainGeneral, each provincial executive was a subordinate governor appointed

6

Ibid., p. 98.

7Ramon A. Salazar, Historia de Veinteun Anos: La Independencia
de Guatemala (Guatemala: Tipografla Nacional, 1923), p"! 14.
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by the crown.

Provincially, the major subdivisions were districts of

various grades and carried

titles such as Alcaldias or Corregimientos,

designations which seem to have been of equal importance.
Central Americans "lived in a number of different centers of
population; mostly in cities, towns, and villages, but also in
£smaller areas known colloquially as^ rancherias, valles, pajuides,
g

salinas, and others."

Severo Martinez Pelaez notas that colonial

cities were originally meant to be inhabited by only Spaniards while
the mestizos, or those of Spanish-Indian ancestry, and Indians were
confined to the surrounding areas.

Utilizing the 1778 census as a

guide, he writes that the major cities of colonial Central America
were Guatemala City (pop. 30,000), San Salvador and Leo"!! (pop.
20,000), Granada (pop. 10,000), Cartago (pop. 9,000), and Ciudad Real
9
(pop. approx. 6,000).
Urban government was in the hands of institutions called
cabildos, or municipal councils, of varying ranks of which there were
fifteen in Central America in 1810.^

In cities of primary importance,

municipal councils were given the royal title Ayuntamiento as in the
case of Guatemala City and Leon.

The Ayuntamientos normally had an

executive body comprised of two Alcaldes, or Mayor and vice-Mayor, an

8

/

Severo Martinez Pelaez, "Centroamerica en los Anos de la
Independencia: El Pais y Sus Habitantes," Anales de la Sociedad de
Geograf^a e Historia de Guatemala 47 (1974): 16.
9
Ibid.
10

Herrarte, p. 104.
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Alferez Real, or Royal Ensign, one Alguacil Mayor, or Chief Constable,
one Alcalde Provincial, or Provincial Judge, eight regidores, or
11
councilmen, and one sindico procurador, or clerk. “ Although the
rules governing the number of Ayuntamiento members were consistent,
there were times when exceptions were made.

For example, towards the

end of the colonial era, Cartago, in Costa Rica, requested an author
ization from the Audiencia permitting the establishment of an
Ayuntamiento with a reduced number of councilmen.

Although this re

quest was eventually granted, by 1800 only three of the offices had
been filled.

1’

The Guatemala City Ayuntamiento, which is often referred to
as "the family," had over the years evolved into a body of privileged
creole citizens, which surfaced most noticeably after the great earthquake of 1773.

13

Even so, it was by no means a rubber stamp institu

tion and, jealous of

its

privileges, "in many instances was bril

liant in defending its rights with dignity even before the omnipotent
authority cf the king."

11

14

Salazar, Historia, p. 15.

12

/
z
/
Cleto Gonzalez Viquez, "Historia del Regimen y Legislacion
Municipal de Costa Rica en el Siglo XIX," Revista de los Archivos
Nacionales de Costa Rica 19 (1938): 458.
13
Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., "Economic and Social Origins of
the Guatemalan Political Parties (1773-1823)," Hispanic American
Historical Review 45 (November, 1965): 545.
14

Herrarte, p. 104.
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In. the late 1780's the Intendent System was introduced in
Central America.

Initially, four divisions, or Intendencies, were

created (Comayagua, Leon, Ciudad Real, and San Salvador), each di
rected politically and economically by an Intendent Governor.
Guatemala remained a province under the supervision of the CaptainGeneral who also was to continue as the supreme authority over the
entire colony.

Costa Rica's position remained basically unchanged,

although her governor was elevated somewhat to where he had the same
functions as an Intendent except in financial matters.1"* Geograph
ically, each of the four Intendencies was divided into districts
called partidos or sub-delegaciones.
Brought to Spain and America by the Bourbon Monarchs, the
Intendent System was designed to answer a number of problems that
were perceived as important by these rulers.

The Intendents were to

"centralize, uniformize, rationalize, and better the total governing
system of the

n

a t i o

n

.

More specifically, however, they were in

tended to oversee the financial and military administration of the
colony and to "better coordinate the actions of the central and local
authorities and to systematize the activities of the subordinate
U
• •
» 17
authorities.

1^Hector Humberto Samoya Guevara, Implantacion del Regimen
de Intendencias en el Reino de Guatemala (Guatemala: Editorial del
Ministro de Educacion Publica "Jose' de Pineda Ibarra," 1960), p. 65.
16

Ibid., p. 163.

17
/
Rodrigo Facio B., "La Federacion Centroamericana," Revista
de los Archivos Nacionales de Costa Rica 5-6(March and April, 1939):
2 71 .
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Whether or not the Intendent System was successful in Central
America or not remains to be determined.

Rodrigo Facio 3. has noted

that the injudicious implementation of an Intendency in Honduras re
sulted in the "complete decay of mining, agriculture, and commerce in
the province.

„18

Nevertheless, another source, Troy S. Floyd, con

cludes that the mining industry in Honduras was characterized by enlightened, logical, and correct thinking.

19

Supporting Floyd's point

of view, gains in unification and order, plus notable improvements in
the public treasury were reported.

20

Scholars also continue to discuss the role played by the
Intendent System and its relation to Central American independence.
Some have noted that a central power figure (the Intendent) which
possessed broad military and economic powers probably increased pro
vincial autonomy while at the same time developing correspondingly
less allegiance to Spain.

21

Such was the case in El Salvador where a

lengthy period of interim Intendents allowed the creoles to become
influential in the government.
18

22

In this case, the only knowledgeable

Ibid., p. 272.

19

Troy S. Floyd, "Bourbon Palliatives and the Central American
Mining Industry, 1765-1800," The Americas 17 (October, 1961): 118
20
21
22

Herrarte, p. 100.
Woodward, Central America, p. 67.
/

/

/

Rodolfo Baron Castro, Jose Matias Delgado v el Movimiento
Insurgente de 1811 (San Salvador: Publicaciones del Ministro de
Educacion, 1962), p. 61.
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and consistent source of information and control rested in creole
institutions, thereby forcing the Spanish authorities to rely upon
them.
In opposition to this, Facio B., in quoting the Nicaraguan
scholar, Salvador Mendieta, states that "the Spanish colonial system
was calculated to stifle any nationalistic ideas."

23

Yet another

source is of the opinion that royal policies were meant "to destroy
all jurisdiction not visibly emanating from the crown."

■>4

Ernesto

Chinchilla Aguilar supports this view by noting that the Ayuntamientos
lost judicial, police, and financial powers and that some of their
officers were left with but one-third of their former responsibilities.25

Religious Development
The ecclesiastical development of the Spanish Empire was
seldom far behind the political maturation of the colonies.

As a

whole, the Spaniards were devout, staunch supporters of their religion
with the establishment of bishoprics in their respective provinces
being an important personal objective.

In Central America, Nicaragua

was awarded the first Middle American bishop in 1531 with Comayagua
and Guatemala receiving theirs a few years later in 1534.
23
24

The

Facio B., p. 2/1.
Herrarte, p. 103.

25

Ernesto Chinchilla Aguilar, 11 Ayuntamiento Colonial de
la Ciudad de Guatemala (Guatemala: Editorial Universitaria, 1961),
p. 188.
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completion of this level of religious expansion came in 1538 with the
appointment of a bishop in Chiapas.

Perhaps as a result of the Las'

Casas experiment there, a bishopric was also created for the province
of Vera Paz but this was abolished in 1607."

in Costa Rica, re

ligious affairs were under the authority of the Bishop of Nicaragua
and remained so until the early 1800's when it too was granted a
bishopric.
Although the Captaincy-General was technically under the
political jurisdiction of the Viceroyalty of New Spain a correspond
ing situation apparently did not exist on religious matters.

Royal

patronage was supervised by the Captain-General and any serious breach
of conduct brought a quick reprimand directly from the king.

27

Never

theless, the bishops enjoyed considerable autonomy throughout most of
the colonial period even though the Bishops of Guatamala City, it
being the capital, may have exercised some form of dominance.

There

is little doubt though that definite Guatemalan surzerainty probably
surfaced in 1742 when Pedro Pardo de Figueroa was appointed the first
Archbishop of the colony.

25

?S

*

Carlos Melendez, ed., Textos Fundamentales de la Independencia Centroamericana (Ciudad Universitaria, Rodrigo Facio, San Jose:
Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, EDUCA, 1971), p. 55.
27
Mary Patricia Holleran, Church and State in Guatemala (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1949; reprint ed., New York: Octagon
Books, 1974), p. 24.
28
,
,
J. Antonio Villacorta C., "Nomina Cronologica de los
Gobernantes de Guatemala," Anales de la Sociedad de Geografxa e
Historia de Guatemala 11 (June, 1935): n.p.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

16

Mandated to guide the more practical aspects of church busi
ness, a Cabildo Eclesiastico, or Church Council, was established
during the era of conquest.

Ramon Salazar notes that it resided in

the "capital of the bishopric" (Guatemala) and that it was composed
of a Dean, Archdeacon, Choir-Master, School Master, Treasurer, and
both penitent and leading priests.

29

Although its exact functions remain unclear, the Cabildo
Eclesiastico was nonetheless a durable institution and is recorded
as active in the 1820's.

On the other hand, Mary P. Holleran notes

its existence in 1537 when the Bishop of Mexico, Juan de Zumarraga,
ordered Bishop Marroquin of Guatemala to select the executive board.

30

As in other regions, the church in Central America is noted
for its accumulation of wealth and temporal power.

The outlaw priest,

Thomas Gage, wrote of unparalleled riches which may or may not have
been exaggerated.

31

Both Gage and Holleran imply a support of J.

Lloyd Mecham's comment that "the clergy dominated the colonial era
economically and politically."

32

But this presents a somewhat stilted

view of the many unsung efforts of the regular clergy which in many
cases were the only refuge available to the indigenous population.

29
30

Salazar, Historia, p. 18.

Holleran, p. 22.

31
J. Eric Thompson, Thomas Gage’s Travels in the New World
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press^ 1958,), pT l8S.
32
J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1934), p. 47.
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Their role not only in pacification but in a myriad of other ways,
including a critical place in the independence movements, remain as
yet unappreciated.
Commercial Development
The commercial life of colonial Central America was controlled
by Spanish mercantilist policy makers who tended to have an unsympa
thetic view of colonial problems.

Only minimum attention was given

to the needs of the Empire or even to the potential dangers to the
crown itself.

Policy was based on the desire to extract as much

wealth as possible from the colonies with no realistic knowledgeable
consideration given to Spain's economic or military posture.
While Spain's policies were not that much different from other
European powers, they did ignore three crucial areas which were
atypical of her neighbors.

First, Spain suffered from a weak in

dustrial base which by 1600 limited her ability to supply the col
onies.

Second, although the Spanish Empire possessed vast, unex

ploited riches, she possessed an inferior navy which, after 1588,
never posed a serious threat to her stronger contemporaries.

Third,

her merchant fleet was in such a poor state that trade was often
erratic and, of necessity, directed cowards more profitable enter
prises.

Thus, Central America, as a backwater market and producer

benefitted even less than normal from the supposedly profitable at
tachments to Spain.
When the first Europeans arrived, their immediate goal was
quick wealth and no time was wasted in exploiting the easiest and
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most lucrative forms of endeavor.

The numerous and seemingly in

satiable sugar plantations and mines constantly clamored for cheap
labor for which Costa Rica and Nicaragua become prime areas for
slaving raids of various origins.

Continuing until around 1730,

slaving, along with the great epidemics, was a major contributor to
a massive population decline which did not end until nearly 1700.
A number of persons also engaged in gold mining operations which,
for the most part, were confined to panning or surface endeavors
and depended upon an extensive labor force.

However, the mining

enterprises and slaving raids became less frequent as the Indian
population declined, forcing many Europeans to leave.
Faced with labor problems and technological obstacles, a
number of Spaniards turned to agriculture as an alternative.

In

their search for a profitable crop they settled upon cacao, the
major ingredient in chocolate.

This beverage was quickly becoming

a favorite throughout the Spanish dominions.
However, even though the Central American cacao, which had
been long grown by local Indians, was of a quality highly sought
after, the crown, which controlled the monopolies, soon allowed
the more readily available Caracas and Guayaquil product to enter
the market.

For Guatemala, this was especially disastrous in

that it effectively destroyed its one cash product.

Internally,

however, the seed remained an important staple on many levels.

For

example, in 1709 it was still an accepted medium of exchange in Costa
Rica.

Murdo J. MacLeon also notes its continued use as coin among
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certain Indian tribes "until the middle of the twentieth century."

33

By the late 1500's the demand for Guatemalan cacao had de
clined noticeably and colonial leaders were again forced to search
for another viable product.

Within a few years they had enthusiasti

cally adopted indigo, a dark blue dye, as a substitute.

But, due to

the introduction of English indigo, plus the development of synthetic
dyes, the Guatemalan product became subject to periods of stagnation
and neglect.

Nevertheless, it did remain an important product until

independence.
Towards the middle third of the seventeenth century, indigo
production entered into one of its periods of decay.

Out "of desper

ation" the Guatemalan merchants turned to openly trading with their
foreign counterparts to such an extent that by 1715 "contraband
dominated all forms of commerce in Central America."

34

So blatant

was the situation that one Captain-General notified the crown that
"the ports of this shore were used for no other purpose than as a
shelter for foreign ships and that the inhabitants of the whole
territory, including the clergy, the highest government officials,
35
were interested solely in illicit trade." J Since payment for the
contraband was normally in indigo, that industry was able to eventu
ally enter a minor period of resurgence that lasted into the 1800's.

33
Murdo J. MacLeod, Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic
History, 1520-1720 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973),
p. 386.
34Ibid.
35Ibid., p. 373.
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Thus, the Captaincy-General of Guatemala was a colony of only
periodic economic importance.

The political boundaries which would

endure even unto the present were well defined, and typically, the
church was politically, socially, and economically important.

Al

though commercially the colony was less than successful, it appears
that neither famine nor even hunger were commonplace.

That it was

neglected is highly probable but, even so, there were few murmurs of
discontent.

Education
A study of the school system in Central America suggests that
it was one of extreme contrasts.

For example, although there was

hardly a single elementary school in the provinces, in the capital
the University of San Carlos boasted a library of more than 5000
volumes.

Indeed, a second university was authorized for Leon around

1315 even while small towns were trying to drum up funds for a
teacher's salary.

Although education was not a high government

priority, San Carlos became a meeting ground for the most advanced
and enlightened persons in that area.

As such, these same thinkers

were able to impress their ideas on the minds of many future Central
American patriots.
But for the common man, the educational system in Central
America offered little hope and scholars are near universal in their
comments, few as they are, regarding the paucity of elementary schools.
Both Louis E. Bumgartner and Franklin D. Parker in their studies on
/

Jose Cecilio del Valle, the Honduran savant, note that as late as
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1800 there was not a single school in Tegucigalpa and in Comayagua
there "were no schools worthy of the name."

36

Nor was such a deso

late state confined to just the above localities.

In 1798 for ex

ample, the Secretary of one of the economic organizations requested
permission, and funds, to establish a primary school in Trujillo, a
major Caribbean port in Honduras.

A further example might be seen in

the town of Danli, which had to wait until 1814 for a school.

37

Be

cause of this situation, concerned parents were forced into maintain
ing some private schools on an informal basis.
In Nicaragua, education appeared to be somewhat more tradi
tional if sporadic.

During a great part of the colonial period a

Seminario Conciliar de Leon, or councilor seminary, was the only
learning establishment that existed in that province.

38

Sincethis

school was subsidized by funds donated by a number of persons,
students from all walks of life were accepted.

Teachers there were

paid from a variety of sources such as the colonial treasury and
student tuition.

39

f

36

See Louis E. Bumgartner, Jose del Valle of Central America
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1963), p. 8; and Franklin D. Parker,
Jose Cecillo del Valle and the Establishment of the Central American
Confederation (Tegucigalpa: Universidad de Honduras, 1954), p. 12.
37

Guillermo Mayes, Honduras en la Independencia de Centro
America y Anexion a Mexico (Tegucigalpa: Tipografia Nacional, 1956),
p. 15.
38

Chester Zelaya, Nicaragua en la Independencia (Ciudad
Universitaria, Rodrigo Facio, San Jose: Editorial Universitaria
Centroamericana, EDUCA, 1971), p. 59.
39

..
Ioia.
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The critical state of education in Central America can per
haps be best seen in Costa Rica.

In 1803, Governor Tomas de Acosta

wrote to the Audencia in Guatemala City that there was hardly a person
in the town of Heredia that could write.

Furthermore, he noted that

in the entire territory of La Alajuela, barely six subjects could be
found who could write and only three who were capable of being lieutenant governor.

40

Costa Rica was not without hope, however, since

the Casa de Ensenanza de Santo Tomas in San Jose was founded around
1800.
As might be expected, Guatemala City, as the social, admin
istrative, and economic center of the colony, fared better education
ally.

Here, it appears, most, if not all, of the elementary educa

tion was conducted by the religious orders located in the capital.
For example, there was a Franciscan house of studies with a special
section for youths which displayed scientific talent and the convents
of Nuestra Senora de la Merced and Nuestra Senora de Belen both maintained primary schools.

41

The Colegio de San Lucas, which had been

supported by the Jesuit order up to its expulsion in 1767, had, since
then, been placed under the protection of the Archbishop.

It is also

possible that an Indian School, the Colegio de Cristo Crucificado,
was an academy devoted to Indian instruction.
40
/
/ Ricardo Fernandez Guardia, La Independencia y Otros Episodios
(San Jose: Trejos Hermanos, 1928), p. 9.
41
'
Rafael Heliodoro Valle, ed., Pensamiento Vivo de Jose
Cecilio del Valle, 2nd ed., (Ciudad Universitaria Rodrigo Facio, San
Jose: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, EDUCA, 1971), p. 13.
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For girls there were also a few houses of instruction.

The

Beatario de Nuestra Senora del Rosario welcomed Indian girls to learn
the "womanly arts" while the 3eatario de Santa Rosa de Lima instructed
the "daughters of the first families" in sewing, cooking, reading, and
embroidery.

Finally, two schools, the Colegio de la Presentacio^ de

Nuestra Senora and the Colegio del Visitacion de Nuestra Senora taught
girls religion, reading, writing, cooking, :.nd "other womanly duties
An economic organization also conducted a number of promising
efforts in the fields of culture and trade education during the latter
1790's.

A school of mathematics, for example, was opened under the

directorship of Captain of Engineers, Jose de Sierra.

In attempting

to obtain the best talent available, Fr. Jose Antonio de la Huerta y
Caso was employed there until he left in 1798 to become Bishop of Lean
whereupon his place was taken by Miguel Larreinago, a future leader in
the Central American independence movements.

43

An example of the ded

ication to quality was the art school which was founded in 1797.

Here

the organizers utilized the talents of Pedro Garci-Aguirre, the treas
ury engraver, and of the miniaturist, Cabera.

This was a popular en

deavor which soon forced the rental of more rooms which were shortly
filled to capacity.

42

44

,
Holleran, p. 50.

^Eduardo Perez Valle, "Miguel de Larreynaga," in Proceres
de la Independencia Centroamericana, ed. Carlos Melendez (Cipdad
Universitaria Rodrigo Facio, San Jose: Editorial Universitaria
Centroamericana, EDUCA, 1971), p. 294.
^Elisa Luaue Alcaide, La Sociedad Economica de Amigos del
Pais de Guatemala. (Sevilla: Consejo Superior de Investgaciones
Cientificas, Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1962), p. 113.
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While classes were held in politics, economics, bookkeeping,
languages, and drafting, a major emphasis was placed on the schools
• •
J
45
or spinning and weaving.

Designed to promote a nascent textile in

dustry, they were considered indispensable.

Just how necessary they

were can be seen when the spinning schools were closed as too ex
pensive.

In this case the tenacious promoters were able to maintain

three small sub-schools in different barrios throughout the city.

46

This was not just an isolated example for even after the promoting
organization was disbanded in 1799, a few dedicated members were able
to keep the art, mathematics, and spinning schools open.
In comparison, Central American higher education was operated
in a much more professional and dedicated fashion.

Indicative of this

is the often stated opinion that almost without exception, every
architect of Central American independence attended the University of
San Carlos.

47

Taken in context, this implies a correlation between

the University and an atmosphere conducive to independent nonconform
ist thought.

If true, then what conditions existed that allowed such

a state to develop?
In a fundamental sense, an ambiance of independence was gen
erated from the governing structure of the university.

Its regula

tions strictly prohibited any civil or ecclesiastical violation of

-O
Woodward, Central America, p. 32.
46

Luque Alcaide, p. 106.

47
/
Melendez, p. 183.
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its autonomy and, tc meet this end, only university alumni could
elect important officials.

48

A further guarantee was that the

Rectorship was forbidden to any high civil officials and, hopeful
of maintaining the tradition of freedom in teaching, any member of
a religious order.

49

/

Jose Mata Gavidia is of the opinion that the Rector was more
a figurehead than anything else and the real governing was done
through claustros, or committees.

For example the Claustro de

Diputados decided on economic matters whereas on administrative and
educational concerns the Claustro Ordinario governed.

And finally,

on matters of extreme importance and on filling professorships, a
Claustro Pleno was consulted.^®
Although the physical and bureaucratic aspects of the school
were indeed important in creating a certain mentality in its gradu
ates, it would have accomplished little without a faculty capable of
complementing its liberal structure.

Fortunately, the last decades

of the nineteenth century witnessed the coalescing of a number of edu
cators at San Carlos which did exactly that.

Although a certain

amount of opposition to university reform did exist, it is generally
agreed that a liberal blueprint engineered by Fr. Antonio Liendo y
Goicoechea of Cartago was readily accepted.^
43
49

Ibid., p. 187.
Ibid.

^Ibid. , p. 136.
"^Valle, Pensamiento, p. 14.
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At a time "when judges were still prosecuting witches" .the
University or San Carlos was forging ahead with a modern curriculum.

52

Propelled by Fr. Goicoechea's classes in experimental physics, an
enlightened effort was made to introduce the "great works of the
natural philosophers."i.53

In medicine for example, Dr. Narciso

Esparragza y Gallardo was introducing new surgical techniques and had
inaugurated smallpox vaccination.

54

Also in medicine, the Chiapan,

/

Dr. Jose Felipe Flores, known even in Europe, conducted classes in
medicine which were considered to have been better than those offered
on the continent.33

Interestingly, a colleague of Flores,

Dr. Pedro

Molina, became one of the principal leaders of the Central American
independence movement.
As in other areas of the colony, the University of San Carlos
was plagued with continual financial woes.

In 1308, for example, the

Rector notified Spain of the "ruinous and decadent state of the
University."

Professors' salaries had barely increased since its

founding in 1678 and one Audiencia judge earned more than all the
professors put together.

To make ends meet, university officers re

sorted to "many petty devices" in order "to lay hold of extra small
sums" and numerous campaigns were run to raise monies in the early
52

Ibid.

^Bumgartner, del Valle of Central America, p. 16.
54

Ibid., p. 19.

^Ibid., p. 17.
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In spite of this, the University of San Carlos vibrated with
a newness and anticipation.

The freedom of expression among both

faculty and student body gave birth to a spirit of criticism and prin
ciples which were often in opposition to the absolutist government in
Spain.

Between 1780 and 1800 the "intellectual revolution in

Guatemala was reaching its peak" as new scientific and philsophic
theories produced an anti-authoritarian atmosphere that years later
would manifest itself as opposition to Spanish dominance.

58

The Press
Under the tutelage of many of the above luminaries, colonial
journalism took giant strides forward after 1795.

In that year the

only Central American newspaper extant at that time, La Gaceta de
Guatemala, became the spokesman for the Sociedad Economica de los
Amigos del Pais de Guatemala, an economic organization which will be
discussed later.

While La Gaceta came to openiy criticize a number

of areas it also offered at the same time suggestions for improvement.
Its pages carried discussions on land redistribution plus Indian and
colonial problems, along with their possible solutions which were
scientifically explored.

Although it would eventually fade, as did

56
John Tate Lanning, The University in the Kingdom of Guatemala
(Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1955), pp. 802-304.57
Mayes, p. 21.
58

Bumgartrier, del Valle of Central America, p. 16.
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the Sociedad Economica, it established standards for other periodicals
which would surface just prior to independence.
Although Guatemala City was the fourth city in the Spanish
colonies to receive a printing press, prior to La Gaceta most publications were confined to religious tracts.

59

It was not until 1785,

when Ignacio Beteta purchased a press, that the fortunes of Central
American journalism improved.

Even so, Beteta waited until June 18,

1793 before he petitioned Captain-General Martinez for a license to
publish a monthly Gaceta which would maintain a format similar to
that of El Mercurio in Peru.

He argued that a newspaper was necessary

for the betterment of the colony, that very few periodicals even arrived in Guatemala and then only government employees read them.

60

Beteta received tentative permission to publish a Gaceta on
July 5, 1793.

At the same time notice was also given that the

Captain-General's secretary, Mariano Ezeta, was to act as its official
censor.

This action was shortly approved in Spain which only cau

tioned that care be taken as to what was printed and requesting that
copies be sent there for official scrutiny.^
59
J. Antonio Villacorta C., "Epitome de la Historia de la
Imprenta en Guatemala Durante la Colonia," Anales de la Sociedad de
Geografia y Historia de Guatemala 12 (March, 1936): 281.
60
„
,
David Vela, La Gaceta de Guatemala, Segundo Periodico de
America," Anales de la Sociedad de Geografia e Historia de Guatemala
17 (June, 1942): 466.
'
61

Ibid.
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After a precarious beginning which included sporadic delivery
and even a brief suspension in 1796, La Gaceta reappeared in 1797 with
a new format and more vitality.

62

It contained more provincial news,

articles on culture, geography, history, medicine and even some creole
literary efforts.

Furthermore it had also changed to a weekly and ar

rangements were made for better distribution.

The cause of all of

this ferment was La Gaceta1s twenty-year-old editor, Alejandro Ramirez,
secretary to the Audiancia and a member of the Sociedad Economica.
Support and guidance also came from Fr. Jacobo de Villa Urrutia, a
/
63
judge of the Audiencia and Director of the Sociedad Economica.
Especially under Villa Urrutia, and comparable to their
efforts in education, the Sociedad Economica was a staunch defender
of the press.

In 1798, for example, by order of the Captain-General,

La Gaceta was suppressed for reasons as yet unclear.

This might have

happened because it had become a champion of a number of liberal
ideas and had criticized Central American commerce as "slow, lazy,
and debilitating."

64

It had even gone so far as to question royal

succession to the throne.^

The suppression order was soon rescinded

however on February 7, 1798, perhaps due to pressure exerted by in
fluential citizens.^

Judge Villa Urrutia, for example, had forwarded

62Ibid., p. 468.
63TIbid.
.
^Luque Alcaide, p. 468.
6:5Ibid., p. 157.
66

Ibid., p. 122.
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a stern letter to Spain in which he defended La Gaceta as a useful
organ which exposed "the egotism, the monoply, the abuses, and the
political, economical, and moral errors which were holding up national
progress.

„67

The intense interest in maintaining a periodical, at

least as far as the Sociedad Economica was concerned, can be seen in
Villa Urrutia's statement that "without a newspaper on which to
voice its ideas and programs" the Sociedad Economica "would be an
obscure and inert body."

68

Perhaps La Gaceta1s most controversial period began in 1804
when Simon Bergano y Villegas became its editor.

Destined to be tried

for sedition before the Inquisition, Bergano often criticized insti
tutions which had long been considered sacred.^

The large land

holders, for example, were alienated when he claimed their holdings
were detrimental to the public welfare and when he proposed a system
of land redistribution to correct the problem.

70

In noting the apal-

ling state of the Indian he carried on a favorite discussion of the
then disbanded Sociedad Economica.
67
68

Even the progressive University

Ibid., p. 125.
Ibid., p. 121.

69
y
David Vela, "Bosquejo de la Vida Azarosa y Pasional del Lie.
Jose Francisco Barrundia, Pricer de la Independencia Centroamericana,"
Anales de la Sociedad de Geografia e Historia de Guatemala 15
(December, 1938): 176.
70

Bumgartner, del Valle of Central America, p. 34.

71
Parker, del Valle and the Establishment, p. 19.
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of San Carlos did not escape his questioning eye.

In this case he

questioned the use of Latin in the lectures and called the law curriculum worse than useless.

72

So infamous was La Gaceta under Bergano

that on January 8, 1806, Archbishop Luis Penalver y Cardenas denounced
the newspaper for its satires on certain persons, and for articles
73
"that excite the carnal passions."
Thus pre-Napoleonic Central America

noted the existence of

both an independent university and a free press.

Complementing these

institutions were men of advanced ideas, who in many instances af
fected membership in both.

Many university graduates or instructors,

for example, maintained close connections to La Gaceta through their
association with the Sociedad Economica.
least it would seemthat many of these same
pendence fearlessly

Logically then, at the very
men could approach inde

albeit if in asomewhat confused manner.

The Merchants and Commercial Organizations
By 1799 there were four important commercial entities in the
colony:

the merchants, the Consulado de Comercio, a Merchant Guild,

the Sociedad Economica de los Amigos del Pais de Guatemala, the
Economic Society of

the Friends ofGuatemala, and the Sociedad de

los Cosecheros de Anil, the Indigo Grower’s Society.
Concerning the merchants-, during the last half of the 1700's
a number of individuals arrived in the Captaincy-General of Guatemala

72

Bumgartner, del Valle of Central America, p. 25.

^Ibid., p. 35.
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who were destined to have a profound effect on the commercial life of
the colony.

Groomed to one degree or another in the commercial houses

of Cadiz and Seville were such well-known Central Americans as Juan
Baptista de Irisarre, Martin Barrundia, Josef Pinol, Cayetano Pavon,
Diego Peinado, and Juan Fermin Aycinena all of whom were to maintain
strong financial connections in those cities.

74

These relationships

were so durable that 75 years later they were still extant.
Complementing these arrivals was the earthquake of 1773 which
destroyed the old city of Guatemala (now Antigua).

The disaster

caused the ruination of "some of the leading merchants" of the city
and help create an atmosphere "where paved the way for a new social
■ 75
and economic order."

Once a new capital city was established,

ample opportunities presented themselves for "capable and fortunate
individuals" such as those named above.

They joined with some of the

old-city aristocrats and produced a new colonial elite eventually re
ferred to as "the family" and led by Juan

A y c e n i n a . ^

Many of the Guatemalan merchants were related either through
ties of marriage or finance.

An astute group, by 1775 they had estab

lished a formidable power base.

As in so often the case, a "bond of

common interest between merchants and municipal officials and consider
able overlapping in the membership of the cabildo, or the city council

74
Troy S. Floyd, "The Indigo Merchant: Promoter of Central
American Economic Development, 1750-1808," Business and History Review
39 (Winter, 1965): 468.
Woodward, "Economic and Social Origins," p. 5^5.
76

Ibid., p. 546.
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and the body of merchants" was also established. 77

From the beginning,

and to this end, the merchants had purchased various positions in the
Guatemala City Ayuntamiento, or at the very least, had been continu
ously influential in that body.

Juan Fermin Aycinena, for example,

served "two decades" and Cayetano Pavon for "sixteen years" on that
same municipal body.

78

Nevertheless, this was not necessarily a

negative or suppressive activity.

For as Floyd points out, they

developed a sense of "civic responsibility" and became the "leaders
of Guatemalan society" if for no other reason than self-preservation.
It should also be pointed out that a certain appreciation of royal
institutions existed and as such loyalty to the crown was strong.

79

A threat to the dominance of the merchant aristocrats•on
certain levels came from a group that Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr. calls
a "middle class" of merchants.

80

Although not admitted to the of

ficial family for one reason or another, the turn of the century saw
their numbers and influence grow at a noticeable rate.

So strong

was their presence that the family-dominated Ayuntamiento petitioned
the crown for an exception to the rule disallowing dual participation
as municipal officers and members of the ruling body of the merchant
guild.

This request was made after their control of the Ayuntamiento

77
Robert S. Smith, "Origins of the Consulado of Guatemala,"
Hispanic American Historical Review 26 (1946): 152.
78
Floyd, "The Indigo Merchant," p. 432.
79

Ibid., p. 481.

30
Woodward, "Economic & Social Origins," p. 549.
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had been lost due to the political tactics of those same middle class
merchants.^
Support for the erection of an organization to represent
merchant interests had long existed in Central America.

The fore

runner of such an establishment has been noted as early as April 22,
1779, when a meeting of Guatemala City merchants elected four of their
company to represent merchant interests.

8’

A second step towards the

formation of a guild was taken during October of 1787 when permission
was received allowing meetings preparatory to the creation of a
merchant society.

Shortly after this, a petition was forwarded to

Spain requesting approval of the establishment of a Consulado de
Comercio.

Permission to do so was eventually granted by Spain on

December 11, 1793 and received in Guatemala City on April 14, 1794.
The royal approval for the creation of a Consulado de
Comercio stipulated regulations that were essentially the same as
those assigned to similar guilds located in other areas of the empire.
Therefore, whereas the Guatemalan merchants had requested a member
ship limited to the 54 signers of the original request, the rules
called for it to be opened to all merchants, plus importers, ex
porters, and certain ships' captains.

Expanding upon this, a year

83
later, the guild was opened to include growers and landholders also.

8L,.,
Ibid.
82

Smith, "Origins," p. 153.

83
Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., Class Privilege and Economic
Development: The Consulado de Comercio of Guatemala, 1793-1S7!
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 9.
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Control of this institution was important to the dominant merchants
and to this end a considerable effort was expended by them, not always with expected results.

84

The Consulado de Comercio1s responsibilities were, as else
where, established by royal order.

It was to be governed by a prior,

two consuls, nine councilmen, one syndic, a secretary, an accountant,
and a treasurer.

Located outside of the capital in the major popu

lation centers were sixteen deputy judges who presided over commer
cial disputes in distant areas.^

The Consulado de Comercio was

divided into two autonomous sections: a Tribunal, which presided over
commercial cases, and a Junta de Comercio, or Commercial Board, which
was concerned with the development of commerce in the colony.
The Tribunal heard an average of fifty cases a year between
the years 1803 and 1815 on a variety of topics.

Not a self-protection

agency, there were a number of cases in which merchants

who

had

been tried for smuggling had, after being convicted, had their goods
confiscated and auctioned off as a fine.

86

At other times, cases be

tween "merchants, landowners and planters concerning the sale and
purchase of commercial effects and products for export" were heard.

84
Woodward, "Economic and Social Origins," p. 548.
85
86

Salazar, Historia, p. 17.

Woodward, Class Privilege, p. 26.

87

Ibid., p. 23.
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The responsibilities of the Consulado were twofold.

It was

to provide the "briefest and easiest administration of justice in
mercantile litigations" and it was to direct its attention towards
the "protection and development of credit in all its aspects."

88

Under these directives, it was expected to undertake public work
projects, road and harbor construction, establish new settlements,
improve river navigation, and uncover business problems and economic
needs.

89

Considering the needs, it appears that little substantial

improvement was accomplished in any of the above areas.
To further develop the colony's economy, a second organiza
tion, the Sociedad Economica de Amigos del Pais de Guatemala, was
established by a ce^ula dated October 21, 1795.

A kind of intellec

tual counterpart to the Consulado de Comercio, it was first proposed
by the Dominican priest, Fr. Jacobo Villa Urrutia who, as a judge of
the Audiencia, was very much interested in reversing the economic
90
stagnation of Central America. . To this end he proposed to the crown
/

that a Sociedad Economica be established as had been done in other
parts of the empire.

He also enlisted the assistance of the enlight

ened intelligencia of the colony.
88

89

Among the founding fathers of the

Ibid., p. 13.
Smith, "Origins," p. 159.

^Arturo Valdes Oliva, "Fueron Determinantes para la
Independencia los Movimientos de Tipo Politico en el Reino de
Guatemala al Principios del Siglo XIX," Anales de la Sociedad de
Geografia e Historia de Guatemala 46 (1973): 77.
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Sociedad Economica were such luminaries as Jose Flipe Flores, Antonio
Garcia Redondo, Jose/ Sierra, Juan Ignacio Barrios, Francisco and
Martin Barrundia, Alejandro Ramirez, Fr. Goicoechea, Simon Bergano
y Villegas plus the artists Cabrera and Pedro Carei-Aguirre.

91

Structurally the Sociedad Economica was governed by a director
and sub-director plus the usual complement of officers.

However,

because of its extensive mandate, it was necessary for it to divide
itself into a number of juntas, or committees, each of which addres
sed a particular issue.

This mandate specified that it was to

"promote the advancement of the colony in all the branches of human
activity:

commerce, industry, agriculture, the sciences, the arts,

public instruction, etc."

9?

Membership expanded rapidly and soon included persons in
Mexico plus clusters of corresponding members in various towns and
cities of size.

With a judge and secretary of the Audiencia as

members, the way was open to include government officials plus other
persons from a variety of occupations.

93

Of major importance was the

inclusion of the religious community, which, as a collaborator,
"never refrained from any possible advancement . . . for their
parishes."

94

Indicative of clerical interest can be seen in 1813

91
✓
Jorge Mario Garcxa Laguardia, Origenes de la Democracia
Constitucional en Centroamerica, 2nd ed. (Ciudad Universitaria
Rodrigo Facio, San Jose: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana,
EDUCA, 1976), p. 53.
9?
“Parker, del Valle and the Establishment, p. 17.
93
94

Luque Alcaide, p. 56.
Ibid., p. 104.
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when the Archbishop of Guatemala became director.

95

A further ex-

/

pansion came when the Sociedad Economica associated itself with a
Junta de Correspondencia, or corresponding Board, in Trujillo and
the Asociacio'n ds Damas Leonesas, or che Association of Ladies of Leon.^
As befitted its mandate, the Sociedad Economica's efforts were
wide-ranging and numerous.

Its support was critically important to

the success of La Gaceta, an organ which was frequently used to voice
its ideas.

An example of this can be seen in the proposal to use

Spanish in University lectures rather than Latin.

97

Also, a number

of schools were begun with the greatest attention being given those
concerned with the textile industry.

At a spinning school in

Guatemala City, for example, apprentices were paid and prizes offered
as a stimulant for quality work.

98

And at Pinala, Fr. Vincente

Guillen taught young ladies spinning techniques with the use of a
spinning wheel, a relatively new instrument there.

99

Such efforts

were maintained even after the disbanding of the Sociedad Economica
and strongly suggests a deep sense of responsibility on the part of
the membership.
95

Closely allied to these efforts, and as proof of the

Ibid., p. 69.

^Ibid., p. 118.
"^Garcia Laguardia, p. 58.
98

Luque Alcaide, p. 105.

99
/
Garcia Laguardia, p. o7.
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thoroughness with which the Sociedad Economica approached a topic, was
the introduction of flax seeds from S p a i n . L o c a l priests were sent
instructions on how to grow better flax and an equipment exposition
was held.

Also prizes and other inducements were offered to pro

ducers of exceptionally fine examples.
Other areas of agriculture also received consideration by the
Sociedad Economica.

The reintroducticn of cacao was being studied

in 1797 and, in fact, a plantation was operated in Suchitepequez for
this purpose.

In other districts, prizes were offered to anyone who

planted 500 or more cacao trees.

10’
“

Jose Maria Peinado, a future

independence leader, introduced silk worms from Oaxaca, and the
eternally active Alejandro Ramirez brought in cinnamon, canfor,
mango seeds, breadfruit, sugar cane, and new species of birds from
Jamaica.

103

✓
The Sociedad Economica also supported a botanical

garden, a natural history museum and proposed a scientific expedition
to study the Central American fauna.

104

Mysteriously, and for reasons not yet fully understood, the
Sociedad Economica was suppressed in a cedula dated November 23, 1799.
Different scholars have suggested a number of causes, all of which

^^Luque Alcaide, p. 101.
101

u Ibid., p. 103.

102

Garcia Laguardia, p. 57.

103 . . ,
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Ibid., p. 58.
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Parker, del Valle and the Establishment, p. 17.
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may have played a part.

Elisa Luque Alcaide says that perhaps it

was "some hidden personal reasons or the aversion to philanthropic
i n s t i t u t i o n s . A n o t h e r authority proposes that a request and sub
sequent permission for the erection of a Mexican Sociedad Economica
was somehow instrumental in causing the "Minister of Justice, Don
/

Jose Antonio Caballero" in Spain, to cancel the Guatemalan institution.

106

Financial woes exist as yet a third possibility.

The

Sociedad Economica gained sustenance from a variety of sources in
cluding dues of four, six, or eight pesos a month, voluntary donation,
107
raffles, and even government supported lotteries."

These funds do

appear to have been insufficient since basic debts were left unpaid
after the disbandment, and may have caused a kind of bankruptcy.

108

Nevertheless, the most likely cause for suppression is the
one suggested by Woodward.

In expanding upon all of the above theses

he suggests that the Sociedad Economica's liberalism was a basic fault
since it threatened traditional institutions.

This explanation seems

most probable since the basic premise of such an institution is change
and this is often viewed as a threat to established powers.

Of equal

importance is that the Sociedad Economica attracted members who at

^^Luque Alcaide, p. 59.
^^Valdes Oliva, "Fueron Determinantes," p. 78.
Ibid.
10S

Luque Alcaide, p. 62.
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times proposed measures that aroused official displeasure.

Not only

were the rules of succession and Indian laws criticized, but a con
stitutional monarchy was seriously discussed also.

So stirred up was

the Spanish hierarchy that the regent of the Audiencia noted that the
"Gaceta and Sociedad Economica were a seminary of republicanism.
/

The Sociedad Economica unfortunately ceased to exist except
for a flurry of activity after 1800.

Officially re-established on

July 12 of that year, its former enthusiasm was noticeably absent.
New activities involving tanning, honey, cochineal, and resin were
begun but soon floundered.

An independent periodical commenced

publishing in 1815 only to fade shortly.

Bearing little fruit, the

last known meeting was held on October 25, 1818.
Predating the Consulado de Comercio by over ten years, but
suggesting a long standing effort to offset merchant-financed
strengths and abuses, was the creation of the Sociedad de Cosecheros
de Anil on September 2, 1782.

Before this, the indigo growers, like

the miners and cattlemen, were forced to obtain financial relief
through the offices of the Guatemala City merchants.

Loans on crops,

for the procurement of certain goods such as quicksilver, and for the
exportation of their commodities were constantly n e e d e d . O n a

"^^Garcia Laguardia, p. 67.
^^Woodward, Class Privilege, p. 41.
Ill

Miles Wortman, "Government Revenue and Economic Trends in
Central America, 1787-1819," Hispanic American Historical Review 55
(May, 1975): 255.
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provincial basis, this constant indebtedness created feelings of dis
content augmented by the merchants' practice of interfering with
price fixing policies.

For this, and as part of the decree estab

lishing the Sociedad de Cosecheros, a Montepio, or financing in
stitution, was established to provide loans to the provincial growers
which lessened their dependence on themerchants.
of 100,000 pesos

The initialamount

was financed from theroyal treasury and was to be

-j from
*
repaid
export taxes. 112
Unfortunately however, by 1790 the indigo industry had begun
a slow but consistent decline causing the fund to collapse.

Further

damage to the grower's association's effectiveness came from the
evolution of a mellowing of grower-merchant relations wherein the
merchants became
Thus, in

113
far more "tractable."
the years just before

Napoleon invaded Spain,

Central America witnessed the introduction of a new class, the creole
merchant-princes, who although aware of the colony's problems, were
either unwilling or unable to commit themselves to a solution.

The

Consulado de Comercio held promise but it also reflected merchant in
ability to provide large sums that were needed to correct the myriad
problems that faced the colony.
The Sociedad Economica also suffered financial woes and may
even have spent itself out of existence.

Like a rocket, it gained an

11?
“Woodward, "Economic and Social Origins," p. 547.
113

Floyd, "The Indigo Merchant," p. 479.
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enthusiastic ascendency only to fail disappointingly, perhaps a
victim of official intrigue.

Because of its acceptancy of new ways

and ideas, its acceptance of social and political innovation, and
the thoroughness with which it approached problems, the Sociedad
/

Economica might very well have been the answer Central America needed
Unfortunately, little is known of the Sociedad de Cosecheros
de Anil.

Questions remain on its governing structure, its activities

its finances, and its demise.

Nevertheless, in a colony very much

dominated by one province, Guatemala, it stands out as a local
attempt to negate the powers of the merchant-aristocrats.
The role played by these groups in paving the way towards
Central American independence is difficult to assess.

Importantly

though, many of the persons involved in the commercial pursuits of
the colony were highly educated with many having been granted degrees
at the University of San Carlos where they were exposed to its in
novative methods.

Therefore, while they might outwardly espouse a

certain political viewpoint, the degree to which new ways were ac
cepted was at the very least, greater than before, and while the
Sociedad Economica may not have been a seminary of republicanism,
the free flow and discussion of alternatives certainly opened the
door to greater toleration.

The magnitude of these feelings is es

pecially noticeable when during the 1830's a number of truly excep
tional reforms were attempted.
In essence then, the economic institutions or even their con
siderations may not have played an outwardly significant role in
Central American independence.

They were nonetheless, building block
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contributors towards attaining that goal even though at that par
ticular time the very thought of independence might have been
abhorrent to most.
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CHAPTER I I I

CONSEQUENCES OF THE FRENCH INVASION

In laying at the feet of Napoleon the crown worn by Isabel
the Catholic and Carlos V, the disgraceful successors of
these great kings delivered a stroke of death to the prestige
of the Spanish monarchy in its American colonies.
Napoleon’s invasion of Spain in 1808 set into action certain
events which would culminate in the total separation of Central
America from the Mother Country.

Unconsciously building upon the

enlightened atmosphere already extant in the colony, the political
and social rights authorized by a new constitution permitted an al
most euphoric growth in expectations.

These same expectations were

not easily forgotten even after they were viciously and unjustly
torn away in 1814.

And although temporarily thwarted, Guatemalan

patriots only needed to be patient until a second opportunity pre
sented itself.

The French Invasion
At its height, Napoleonic hegemony in the early 1800's was
indeed extensive.

It included the combined kingdoms of Italy, the

Confederation of the Rhine, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, all of
which were aligned under the Grand Empire.
countries also belonged while
ent.

Most other European

only England remained truly independ

She alone was strong enough to inflict a severe defeat on

France at Trafalgar in October of 1805.

To this Napoleon responded

^■■^Fernandez Guardia, La Independencia, p. 7.
45
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with his Continental System,

an economic measure under which

European ports were closed to English goods.
Although impotent, Spain's position was nevertheless one of
importance and was probably even considered essential to the very
success of the Continental System.

Even so, Napoleon remained unchar

acteristically hesitant as to what course to follow with either Spain
or Portugal.
After lengthy consideration he came to a decision by late
1807.

His only alternative, as he saw it, was to turn Spain into a

"satellite s t a t e . E x a c t l y why this particular decision was made
is still not yet fully understood, but there seems little doubt that
he distrusted the Spanish court and viewed the entire affair there
as irredeemable.

One alternative that he had apparently considered

was to try to maneuver Fernando into the role of puppet and thereby
rule vicariously.

But since Fernando had gone as far as actively

conspiring for the overthrow of his father, he was justifiably
suspect.

Furthermore, any chance of Carlos going along with this

plan was probably small since at one point he had suggested to
Napoleon that someone other than Fernando be considered as the next
,.
116
king.

Indicative of his de facto involvement, Bonaparte had also
been requested by both Carlos and Fernando

to supply a proper wife

*^See Gabriel H. Lovett, Napoleon and the Birth of Modern
Spain, 2 vols., (n.p.: New York University Press, 1965}, 1: 86; and
Raymond Carr, Spain, 1808-1939, (London: Oxford University Press,
1966), p. 81.
^^Garcia Laguardia, p. 102.
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for the heir apparent.

This could have been a plan that Napoleon had

initially preferred but it never reached fruition since by then other
factors had caused him to decide upon a military occupation.
Primary among such considerations was that such an action might, if
correctly timed, and properly executed, insure the deliverance of
the Kingdom of Portugal, his principal goal.

Such an occupation

would insure the official closure of the remaining European ports to
English products.

Spain's loyalty in this effort was gained from the

promise that she would be given Portugal and its dominions as a prize.
It proved astonishingly easy to introduce the French armies
into Spain.

On October 17, 1807, the Treaty of Fountainbleau between

Spain and France had been signed and contained among other things, an
article which allowed for the movement of French troops across the
Iberian peninsula with the secret objective of invading Portugal.
The attack was to be accomplished by 30,000 French soldiers augmented
by an equal number of Spanish troops.

A second French army of 40,000

was to wait in readiness in the city of Bayonne, just across the
border in France.

118

The combined Franco-Spanish force defeated the Portuguese
armies during engagements fought in late November 1807, forcing the
flight of the House of Braganza to Brazil.

117

119

Once this was

Lovett, 1:88.

y

118

Pedro Aguado and Cayetano Alcazar Molina, Manual de la
Historia de Espana, 3 vols., 8th ed., (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, S.A.,
1959), 3:242.
119

Ibid., 3: 244.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

48

accomplished, Napoleon then audaciously ordered the full scale in
vasion of Spain from France.

In December, a large number of French

troops began entering Spain to the point where by March, 1808, there
were more than 100,000 of Napoleon’s soldiers on the peninsula.

In

the time it took to accomplish the occupation not one serious ob
jection was made by Spanish authorities.
Once the French designs were clear, Carlos began to give
serious consideration to following the Portuguese monarch and his
family to the New World.

When this became public knowledge a serious

rebellion broke out in Aranjuez, the then current site of the Spanish
court.

Considering this and at the same time fearing for the life of

the unpopular royal favorite, Manuel Godoy, Carlos abdicated the
Spanish throne in favor of Fernando on March 17, 1808.

This was im

mediately seen as an unfortunate decision and a few days later an
unsuccessful attempt was made to retract it.

120

So great was the

national revulsion that Carlos' repudiation of his abdication was
not accepted and Fernando entered Madrid as King of Spain on March
24, 1808.
A short time after this Napoleon invited the two feuding
monarchs to meet with him in Bayonne, ostensibly to set their affairs
in order.

Before departing, Carlos and Fernando, who were by then

both claiming the right to the throne, left the Spanish government
in the care of two different proxies.

Fernando assigned his powers

to a Junta de Gobierno, or Governing Committee, while Carlos on the

120

Lovett, 1: 107.
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other hand appointed Napoleon's brother-in-law, Marshall Jean Murat,
Lieutenant-General of the Realm, a position of absolute power that he
would hold until Napoleon's brother, Joseph, became King of Spain on
July 9, 1808.111
Arriving in Bayonne, Carlos and Fernando were both soon
forced into abdicating all claims to the Spanish throne to Napoleon's
designee as of May 5, 1808.

But this did not clear the way for an

uneventful French domination of Spain however.

By this point the

entire peninsula was taking its first steps towards a total revolt
against the French.

The Central American Reaction
In Central America the Spanish officials there were very much
aware of what was happening in Europe.

However, being sensitive to

the public morale, the authorities were selective in their choice of
exactly what information was to be given out for public consumption.
For example, Captain-General Mollinedo, who knew of Fernando's
October revolt, chose to keep the public ignorant of the matter.

122

But on August 14, 1808, when a confidential communication from Viceroy
Jose/ de Iturrigaray of New Spain was received in Guatemala which told
of the French invasion, he not only let the information be printed
but he also convoked a meeting of the most distinguished citizens to
discuss the matter.

121

122

This gathering included the members of the

Ibid., Is 121.
/

Garcia Laguardia, p. 102.
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Audiencia, The Archbishop, the Cabildo Eclesiastico, the local
Ayuntamiento, prelates of the convents, military officials, Treasury
officers, university leaders, members of the Consulado de Comercio,
and the Intendent of Comayagua.

As the most influential private

citizen, the Marques de Aycinena was also invited.

123

Surprised at what had happened in Spain, these notables
drafted a response which stated that Guatemala "does not now or ever
will recognize any decisions which are believed to be void to author
ity, strength, or which have been violently or illegally substantiated."

124

In this fashion the colony renounced the acts of abdi

cation while at the same time declaring Fernando as their king.
On September 19, 1808, the Captain-General initiated a donativo patriotico y voluntario, or voluntary patriotic donation, to
secure monies for the struggle against France.

The donations even

tually reached the sum of 1,066,922 reales, most of which was in the
1?5
form of indigo and drafts from Holland. “
Though the amount of hard
currency was not great, the subscription nevertheless represented a
sacrifice.

Not only could the colony not afford such a sizeable loss

but, like other Spanish dominions, Central America suffered from a
chronic lack of coin which only aggravated their poor commercial
posture.

126

123
124

Noting that the total commercial output from the

Ibid., p. 106.
/
Baron Castro, p. 68 .

^■^Garcia Laguardia, p. 107.
126por a discussion of this type of problem see Martin L.
Seeger, "Media of Exchange in 16th Century New Spain and the Spanish
Response," The Americas, 35, (October, 1978): 168-184.
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Captaincy-General of Guatemala for one year was less than the total
amount collected, Salazar calls the subscription a "truly suicidal
act.

,,127

Surprisingly enough, the Indians were^ collectively, the

largest mass contributor with the Marques de Aycinena, Gregorio
Urruela, Gregorio Castriciones, and Archbishop Penalver the major
private donors.

128

An interesting sidelight on the solicitation of

funds, and indicative of its far-reaching nature was that Spain
granted 600 Honduran slaves their freedom in gratitude for their
generous gift of 1,000 pesos.

129

Besides denying any "foreign authority," a number of other
minor actions were also taken.

Captain-General Mollinedo ordered a

temporary confiscation of most of the French-owned property and all
Central American ports were strictly closed to foreign shipping.

One

authority even notes that French nationals living in the colony were
put under guard.

130

Other than these steps, little else appears to

have taken place and, on a public level, the response was generally
calm and less than sanguine.

127

Salazar, Historia, p. 114.

128
,
Garcia Laguardia, p. 108.
129

/
Carlos Martinez Duran and Daniel. Contreras, "La Abolicion
de la Esclavitud en Centroamerica," Journal of Inter-American Studies
4, (1962): 225.
130
.
Garcia Laguardia, p. 111.
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The Spanish Reaction
Events in Spain meanwhile were gathering momentum.

Napoleon,

who had been convinced by Murat that a French occupation would be an
effortless undertaking, must have been surprised at the stoutness of
the Spanish resistance and probably astounded at the depth of co
operation exhibited among the different authorities.

As an example,

in the unoccupied areas, local governing juntas were forming and
armies were being trained and coordinated.

So effective were these

efforts that by the end of July, 1808, three French armies had been
defeated.

131

Considered by one historian as Central America's first con
stitutional antecedent, a Cortes, located in Bayonne began its sessions on June 15, 1308.

132

Murat had initially approached Napoleon

with the idea of a Cortes as a possible avenue by which Spain might
better put her economic and administrative houses in order.

This

was acceptable to Napoleon who no doubt also anticipated the more
efficient extraction of Spain's commercial and military resources.
Comprised of an equal number of representatives from each of
the three major vectors of society, the nobility, the clergy, and the
estado llano, or the proletariat, a total of 150 delegates were to
be selected through an electoral system established by the Spaniards.

133

Although the organizers did allow for colonial representa

tion, it proved impossible for the machinery of selection to move
131

Lovett, 1: 86.

X32
/
Garcia Laguardia, p. 114.
133Ibid.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

53

in the amount of time allotted.

Therefore, certain individuals were

selected as temporary deputies from among the colonials then resid
ing in Spain.

For the Captaincy-General of Guatemala, Francisco

Antonio Zea, the director of Madrid's Botanical Gardens, was chosen.
As probably the first instance of colonial representation in Spain
this action set precedents in surrogate selection and dominion voice
that would be manifested in future gatherings.

Nevertheless, with

its authority universally denied, this Cortes was doomed to a limited
tenure and indeed, it was soon disbanded having never once met with
its full complement of deputies.

134

The true causes of the uprising against the French in the
spring of 1808 are still unknown.

It has been suggested however,

that a number of Spanish nobles, faced with the possibility of mob
anarchy, were forced into denying Napoleon's authority.

135

Perhaps

fearing a repetition of the French Revolution, these natural leaders
joined the patriot cause, and therefore were better able to control
the rebellion's direction rather than relying on a chance proletariat
victory.

Apparently these nobles placed more faith in the ferocity

of the masses than in Napoleon’s power to either subdue or control
them.
The popular segments of the movement were coordinated by
locally elected town juntas.

Overseeing these efforts were the

larger provincial juntas which operated with a high degree of autonomy.

134
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Aguado and Alcazar Molina, 3: 539.
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Exactly how independent the provinces were can be seen when Asturias,
on May 25, 1S08, declared war on France.

136

Although effective, the

provincial juntas still required some guidance.

In answer to this

need, a central authority was established in free Spain on September
25, 1808.

On that

datea Junta Suprema Central Gubernative del Reino,

or Supreme CentralJunta of

the Kingdom, was created in Aranjuez.

Under the presidency of the Conde de Floridablanca, it declared itself
sovereign, decided

upon itscomposition, which included the election

of representatives

from all the Spanish dominions, and established an

executive commission.

137

Unfortunately, problems -arose which forced the Junta into
three distinct ideological camps which gave it a divided character
that was incapable of producing results.

138

Also, under unrelenting

military pressure, it was forced into undertaking a series of retreats
which, by December of 1809, saw it lodged in Seville.

139

Owing to

this the Junta's position disintegrated to the point where it was
necessary to dissolve itself in favor of a Council of Regency.

This

was done on January 31, 1810, after instructing the Council to maintain the same political directions as had guided it.

140

^^Ibid., p. 87.
137
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Ibid., p. 138.

/

Aguado and Alcazar Molina, 3: 547.

140
/
Garcia Laguardia, p. 144.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

55

Under the Regency, as it had been under the Junta Suprema
Central, it soon became apparent that before any group could suc
cessfully rule Spain, it would first have to legitimatize its author
ity through a mandate emanating from Spain's traditional, if moribund
parliament, the Cortes.

Furthermore, such a Cortes would probably be

expected to have constitutional powers and also be oriented somewhat
towards meaningful reform.

This was necessary for as Raymond Carr

suggests, the Spanish patriots were beginning to raise a number of
questions concerning the fundamental goals of the independence movement.

141

Such questions could only be answered by a meeting of

Spanish leaders.
Although proceeding somewhat hesitantly at first, which in
itself suggests that it questioned the wisdom of such a move, the
Regency did ultimately issue a call for the Cortes to meet.

Insofar

as it pertains to the colonies, and undoubtedly brought on by the
French invasion, part of the Regency's decree admitted to Spain's
erroneous practices in her colonies.
elect

its

It also invited each colony to

own Cortes deputies, the number of which was to be based

on population.

Unfortunately, the Regency lost some of its luster

when it succumbed to initiating certain unnecessary delays.

Due to

this, it was ignominiously forced into ordering a speed-up of the
election processes on June 11, 1810.

142

Carr, p. 93.
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Political Change in Central America
The above events were closely followed in Central America
where at least one half-hearted attempt was made at establishing a
popular junta as had been done in Spain.

But with a stable govern

ment still extant, the Captain-General quickly vetoed this idea.
Perhaps fearing the negative influences of the unsteady political
situation in New Spain, he did, however; reinforce the capital's
143
defenses shortly afterwards.
In general, though, the colony re
mained dutifully faithful and by early 1809 almost all the formal
institutions had sworn loyalty to the Junta Suprema Central.
On April 30, 1809, the decree which called for the selection
of deputies to the Junta Suprema Central was received in Guatemala
City and instituted what has been called the "first popular elections" in Central American history.

144

The election rules which ac

companied the decree stated that each Ayuntamiento was to hold an
election from which would be chosen three of the most appropriate
candidates.
a draw.

Of these three, a finalist was to then be chosen through

Subsequently, the name of each finalist was to be forwarded

to the Audiencia which in turn was to choose the three most capable
from all the names submitted by all of the colonial Ayuntamientos.
From these three names the deputy was finally picked, also through
a
145
a draw.

^4 ^Garc^a Laguardia, p. 135.
144
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It took eleven months from the receipt of the election regu
lations until the day the Central American deputy was chosen.

The

Ayuntamientos of Guatemala City, San Salvador, Leon, Ciudad Real,
Comayagua, Cartago, Quetzaltenango, Sonsonante, San Miguel, San
Vicente, Santa Ana, Granada, Nicaragua, Nueva Segovia, and Tegucigalpa
all had sent in their nominations to the Audiencia in Guatemala
City.

146

/
On March 3, 1810, the names of Jose Aycinena, Antonio

Juarros, and Manuel Pavon y Munoz were placed in an urn.

Pavon was

147
the eventual, winner.
Despite this hopeful, if inauspicious, beginning, it was inevitable that some discontent be voiced.

/

With two nominees, Pavon

and Aycinena, being from the Guatemalan oligarcy and with all three
being from the province of Guatemala it proved a little too much for
some to swallow.

Ineffectual, this displeasure was evidenced mostly

in wall grafitti such as:
A1 derecho y al reves
No va Pavon,,„
148
novap av on.
Although the degree of public involvement in the election is subject
to discussion, the event nonetheless provided valuable electioneering
experience for the future.

146

/

Also, some scholars note that both Pavon

Salazar, Historia, p. 119.
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and Aycinena were, at least to a certain degree, liberals, thus indieating a promising new trend.

149

Unfortunately, these efforts were unrewarded since, by the
time Pavon had been chosen, the Junta Suprema Central had already
been replaced by the Regency.

This news reached Guatemala City by

mail on May 25, 1810, and was published in La Gaceta on June 9.^^
A week later the Regency's decree, which Salazar calls a "genuine con
fession, an acknowledgement of the poor administrative system that
Spain had imposed on her colonies and an admission that the creole
complaints were indeed justified and, until then, ignored" was also
p r i n t e d . H e u§es one particular paragraph to suggest the
Regency's apologetic tenor:
Spanish Americans, from this moment you have been
raised to the dignity of free men: no longer are you the
same as before, under a heavy yoke, far from the center
of power, looked upon with indifference, vexed by greed,
and destroyed by ignorance. Choose your representatives
to the National Congress and tell us of them, as your des
tinies no longer depend on Ministers, Viceroys, or Gover
nors; it is in your hands.^52
Accompanying the manifesto were the regulations pertaining to
the Cortes and the elections of its deputies which were essentially
the same as those for the deputy to the Junta Suprema Central.

A

major difference however was that rather than being allocated but one

^^Garcia Laguardia, p. 138.
^^Salazar, Historia, p. 128.
151Ibid.
152Ibid.
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deputy, Central America was given six, a number based on the colony's
population.

Since the Cortes was scheduled to begin its sessions in

September, each Ayuntamiento had to rush through the elections which
although intense, were relatively problem free.

As a result, a slate

of deputies was chosen who were knowledgeable and honest.

The first

to be selected was Father Antonio Larrazabal for the province of
Guatemala on July 24, 1810.

153

Shortly, Jose Antonio Lopez de la

Plata was selected for Nicaragua, Father Jose Ignacio Avila for El
Salvador, Father Florencio del Castillo for Costa Rica, and Father
Mariano Robles was chosen to speak for the province of Chiapas.

154

A minor problem in Honduras appears to have been the only serious
occurrence which marred the entire enterprise.

Due to continual

strife between the cities of Comayagua and Tegucigalpa, the repre
sentation there was confused.

Initially, Jose Francisco Morejon was

selected and did in fact represent Honduras in S p a i n . H o w e v e r , a
second deputy, Jose" Santiago Milla, was also chosen from Honduras
only to arrive after the Cortes was dissolved.

156

This unfortunate

153
✓
✓
Ramon A. Salazar, "Mariano de Aycinena," in Proceres de la
Independencia Centroamericana, ed. Carlos Melendez (Ciudad Universitaria Rodrigo Facio, San Jose-': Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana,
EDUCA, 1971), p. 110.
154ibid.
^^Mario Rodriguez, The Ca<3iz Experiment in Central America,
1808-1826 (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1978,), jTI 72.
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situation was indicative of the extreme localism which would plague
Honduras for many years.
Structurally, no important changes were ordered in the govern
ment of Central America.

A possible exception to this might be noted

when on May 27, 1810, Captain-General Mollinedo created a Tribunal de
Fidelidad, a kind of court meant to investigate unpatriotic acts.
The Tribunal was composed of three military officers, all Spaniards.
/

/

Jose Mendez, the Commander of Artillery and Sub-Inspector of the
Militia was appointed president with Joaquin Bernardo de Campuzano
the second judge and Joaquin Ibanez the A u d i t o r . P o s s i b l y estab
lished as a precaution due to the insurgent movements elsewhere in
the Empire, the Tribunal nevertheless proved short-lived and was
abolished on February 20, 1811.
Guatemala also received information concerning possible
French provacateurs descending upon the Spanish colonies.

Captain-

General Mollinedo was officially notified that agents, organized by
one M. Doutlart of Baltimore, had been dispatched to Guatemala and
that they were to enter Central America through the Gulf of Honduras.
Cognizant of creole resentment at their continued second class status,
the agents were ordered to cause as much dissention as possible.
Apparently, by appealing to the lower clergy and government workers
they hoped that official secrets might be gained and rebellions in
stigated.

Supporting these suspicions were reports from northern

Mexico and Yucatan which claimed the actual presence of these agents.

157
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Considered by some historians to be a farce, Captain-General Mollinedo
nonetheless responded with a strong statement that warned that any
French sympathizer or spy "would suffer the worst punishment that the
government could inflict."

158

While cautioning all Guatemalans, he

also offered a 500 peso reward for the disclosure or capture of any
French agent.
Indicative of the nascent sense of strength, an independent
spirit that would manifest itself more openly after 1811, the
Guatemala City Ayuntamiento initially balked at accepting the author
ity of the Regency.

This act moved one author to call it the "first

indication of those movements which would become expressions of
popular sentiment."

159

Although eventually accepted for expediency’s

sake, the Ayuntamiento qualified their acceptance by first noting
that they considered the establishment of the Regency as contrary to
Guatemala's rights.

160

This position gained strength from the support

given it by such well known Central Americans as the Marquis de
Aycinena, Jose Maria Peinado, and Cayetano Pavon.
Fearless, and ever vigilant, the Ayuntamiento also protested
to the Captain-General that the Tribunal de Fidelidad did not have a
single creole member and suggested its enlargement to six persons,

158

Salazar, Historia, p. 123.

"^^Manuel Valladares Rubio, "Jose' Matxas Delgado," in Proceres
de la Independencia Centroamericana, ed. Carlos Melendez (Ciudad
Universitaria, Rodrigo Facio, San Jose: Editorial Universitaria Centro
americana, EDUCA, 1971), p. 250.
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half

of which would be colonials.

161

The Spanish government was not

blind to such a threatening posture and indicative of its concern was
the communication from Captain-General Mollinedo dated December 10,
1810, to the Secretary of Justice in Spain.

In it Mollinedo com

mented upon the "alarming symptoms of rebellion against Spain and
calling special attention to the Guatemala City Ayuntamiento."

162

Perhaps the most widely known Central American effort relative
to the Spanish American activities in the Cortes were the Instructions
on the Fundamental Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy. Meant to be
a set of directions for deputy Larrazabal, they were written in com
pliance with the same decree which authorized the convocation of the
Cortes.

On August 17, 1810, the Ayuntamiento of Guatemala City com

missioned Jose Maria Peinado, Vicente de Aycinena, Miguel Larreinaga,
and Father Antonio Redondo to prepare a set of Instructions which
would state their desires and empowering Larrazabal to act on their
behalf.

163

The project was completed and subsequently presented to

the Ayuntamiento on October 13, 1810 for its approval.

As written,

the Instructions were duly approved and enjoyed with acceptance as
suggested when the other five Central American deputies, plus the
representative from Mexico City, adopted them.

Even so, some dis-

sention was experienced in Guatemala City when four councilmen, Isasi,

Baron Castro, p. 94.
1_62
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Melon, Gonzalez, and Aqueche refused to sign them in their entirety.

The Instructions were, in reality, the constitution that the
Central Americans wanted.

They expressed conservatively progressive

ideas even though based on the objective of concentrating "political
power in the hands of the American e l i t e . I t

is nevertheless a

remarkable document considering its authors and the times.

It cries

out against the despotic degradation of mankind and laments an
arbitrary criminal code that has no "philosophy or principles" and
the "blind and superstitious veneration for all the errors and in
consequences of the most barbaric and obscure times that self-interest,
neglect, ignorance, or maliciousness have caused being made our laws."
It notes an insatiable, arbitrary and obscure administration that
views its subjects as a "troop of slaves," of interests born of the
most "absurd principles," cf capricious and ignorant distinctions be
tween men that are contrary to reason and justice," of offensive in
equalities based on localism and ignoring the general welfare."

The

authors wrote of a hierarchy "invented and amplified according to
despotic interests and without public examination" and they called
for a constitution that prevents royal absolutism by limiting mon
archical authority and one whose laws are based on man's natural
rights.

They wanted a document which created an economic and politi

cal organization which supported the "three sacred principles of

Garcia Laguardia, p. 222.
^^Rodrfguez, The Cadiz Experiment , p. 48.
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property, liberty, and security" and demanded an educational system
that dissolved public ignorance and was of general usefullness.

166

The document was divided into a number of parts the two most
important being the Declaration of the Rights of the Populace and
the Constitution. The Declaration was, as one scholar has called it,
a "literal copy of the Declaration of the Rights of the French
Constitution of August 22, 1794" and as such need not be considered
here except to note the extensiveness of French philosophe thought.
The Constitution was more original.

167

It maintained the

Catholic church as the state religion and suggested a shared govern
ment wherein royal powers would be balanced between the king and a
powerful supreme council.

Other articles indicate the colonial

preference for personal qualities over social position in regards to
state employment.

A form of colonial congress was proposed whose

deputies would be nominated by the Ayuntamientos.

This same congress

would address itself to the advancement of the Indians, the establish
ment of state revenues, their proper collection, distribution, and
administration.

Of major importance, the colonial congress was to

have a "special obligation" to continually examine and modify existing laws.

168

The Constitution proposed, in essence, an exercise in

166

J. Antonio Villacorta C., "Guatemala en las Cortes de
Cadiz," Anales de la Sociedad de Geograf^a e Historia de Guatemala
17, (March, 1941): 10.
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federalism..

169

A New Captain-General in Guatemala
/
When Jose de Bustamante y Guerra was sworn in as the CaptainGeneral of Guatemala on March 14, 1811, it was with the determination
of a man secure in the purpose and propriety of his mission.

As a

career soldier who had served the crown faithfully, and more or less
successfully, at a number of different assignments, he was apparently
well thought of.

By the age of nineteen he had risen to the rank of

brigadier and at twenty-one he had taken part in Malespina's circum
navigation of the globe in the 1790' s^ ^
Later appointed Governor-General and Commander of Montevideo
he became known there for his persecution of Uruguayan patriots.

171

Unfortunately, while serving in South America he had the bad luck
of being captured by the British but had returned to Spain in time
to take part in the famous May 2 (Dos de Mayo) uprising against the
French in 1808.^’^
Although Bustamante was, as Rodriguez suggests, initially
positive towards his new position, and even maintained a "highly
favorable" first impression of the Guatemalans, it is quite likely

^Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment , p. 49.
Salazar, Historia, p. 140.
171
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that these feelings did not extend to that part of the colonial administration under creole domination.

173

There is little doubt that

before entering Guatemala he entertained certain suspicions of the
Ayuntamiento.

An objective outlook on his part was in fact made all

but impossible when in early 1811 he had read the above mentioned
Instructions. He noted them to be "very subversive and dangerous in
the present delicate state of the monarchy, and enough to inflame a
spontaneous revolution."

174

They were, he thought "designed to

destroy the laws of the Indies and to set forth a plan of Independ
ence.

He also viewed one of their authors, Jose Maria Peinado,

as "the ideological flame in the territory under his control.
Nevertheless, when he assumed his responsibilities, he did
so with at least some idea of improving the life of the colony.

He

suggested that more nightwatchmen be employed and urged that prison
conditions be improved.

He proposed methods to control drunkenness

and, under his sponsorship, a college of surgery was founded for
•
• , j
provincial
doctors. 177

Fearful of possible French designs on the Spanish colonies,

173
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he initiated a third monthly mail delivery between Oaxaca and
Guatemala City so as to better improve communications with Spain.

178

To this same end, and in partnership with his wife, a public donation
was begun in April, 1812.

All persons were expected to contribute

to this subscription and he was hopeful of raising enough money to
maintain a Central American army.

179

But these accomplishments were but mere trappings which did
nothing to alleviate the chronic problems which he inherited.
colonial government continued to flounder badly.

The

Since the turn of

the century the annual general administration receipts had declined
to a point where they hovered around 70,000 pesos, an amount not
nearly enough to maintain an efficient rule.

180

A further indication

of the economic stagnation then being experienced by the colony was
the near zero growth of revenues from the interior customs houses.

181

As suggested by Miles Wortman, by 1810 Central America was near bank
ruptcy with a "deficit of over 400,000 pesos" and debts "exceeding
four and a half million pesos."

182

Attempts to alleviate the situ

ation by raising taxes were ineffectual due to the poverty-stricken

178
/
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conditions of the populace and to ayuntamientos which would not ap
prove any further increases in taxation.

So destitute was the govern

ment that when a rebellion occurred in El Salvador the expenses in
curred by the expeditionary force sent to suppress it could only be
paid with funds confiscated from the rebels.

183

The 1810 Cortes
Yet even before Bustamante had assumed his powers in Guatemala,
certain events in Spain were occurring which would lead to a direct
confrontation between him and the creole hierarchy.

When the Cortes

convened its first session on September 24, 1810, it lost little time
in making changes.

On the very day of its inauguration and with a

bare majority of one, it decreed that "sovereignty resides with the
people."

It mandated "freedom of press, and abolished the office of

the Inquisition and forced Indian labor.

It also authorized certain

.
,
,,184
freedoms of industry and commerce.
One of the Spanish leaders, Fr. Diego Munoz Torrero proposed
that the government have three branches:
and a judicial.

an executive, a legislative,

Furthermore, and until the king returned, the

Regency was to have executive responsibility, and the current extra
ordinary Cortes was to be the legislative body.

Fr. Torrero also

moved that Fernando VII be recognized as the true Spanish sovereign

183
Francisco Gavidia, His toria Moderna de El Salvador, 2 vols,
(San Salvador, 1917), 1: 29.
184
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and that his Bayonne abdication be ignored.

185

That these far-

reaching pieces of legislation were successfully enacted suggests
the presence of great enthusiasm and the promise of extensive reform.
Confronted with this, the Regency, which is depicted as a rather
traditional body, resigned that same day in protest.

Taking its own

time, the Cortes eventually responded to this by appointing a new
Regency.
Philosophically, the Cortes was divided into three groups:
the liberals, the partial liberals, and the radicals.

While all

were advocates of change, the degree to which they were dedicated
to reform varied.

Least successful in gaining a political following

were the partial liberals who had limited guidance and possessed a
philosophy that was nothing more than a "naive reformism."

The

liberals were only slightly more successful than the partial liberals
with only a meager connection to the Spanish nation being their
principal political lever.

The radicals, who may have been no more

than a branch of the liberal school which had somehow managed to
formulate a plan of action were the most successful group.

Their

main strength lay in an "eloquent leadership" such as in their
spokesmen, Arguelles, Torrero, and Toreno.

186

Noteworthy is that

any concept of a modern political organization was absent from all
three groups with even important discussions being held informally.

185.
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Central America in the Spanish Cortes
When the Junta Suprema Central dissolved itself in favor of
a Regency, it not only stipulated that a Cortes was to be convened,
but also that it was to have colonial representation.

In their final

form, the instructions called for deputies to be selected from the
Viceroyalties of New Spain, Peru, Santa Fe, and Buenos Aires, from the
Captaincys-General of Puerto Rico, Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Guatemala,
and from Chile and the Philippines.

187

Most of the representatives

from Central America had arrived in Spain by late August, 1811.

188

Although each of the Central American provinces had adopted
the Guatemalan Ins true tions, each of the individual provincial govern
ments expanded on them somewhat and authorized their deputies to
lobby for their own independent goals.

For example, Fr. Florencio del

Castillo of Costa Rica requested that his province be granted a
bishopric and elevated to the status of an Intendency.

In addition

to petitioning for the creation of a Provincial Deputation, Costa
Rica also asked to have its educational system upgraded.

189

The

delegate from El Salvador, Fr. Jose‘S Ignacio de Avila argued for the
establishment of a bishopric independent of Guatemala City, and he
used the large Salvadorean population, plus the richness of its tithes
as being indicative of the importance of its request.

190

Eventually
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he would also speak on the need for El Salvador to have a seminary
and for it to be more independent politically of Guatemala.

191

From

Chiapas, Fr. Mariano Robles appealed for a number of changes, among
which were the creation of a seminary, trade relief, tax incentives,
and even a Tehuantepec canal.

192

Significantly, in 1813 Robles was

to request that a Provincial Deputation be created in Ciudad Real
"since Guatemala City did not pay attention to questions essential
to the prosperity of Chiapas."

193

In Honduras unfortunately, a situ

ation existed wherein the cities of Tegucigalpa and Comayagua seemed
to be in a continual state of near war with each other.

In spite of

this, and even though Tegucigalpa would deny his authority, the
Honduran delegate, Jose/ Francisco Mayorga conducted himself admirably.
He presented the Comayaguan requests for a Provincial Deputation, an
independent port authority, and mining and educational reforms.

194

The Nicaraguan, Jose/ Antonio de la Plata, submitted what were prob
ably the most energetic proposals.
canal

Nicaragua requested a seminary, a

across the isthmus, a university, and aseparate

addition, it was asked that Nicaraguabe allowed
with its tithes without direction from Guatemala.

audiencia.

In

to do as itpleased
195

191_
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■^^Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 73.
195 , . .
Ibid., p. 72.
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Although not all of the Central American deputies conducted
themselves with equal ardor, overall they were surprisingly active
and noticeably competent.

Outstanding in this respect were Fr.

Larrazabal of Guatemala and Fr. Castillo of Costa Rica both of whom
/
196
Mario Rodrxguez considers to be "outstanding leaders."

Impor

tantly, the Central Americans were not at all intimidated by
their illustrious colleagues from Spain.

Larrazabal may even

have been threatening when he commented that all of the colonies
were in danger of revolutions similar to that which had happened in
North America.

Additionally, Fr. Larrazabal was one of ten American

deputies who had worked on the Constitution and one of four on the
Constitution's "permanent deputation."

197

He was also selected

President of the Cortes (a rotating position) for a number of terms,
and served on the Overseas, Justice, and Ecclesiastical Commissions.
He was also active in different capacities on projects which attempted
to limit abuses of power.

198

Fr. Castillo, who was the better orator,

worked forcefully to abolish the Indian taxes and, like Larrazabal,
served as Cortes president.

199

Castillo, as a champion of Central

America's indigenous population, spoke out against the abuses that

^^Rodrxguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 59; and Aguado and
Alcazar Molina, 3: 554.
197

Garcxa Laguardia, p. 210.

198-..,
...
Ibxd., p. 211.
199

Salazar, Historia, p. 160.
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it was subject to and the virtual slavery in which it was held.^*^
It would appear that the Central American deputies were, to
some extent anyway, successful in attaining their individual goals.
As seen, for example, when Provincial Deputations in Guatemala City,
Leon, and Ciudad Real were c r e a t e d . A l s o , trading concessions
were granted, and Costa Rica was raised to a bishopric although this
particular honor was not taken advantage of immediately.

Also, a

Honduran port authority was established, a Nicaraguan university was
authorized, and the colony would automatically benefit from the
planned empire-wide educational reforms.
Nevertheless some abrasive issues were not addressed.

Most

serious were those problems which seemed to stem from the traditional
position of dominance enjoyed by the province of Guatemala.

An exam

ination of the provincial requests of the Cortes indicates a strong
desire to be more independent of the capitol and its environs.

The

Honduran petition for authority in pert matters is an example.
Furthermore, Chiapas, like the other provinces, wanted a Provincial
Deputation established because Guatemala essentially ignored her
needs.

El Salvador requested a bishopric (which might have been

granted but for

unease

growing in that province) and along with

Nicaragua, it expressed a need for greater political autonomy.

The 1812 Constitution
Although writing a constitution was not its only task, the

^^Salazar, "Mariano de Aycinena," p. 115.
^Hfoodward, Central America, p. 82.
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Cortes from the beginning explored the possibilities of such an
action.

In light of this, on December 23, 1810, a commission was

named for that signal purpose.

The "constitutional project," as it

was called, was first presented to the Cortes on August 18, 1811, and
debated on until March 11, 1812.

202

The completed document was shortly

thereafter promulgated in Cadiz on March 19, 1812.
The "Men of 1812," as Raymond Carr refers to them, appear to
have been truly interested in building a powerful middle class in
Spain with the Cortes as the "sole representative of the sovereign
nation."

203

They believed in a uniform income tax, absolute property

rights and they anticipated an extensive dismantling of the bureauc
racy wherein a number of uniform, streamlined municipalities would
be created.

In turn, these municipalities would be "subordinate" to

a centralized system of government.
Nonetheless, as Rodriguez suggests, the final document was
not democratic but moderate.

Especially noticeable was that it was

religiously and electorally traditional.

The senorios, or enclaves

of private jurisdiction,were abolished, but only to a point where it
would increase agriculture production.
over twenty-five were granted suffrage,

While in theory all males
in actual practice the qual

ifications were so extensive that only certain men could vote.

2^2Aguado and Alcazar Molina, 3:555.
203Carr, p. 98.

204.,.,
Ibrd.
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issue of sLavery was examined but nothing was done until 1817 and
205
then only the slave trade was banned.”

Importantly, although the

monarchy was limited as never before, it still remained very power, , 206
ful.
Nevertheless, some progressive changes were incorporated.

It

was ordered, for example, that royal power was hereinafter to be
tempered by a forty member Council of State which was to have twelve
colonial delegates.

207

As the Spanish Cortes was given extensive

powers to enact laws on national welfare, so were a number of major
political laws enacted.

208

For example, each town of more than one

thousand persons was to have an ayuntamiento and all councilmen were
to be subject to a popular vote with no ayuntamiento office being
open to purchase or inheritance.

209

Furthermore, no councilman was

to be a royally appointed official at the same time he was a council
man and the total ayuntamiento body was to experience a complete
turnover every two years.

210

Also, a new institution, the Provincial

Deputation, was to be created in various localities.

Finally, it is

noticeable that the Constitution began to limit the Viceroys and
205
/
Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 88 .
206
207

Ibid., p. 76.
Samoya Guevara, p. 121.

208
s
Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 80.
209
210

Facio B., p. 274.
'

Gonzalez Viquez, p. 459.
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Captains-General by placing certain economic and administrative
duties in the hands of "Superior Political Chiefs.”

211

As a result of the new Spanish laws there were, in addition
to the more obvious changes, some less tangible effects.

As noted

above, a major problem which remained unsolved in Central America
was the provincial animosity towards the capital.

Most of this ap

pears to have stemmed from commercial difficulties and abuses com
mitted by certain merchants which were based in Guatemala City.

Due

to their importance, it is consequently difficult to understand why
the delegates to the Cortes did not pursue these issues more fervently.
Or for that matter, why were their instructions not more explicit on
this point?

It is not surprising then, as Thomas L. Karnes notes,that

the Cortes did relatively little to alleviate commercial restrictions.

212

Furthermore, abrasive religious issues were untouched.

This was especially true in El Salvador which had long wanted its
own bishop and yet did not receive one.

It must have been especially

galling for the Salvadorean leaders to receive news that Costa Rica
had been granted a bishopric while their own petitions remained un
answered.
Of future importance to the growth of a politically aware and
more demanding society, were the reforms authorized in local politics.
For the first time segments of the population hitherto ignored by

211

Samoya Guevara, p. 129.

212

Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure of Union: Central America,
1824-1975, rev. ed., (Tempe, Center for Latin American Studies,
Arizona State University, 1976), p. 12.
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these procedures were now drawn into them.

Even though the personnel

in the elected bodies would not change significantly, the politicians
would henceforth be cognizant of issues and peoples they had previ
ously ignored.

In essence then, colonial leadership was being forced

into becoming more responsive to the citizenry.
Still awaiting an objective analysis is the attitude towards
the new laws by the Captains-General.

In light of the fact that their

overall powers were reduced, it seems probable that some resistance
was evidencd.

Hector Samoya Guevara notes, for example, that Captain-

General Urrutia y Montoya attempted to name Political Chiefs as
subordinate to him even though there were no authorized hierarchical
divisions.

213

Another authority claims that under Urrutia y Montoya’s

predecessor, Bustamante, freedom of the press was a myth.

214

The

effectiveness of the constitution therefore may have been in certain
areas, at least, partially limited by unofficial restrictions.

’15

In an age of growing and somewhat uncontrolled sophistication,
a number of inopportune political objections surfaced.

As the Cortes

was liberal and at the same time anticlerical it alienated both the
clergy and conservative factions in the colonies.

Rodriguez agrees

with this position to a certain point and even claims that an
"arrogance of power" existed in the Cortes which the colonials found
213
214

Samoya Guevara, p. 130.
Herrarte, p. 124.

2XS

Garcia Laguardia, p. 285.
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offensive.
It can be seen then that the overall effect of the Spanish
Cortes in Central America was indeed conducive to the creation of a
psychology of independence.

Also at the same time, it helped lay

the foundation for eventual separation by failing to inaugurate
positive changes which would have forestalled such an action.

Those

reforms that it did decree were but tokens which did little to ad
dress the real needs of the colony.

The Cortes created a frame of

mind in which independence was viewed cautiously and perhaps in
evitably.
The Constitutional Ayuntamiento
and Provincial Deputation
Politically, Bustamante entered an arena that was soon to be
a boiling cauldron.

The new constitution allowed for popularly

elected Ayuntamientos, which although promising, soon became a cause
of continual irritation to the Captain-General.

Beginning work in

late 1812 its liberal creole leaders quickly surged forward and
vigorously assumed tasks with a sense of freedom that startled the
Spanish hierarchy.

Notwithstanding the obstacles he placed in front

of it, the Ayuntamiento of Guatemala City achieved an honorable
record as the most important institution of its kind in the colony,
and it established a code of conduct which others would follow.

It

dutifully accepted its new mandate of overseeing the public health
programs, the maintenance of primary education, hospitals and other

2JL6

✓

Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 96.
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welfare organizations, roads, bridges, and the promotion of agriculture, industry, and trade.
reinstituted Sociedad

217

Informally connected to the newly

I-.anomica and the Consulado

loosened government controls on

business while at

prohibiting the growth of certain monopolies.

de Comercio,it
the same time

218

The newly commissioned Diputaciones Provinciales, Provincial
Deputations, were also offensive to the Captain-General.

Beginning

as local governing juntas as had been established in Spain shortly
after the Napoleonic invasion, they were intended to function as
interim governments until a more formal system was created.

Quickly

gaining legitimacy in both Spain and the colonies (although not in
Guatemala), they werelegalized under the 1812 Constitution.
Ominously, though, itshould be noted that it was only through

the

intervention of certain renowned Americans that such units in the
colonies were permitted.

219

The Captaincy-General of Guatemala was

initially granted two, one seated in Guatemala City and one in Leon,
Nicaragua.
After the electoral Junta Preparativa, or Preparatory Junta,
had established the political boundaries, a deputy to the Provincial
Deputation was elected from each district.

For the Guatemalan

Provincial Deputation, this included representatives from Guatemala

217

Bumgartner, del Valle of Central America, p. 121.

2X3
s
Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 111.
219

Zelaya, Nicaragua, p. 97.
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City, Ciudad Real, Comayagua, San Salvador, Quetzaltenango, Sonsonante, and Chimaltenango.

The Nicaraguan Provincial Deputation

included deputies from Leon, Granada, Segovia, Villa de Nicaragua,
Nicoya, plus two from Costa P.ica.

220

Besides the seven ordinary

members, the Provincial Deputations were presided over by a Jefe
Politico, or Political Chief, who was a royal appointee who, like
the deputies, had but one equal vote.

221

In the case of Guatemala,

and while not necessarily typical throughout the empire, the Political
Chief was also the Captain-General.
The Provincial Deputations represented a serious threat to
the powers of the Captains-General and the Viceroys.

Since the

Political Chiefs were all of equal rank, it is conceivable that, had
the Constitution been strictly adhered to, their offices might have
been severely weakened.

222

If Chester Zelaya is correct when he says

that the "Provincial Deputations were responsible directly to the
central government in Madrid and not to any organ of government in
America" then the absolutist positions of the Viceroys and CaptainsGeneral were indeed in jeopardy.

223

Although the ayuntamientos were technically subordinate to
the Provincial Deputations, in the Captaincy-General of Guatemala at
least, the Guatemala City Ayuntamiento was forced to assume its

220

221
222

/

Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 108.
Ibid., p. 65. .
Samoya Guevara, p. 132.

223Zelaya, p. 98.
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responsibilities until its Provincial Deputation could begin to
function.

224

Besides being advisory bodies to the Political Chiefs

and Intendents, the Provincial Deputations were in charge of all ad
ministrative aspects of the colony and even directed the activities
of the ayuntamientos.

225

They were obligated to supervise taxation,

to ensure the proper use of public funds, the establishment of new
ayuntamientos, the advancement of public education, the development
of agriculture, industry, and commerce, census taking, the policing
of constitutional laws, the care of welfare institutions, and the
care and improvement of the Indian population.

226

They were also a

kind of appellate court on taxation issues and their offices were
often used for military recruitment.

227

They distributed vacant

lands and could intervene in certain judicial matters and at times
even determine the role of the government of economic matters.

228

By the time the Guatemalan Provincial Deputation had begun
its work in the fall of 1813 a venomous sense of animosity had al
ready surfaced between the Captain-General and the Guatemala City
Ayuntamiento.

224

The Provincial Deputation was also affected by this

Bumgartner, del Valle of Central America, p. 133.

225
✓
Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 65.
226

Samoya Guevara, p. 123.

227Ibid., p. 125
228Ibid.
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but to a lesser extent since its active life was so much shorter.
Nevertheless, it did try to conduct business under this handicap al
though its effectiveness is still not certain.

The Nicaraguan

Provincial Deputation, of which even less is known, also attempted
to work in a similarly honorable fashion.

Unlike its brethren in

Guatemala, however, it was assisted rather than hindered by the
Intendent, Col. Juan Bautista Gual.

229

Bustamante Versus the Ayuntamiento
and the Provincial Deputation
The constitutional Ayuntamiento of Guatemala City and the
Provincial Deputation continued to function under wearisome con
ditions until Fernando's return in 1814.

Although promising, their

existence was limited due to the unsympathetic chief executive.

As

bastions of creole strength, they were an effective, if brief,
education in the processes of electioneering and politics.
As noted above, Bustamante's posture of antagonism was evident
in the final months of tenure of the old-style Ayuntamiento, and by
the time he swore allegiance to the 1812 Constitution in September of
1812, most Central American leaders viewed any of his actions quite
skeptically,

regardless

of their humanitarian nature.

230

Salazar

notes that his actions and personality were especially offensive,
even begrudging the freedom to discuss colonial and Empire problems

229
✓
✓
Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 118.
Salomon Carrillo Ramirez, "Quimeras de los Libertadores,"
Anales de la Sociedad de Geografia e Historia de Guatemala 12 (June,
1936): 424.
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and their destiny.

231

If, as is claimed, he was sent by Spain to

"retard" any independence movements in Central America, then he
complied with this mandate zealously. 232

A police force was estab

lished which watched over even the slightest movement.

Tribunals of

Faith to review unpatriotic acts were established, and espionage was
in use everywhere.

Peace was maintained through a strict systema

tized persecution and denunciation with rich and poor equally fearful
that even the most innocent act would be viewed as subversive.

233

A

system of mail censorship was imposed and Guatemalan readers were
kept ignorant of the progress of the Mexican and South American re234

bellions.

Given the nickname "Zonto" because of a mutilated ear,

he commented in mid-1813 that Guatemala City "has been the center
from which the turmoil which has embraced the provinces has originated."

235

This was in partial response to the rash of uprisings

then sweeping the colony.
Bustamante’s wrath was not selective and his only criteria
was whether or not, in his opinion, a person was a threat to the
Empire.

A good example of this can be noted after the election of

the Guatemala City Ayuntamiento in the fall of 1812.
231

Of the seventeen

Salazar, Historia, p. 151.

232
/
Chamberlain, Francisco Morazan, p. 11.
233
,
Carrillo Ramirez, p. 41o.
234
Karnes, The Failure, p. 16.
233

✓
Fernandez Guardia, La Independencia, p. 8
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elected members that Salazar considers, seven of them,Asturias, Batres,
Barrundia, Garcia Granados, Urruela, and Beltranena, were members of
"the family."

236

As such, the creoles, a group whose loyalty he

should have cultivated, became intimately involved in the BustamanteAyuntamiento feud and their letters to influential persons in Spain
reflect a strong desire to see the Captain-General removed.

237

In

response to this animosity, Bustamante used his position to hurt the
powerful Aycenina clan, and indirectly others as well, through a
denial of loans and by bringing legal suits against them on tax debts
of 35,000 pesos.
Although his disputes with the Ayuntamiento had arisen almost
immediately, probably the most widely heralded argument concerned
his battle over freedom of the press.

First decreed by the Cortes

on September 24, 1810, it became a tool which Bustamante used to main
tain his unyielding rule.

Under him, the once promising Gaceta was

reduced to printing lies and by 1811 it was securely "in government
hands as is indicated by its new title, Gaceta del Gobierno" and
as such, it was "reduced to a gossip sheet of Europe and Guatemala."

236

Susan Emily Strobeck, "The Political Activities of Some
Members of the Aristocratic Families of Guatemala, 1321-1839,"
(Master's Thesis, Tulane University, 1958), p. 5.
237
Woodward, Central America, p. 86 .
238
239

Bumgartner, del Valle de Central America, p. 118.
Luque Alcaide, p. 128.
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Another facet of this same problem was Bustamante's refusal
to allow the printing of any official Ayuntamiento document without
his prior approval.

So all-encompassing was this order that it even

included a prohibition against printing the 1812 Constitution.

To

this the Ayuntamiento sent a formal protest to him on October 1,
1811.

240
Ayuntamiento complaints were more formally voiced on May 13,

1812, when Sebastian Melon, the mayor, and Lorenzo Moreno, a council
man visited the Captain-General.

They presented a list of grievances

which included his frank hostility towards the Ayuntamiento, an
alienation of the citizens, and private decisions that he made with
out considering public opinion.

They also commented upon his at

titude which was causing the relations between the Spaniards, and
creoles to deteriorate along with his inappropriate demands and overly
.
241
severe punishments.
In anticipation of the elections of deputies to the Provincial
Deputation and to the forthcoming ordinary Cortes, the Guatemala City
Ayuntamiento petitioned the Captain-General on December 18, 1812,
for specifics on those same elections and calling to his attention
that the deputies were to be in Spain by September 1, 1813.

942

Bustamante responded that he had decided not to hold the elections
due to the rebellious state of the colony.

The Ayuntamiento's

240
/
Garcia Laguardia, p. 291.
241
242

Ibid., p. 285.
Ibid., p. 286.
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answer to this was to authorize Antonio Juarros, a councilman, to
compose a note which was to be sent to Spain.

The note was submitted

to the Ayuntamiento for approval on January 2, 1813, and was effective
enough to cause Bustamante to shortly call for the elections.

Pos

sibly piqued because the note was sent anyway, he continued to hedge
until March when the elections were eventually held.

As if this

were not enough, after the elections, he also delayed the deputies'
departure

by withholding their travel allowances.

243

On February 1, 1813, the opening ceremonies of La Merced
Church in Guatemala took place, an event that Bustamante chose to
deliver yet another deliberate snub to the Ayuntamiento.

To do this

he ordered those seats reserved for the councilmen to be placed in
an area of lesser importance, an act designed to have a humiliating
impact. 244

The Ayuntamiento protested this act also but only to

the church hierarchy, which gained it little satisfaction.
Until the Provincial Deputation assumed its responsibilities
in the fall of 1813, one of its tasks that had been undertaken by
the Ayuntamiento was the periodic inspection of the jails.

Its

visits during April, 1813, provided yet another opportunity for a
confrontation between the councilmen and the Captain-General.

From

the visits, a report was compiled which was highly critical of the
government and noted problems such as dangerous overcrowding.
Mentioned was the fact two prisoners, Antonio Marure and Gabriel Oxe,
243

j

Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 116.
244

Salazar, Historia, p. 164.
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had been confined without knowing the charges against them and that
another, Liberato Gano, had been imprisoned solely by the verbal order
of Bustamante.

245

Visits of this sort were also the cause of a rift between
the Ayuntamiento and the archmonarchist Ramon Casaus y Torres, the
Archbishop of Guatemala, a chief collaborator of Bustamante.

246

The problem surfaced when he was requested by the Ayuntamiento to
initiate prison reforms similar to those made of the Captain-General.
Casaus scoffed at. this and even went so far as to deny that church
prisons even existed.

This was a falsehood since two councilmen,

Valde^ and Castillo, had inspected one of the "nonexistant" jails and
reported at least two priests were prisoners there.

One of them may

have been the "Indian philosopher" Tomas Ruiz, a savant highly
thought of in the Ayuntamiento.

247

The war of nerves continued throughout the summer with
Bustamante openly admitting that he authorized mail censorship, espe
cially that coming from the rebellious areas.

Even though the Captain-

General claimed that this was done for reasons of security, the
Ayuntamiento decided to inform Larrazabal of this fact plus other
offenses anyway.

245
246

248

The Ayuntamiento also requested of Spain that a

Ibid., p. 166.
Parker, del Valle and the Establishment, p. 29.

247
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248
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Garcia Laguardia, p. 286.
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clarification of those laws pertaining to freedom of the press be
issued since Bustamante continued to oppose it.

2.49

Only constant

pressure such as this forced the Captain-General to allow the Censor
ship Boards in Nicaragua and Guatemala to commence operation in
November of 1813.

250

Probably because he anticipated even further complications,
Bustamante also opposed the election of the Provincial Deputations,
and at least in Guatemala City, their very installation.

As might

be expected, this accomplished nothing more than deepening even
further the already extensive creole-Spaniard schism.

Bustamante

committed a critical tactical error here in that before this his
enemies were generally confined to the capital and its immediate
environs whereas afterwards they were found throughout the colony.
The Guatemala City Ayuntamiento responded to the continued acts of
hostility by forwarding yet another note to Spain protesting his
251
ac tions.
Suggestive of an enthusiastic endorsement of the 1812 Consti
tution, after the Provincial Deputation elections the Ayuntamiento
wrote to the newly-elected deputies and offered them the use of their
offices as a temporary residence, an act to which Bustamante countered
by suggesting that a room in the palace be used instead.

249

252

The

Ibid., p. 291.
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deputies demurred on this and accepted the Ayuntamiento's offer which
was probably taken by the Captain-General as yet another insult.

By

mid-summer, 1813, a number of deputies had arrived in Guatemala City
only to find that the Bustamante would not allow any meetings to take
place until the entire Provincial Deputation had been seated, an
event which could not take place until September 2, 1813.
One of the rules governing the operations of the Provincial
Deputation specified that the president have but one equal vote.

When

Bustamante chose to ignore this rule a further protest was sent to
Spain, this time signed by five of the seven deputies.

The vengeful

Captain-General then requested that Archbishop Casaus investigate
the signers since most of them were priests.

253

This unfortunate

situation might eventually have caused a violent clash had it not
been for the timely return of Fernando to the Spanish throne.

When

this happened, government offices and policies returned to their 1808
state and brought about an automatic and sudden halt to the Bustamantecreole feud.

The Rebellions
The year 1808 ushered in the era of rebellions in Central
America.

Unlike other areas though, the Guatemalan disturbances do

not appear to have been ideologically connected to any one particular
cause but nevertheless remain critical to our understanding of the
times.

One of the first to occur was in Costa Rica in March of 1808.

Serious enough to cause troops to be sent in, it was nothing more

^^Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 122.
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than a weak attempt aimed more at tobacco and liquor laws than at
independence.

254

Later that same year a more serious insurrection

took place in Guatemala City.

Often referred to as the Motin de

Artesanos, or Artisan's Mutiny, it is the act that Samoya Guevara
considers to be the first true suggestion of independence in Central
America.

255

Beginning as an attempt by creole councilmen in Guatemala

City to establish a Junta de Gobierno, it also apparently entertained
the idea of removing Captain-General Mollinedo.

256

For additional

support a group of artisans was called upon who were already up in
arms over high taxes and the threat of outside competition.

On

October 17, 1808, a riot broke out that was led by an ex-secretary of
/
^
the Audiencia, Simon Bergano y Villegas. If the amount of damage
caused was minor, its psychological effect was great.

Along with

ominously demanding that all Spaniards be excluded from any responsi
bilities in government, there were also cries of "down with the Spaniards and long live free Guatemala."

257

0

Thomas L. Karnes, "The Origins of Costa Rican Federalism,'
The Americas 15 (1959): 259.

APP
Melendez, Textos, p. 179.
256t,.,
Ibid.
^^Arturo Valdes Oliva, Centro America Alcanz^ la Liber tad
al Precio de Su Sangre, (Guatemala: Tipografia Nacional, 1965),
p. 9. The era of rebellion also introduced, perhaps unconsciously,
a sense of American nationality as indicated by the use of the terms
"Spaniard" and oftentimes "European" applied to the Spaniards,
whereas the titles "Americans" or "Guatemalans" would be voiced as
pertaining to themselves by the patriots. While the Spaniard may
or may not have been viewed at this time as a foreigner, this
practice is suggestive of a rather extensive schism.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

91

An extension of this event involves Bergano's correspondence
which suggests that efforts were underway to extend the turmoil into
the provinces and even including some priests in the affair.

258

Mention was made of priests calling for the populace to "drink up
the blood of the Spaniards just as they have been sucking up the
, 259

money that belongs to us."

The rebellion was easily suppressed

with most of the leaders, including Bergano, being rounded up, some
even being incarcerated in a Cuban prison.
Although thwarted, the artisan cause was not completely inert,
however, as some leaders continued to actively promote change.

One

of them, Agustin Vilches, on May 6 , 1809, was imprisoned "on proof of
having promoted different insurrections" and even urging the accept
ance of Napoleon as s o v e r e i g n . O n e scholar, Arturo Valdes Oliva,
says that Vilches "figures among the first victims of the struggle
.

,

.

for liberty.

n261

Although it is difficult to gauge the depth of conviction of
the patriots, it does appear that pockets of independence sentiment
did exist throughout the colony.

One of the first indicators of this

occurred in Ciudad Real, the capital of the province of Chiapas.

In

1810 the Ayuntamiento of Guatemala City received a letter from Ciudad

258
259

Bumgartner, del Valle of Central America, p. 57.
Ibid., p. 5 8.

^^Valde's Oliva, Centro Ame'rica Alcanzo', p. 25 .
261Ibid., p. 2 9 .
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Real which urged Guatemalans to follow the South American revolu
tions and discussed a proclamation of independence-

In it, the mon

archy was attacked and suggestions were made as to how to use elections for subversive purposes.

262

Reflective of many creole com

plaints it mentioned high taxes, creole exclusion from the higher
levels of employment, the entrance of any class of Spaniard in the
colonies, and frivolous policies which caused serious commercial de
privations.

It was, as Jorge Mario Garcia Laguardia states, "a

catalog of grievances against Spain, a justification of spiritual
263
and actual independence.”

A bitter letter, it noted that "the

Spaniard, already a slave, intended to submit themselves and their
slaves to the throne of the Bonapartes" and was signed Los Ciudadanos
Patriotas, or the Citizen Patriots.

264

The character of the seditious acts changed

in 1811 when they

became centered for the most part in the provinces of El Salvador and
Nicaragua where they began somewhat inauspiciously.

In April of that

year, a soldier, Encarnacion Valladores, underwent criminal charges
related to "certain words which touched on unpatriotic veins."

Spec

ifically he was accussed of exhorting the citizens of Leon to rebel.

262
,
Garcia Laguardia, p. 278.
263

Ibid., p. 279.

264
Baron Castro, p. 112.
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For his efforts, he languished in jail until 1814.

265

Singly, while

cases such as these were of minor importance, it has been stated that
"hundreds" of similar examples happened during the decade 1810-1820.“
As such they were indicative of serious discontent and probably pre
sented a rather startling picture to Spanish officialdom.
In November of 1811, a very serious riot occurred in the City
of San Salvador.

In this case, the leaders were well-to-do and most

were related through ties of marriage and commerce.

Central among

these were Father Jose/ Matias Delgado and his cousin, Manuel Jose/
Arce (a future president of the United Provinces of Central America),
plus members of the Aguilar, Lara, Aranzamendi and Fagoaga families.

267

Through their extensive connections, it was hoped that

the rebellion would spread throughout the entire colony.
The available evidence suggests that a betrayal forced the
leaders into prematurely launching their offensive before their plans
were fully developed.

263

Exactly what brought this about is unclear

but it seems that a religious schism appeared in the movement which
caused the withdrawal of a number of prominent church leaders.

269

Nevertheless, at five o'clock in the morning on November 5, 1811,

265

Valdes Oliva, Centro America Alcanzo, p. 31.

266
Mayes, p. 34.
267
/
Valladares Rubio, "Jose M. Delgado," p. 254.
268
269

/
Baron Castro, p. 146.
Holleran, p. 66 .
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Father Delgado rang the bells of La Merced church signaling that the
rebellion had begun.

Soon afterwards a vigorous assault against the

military barracks took place and the arms contained there were
taken.

270

Initially successful, the Intendent Governor and other

superior officers in the government were quickly apprehended and im
prisoned.
At first the rebels' demands were controlled and perhaps not
even truly reflective of their philosophical leanings.

They desired

for example, the popular elections of Ayuntamiento members, free
trade, and the abolition of monopolies.

More indicative, however,

of the charged atmosphere may have been seen on that same day when
the rebels declared "national independence."

271

On November 7, 1811

however, the central leadership in an apparent reversal, swore an
oath of loyalty to Fernando.

Also in an effort to enlist aid from

the other districts, patriot representatives were sent out hopeful
,272
of convoking what one scholar calls "an authentic congress."
As had been hoped, the insurrection did indeed spread.

Fol

lowing San Salvador's example, the towns of Usulutan, Chalatenango,
Cojutepeque, and Zocatecoluca, soon rebelled.

Of these, the re

bellion at Zacatecoluca was especially noteworthy.

At first the

movement there was partially suppressed by the local military but

270
9
Valladares Rubio, "Manuel Jose de Arce," p. 30.
271

/
Valdes Oliva, "Fueron Determinantes," p. 81.

272

/
Baron Castro, p. 153.
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a counteroffensive shortly placed the town in rebel hands.
of the residents of Metapan also rebelled.

A number

Led by Juan de Dios

Mayorga, a postal supervisor, the patriots were pledged to "violently
depose Jorge Guillen de Ulisco, only because he was European."

273

Unfortunately, though, no major towns were inclined to par
ticipate in the rebellion.

In fact, the important centers such as San

Vicente, Santa Ana, Sonsonante and San Miguel went so far as to con
demn the insurgents and some even raised troops to be used against
the rebels.

274

And in San Miguel, authorities publicly burned the

insurgents’ invitation to join in their efforts.
• In Guatemala City, the official response was not long in
coming, even though it eventually proved to be surprisingly subdued
and conciliatory.

The Ayuntamiento there had successfully urged

Bustamante to assume a cautious, and even forgiving tone towards the
rebels.

Accepting this advice, he named the creole Jose de Aycinena

as the new Intendent of El Salvador.

The Ayuntamiento meanwhile

named Jose/ Maria Peynado as their representative while the Archbishop
named as his religious counterpart, Fr. Mariano V i d a u r r e . W h i l e
this atmosphere was indeed conciliatory, it should be remembered that
the Bustamante-Ayuntamiento feud had not yet assumed its future ir
revocable proportions.

Commanded by Aycinena, the royal forces

^^Valdes Oliva, Centro America Alcanzo"', p. 49.
274

/
Valladares Rubio, "Manuel Jose de Arce," p. 32.
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entered San Salvador on December 3, 1811, and were greeted more as
liberators than conquerors by the populace.

Although Arce, Delgado,

and a number of other leaders were jailed, a prudent policy of
amnesty was shortly instituted under which they were quickly freed.

?76

There seems little doubt that the San Salvador revolt of 1811
caused the ensuing flurry of similar disturbances.

On December 20,

1811, for example, in Sensuntepeque the district chief was forceably
removed from office and some supplies of tobacco and liquor were
destroyed.

The leaders of that rebellion were soon captured in San

Salvador and tried.

’77

Yet another uprising occurred in the town of

Masaya "against the Spaniards."

278

Spreading, other revolts occurred

in Monimbo and Diriegas (Nicaragua) where groups of Indians rebelled
and imprisoned local officials.

279

A more serious occurrence happened in Leo^n, Nicaragua where
a determined group led by Fr. Benito Miguelena had been storing arms
and conducting clandestine meetings.

280

On the 13th of December,

1811, the Leonese belligerents assaulted a high level meeting of the
Intendent and demanded an end to Spanish rule.

276
277

281

Faced with this,

Carrillo Ramirez, "Quimeras ," p. 417.

Valdes Oliva, Centro America Alcanzo'', p. 50.

278.
^Zelaya, p. 71.
279
280
281

Ibid., p. 72.
Salazar, Historia, p. 154.
Zelaya, p. 66 .
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the Intendent, Jose Salvador, resigned in favor of a Provincial
Governing Junta comprised of prominent citizens which promised to
consider the rebels' demands.
for were:

282

Some of the changes they called

a change in authorities, lower taxes, the abolition of

monopolies and slavery, and freedom for certain prisoners.
Bustamante responded to this by temporarily appointing the
/

/

Bishop of Leon, Nicolas Garcia Jerez as Intendent.

Under his guid

ance, a general peace was achieved even though the Provincial Governing Junta continued to be dominated by rebel leaders.

283

His control

became undisputed however, when on December 26, and facing a seconu
revolt, he ordered troops to forcefully put down any disturbance.
Outside of sending in auxiliary forces, the response of the CaptainGeneral to this second threat remained much as it had been for San
Salvador and thus the insurgent leaders do not appear to have been
severely molested.
Unabated, reports of disturbances continued to filter into the
capital during 1812.

Paralleling the Leonese problem was a similar

one in its neighboring city of Granada.

Destined to last five months,

the ill-feelings boiled over on New Year's Day, 1812, when a new
Ayuntamiento was formed to replace the one which had resigned under
pressure a week before.

The Granadan leaders, perhaps in an attempt

to stave off any official recriminations, then accepted the Provin.
284
cial Governing Junta of Leon as the supreme government in Nicaragua.

“Ibid., p. 66 .
283Salazar, Historia, p. lo4.
284zelaya, p. 72.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

98

Perhaps believing that these incidents were indicative of a
much larger movement, Bustamante responded more firmly this time and
sent a 1,000 man army into the area.

This may have been done re

luctantly though, since, as Bumgartner implies before ordering the
troops to Granada he had twice offered the rebels a genera! amnesty
which they refused to accept.

285

This triggered a terrible spirit

of vengence in the Captain-General and he ordered the royalist com
mander, Sergeant-Major Pedro Gutierrez to attack Granada.

After two

days of fighting a treaty was signed which allowed for the peaceful
entry into Granada of the army on April 25, 1812.

However, Bustamante

refused to honor the treaty and instead ordered that all rebel lead
ers be arrested and tried.

No less than 158 insurgents were even

tually captured and forced to march to Guatemala City in chains.
Many of these unfortunates were destined to perish in the squalid '
prisons of Trujillo, Havana, and Ca^iz.
The first rebellion of note in Honduras took place in
Tegucigalpa on January 1, 1812.

In a letter describing the event,

the Honduran Intendent, Jose Maria Pinol y Munoz claimed that unrest
was centered in the convent of San Francisco.

286

It also suggested

that the suspected leaders, Fr. Antonio Rojas and Fr. Joaquin de
Heredia be exiled from Honduras since wherever they went "they could
,,287
plant poisonous seeds."

Their complaints were not "clearly ex

pressed," but a possible cause was an attempt by the local government
^85
’86

’87

Bumgartner, del Valle of Central America, p. 64.
May&s, p. 34.
Ibid.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

99

to maintain a number of persons as perpetual members of the "district
government."

288

Approximately 100 armed men were involved in the

disturbance which was serious enough to gain a promise that the ex
pected official decision regarding the above named members would not
take place.

Indicative of the pervading discontent felt by the

colonials towards unequal opportunities was a rebel proclamation
stating that "the mestizos were to be equal with the Spaniards."
Costa Rica also witnessed some disorders.

289

However, as sug

gested earlier, the uprisings may have been nothing more than protests
"against tobacco and liquor monopolies" rather than movements for in
dependence .

The town of San Jose appears to have been the scene

of most of the turbulence.

There, a group of perhaps ten men includ-

ing Francisco Osejo, a teacher in the Casa de Ensenanza de Santo
Tomas did discuss new ideas.

Osejo became "the target of the abso-

..291
lutists because of his propagandizing in favor of liberal ideas."
In the province of Guatemala, revolts in Remedios and
Chiquimula kept royal forces on their guard.

The most serious of

the two happened in Chiquimula on February 23, 1812, when a large

288
289

.
Ibid., p. 33.
Ibid.

Ricardo Fernandez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica; La
Independencia, 2nd ed. (San Jose: Librena Lehmann and Cia., 1941),
p. 2 .
291

Ibid., p. 4.
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group of men attempted to make off with an arms shipment.

292

Why

this happened is not certain although the severity of the treatment
afforded the leaders is indicative of their serious intent.

Captured,

many were eventually sent to prisons in Cuba, Trujillo, Peten, and
Omoa, some for extended periods of time.

293

Also in February of 1812, Manuel Paz, a postmaster, incited
the Indians of San Martin Cuchimatan into a rebellious fervor.
Central to their complaints were a number of abuses committed by
local authorities which forced them into a position of "opposition
to the government of the Europeans.” Unsuccessful, Paz and other
leaders of the plot were eventually jailed as "being suspect in inciting riots."

294

These disturbances, plus others in Olancho and

Juticalpa in Honduras may have been efforts to subvert the royal
troops which were on their way to suppress the Grandan revolt.

295

Perhaps as a result of Bustamante's quick action in sup
pressing the rebellions in San Salvador, Leon, and Granada, the
number of disturbances declined sharply in 1813.

As local officials

became more alert, those persons who were inclined towards insurgent
action found it increasingly difficult to plan, much less execute,
their campaigns.

On January 10, 1813, for example, in the town of

29 2
/
/
Valdes Oliva, Centro America Alcanzo', p. 57.
293
294
295

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 61.
Ibid., p. 62.
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San Miguel, Ignacio Corona attempted to incite the populace but was
arrested and jailed even before his movement got started.

296

Therefore, while not as numerous as before, those plots that
were hatched were more secretive and better planned than before.
In March of 1813, the newly appointed Intendent of El Salvador, Jose
Maria Peinado, who had assumed those duties after Aycinina was ap
pointed to an official post in Spain, reported to Bustamante that a
second rebellion was being planned in the city of San Salvador.

297

In this instance the conspirators were much better coordinated and
maintained a truly secret organization with chapters in many
precincts.

An indication of .the depth to which the organization

had permeated official circles is revealed by the recruitment of a
Peinado confident, Victoriano Moto.

’95

The leaders were much the

same as before except for Fr. Delgado who had been confined to
Guatemala City as a result of his rebellious activities in 1811.

299

While their concerns were not very different than those previously
stated, they were further aggravated by harsh imprisonments, distress
over the happenings in Granada, and a feeling that the premises of
the 1812 Constitution were not being kept.^^
296

Ibid., p. 66 .

W'nGavidia,
-A,
l:xi.
’ 93

"Ibid., 1: 6 .
9QQ
/
/
Valladares Rubio, "Jose Matias Delgado," p. 260.
^^Gavidia, 1: 5; and Valladares Rubio, "Manuel Jose de Arce,"
p. 37; Valladares Rubio, "Jos£ Matias Delgado," p. 259.
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For all its planning however, it proved to be a fruitless ad
venture as Peinado had cleverly placed a spy named Costeno in the
rebel midst.

Due to this the plot was uncovered even before it had

gained any momentum and the principal leaders were quickly arrested.
If they were anticipating the same understanding as before they were
sadly mistaken for this instance, Bustamante's mercy would extend
only to the "simple people," a suggestion which probably came from
his secretary, Jose7 Cecilio del Valle in order to forestall any furv, 301
ther trouble.
The most serious threat of 1813 was the

conspiracy

of Bele“n

which was especially alarming to the Spanish authorities because of
its location in the capital.

Furthermore, it was one of the most all-

encompassing, in terms of membership, of all the rebellions.
tial list of participants is worth noting.

A par

There was the highly re

spected Indian priest and professor of philosophy, Fr. Tomas Ruiz, the
/

Sub-Prior of the Convent of Belen, Fr. Juan Nepomuceno de la Con
cepcion, the priests Fr. Victor Castrillo, Fr. Benito Miguelena, and
✓
Fr. Manuel de San Jose. Also included was the aristocratic council
man and officer of Dragoons, Jose F. Barrundia, Lieutenant Joaquin
Yudice, and Sergeants Castro, Diaz, and Aranzamendi.

Employees in

various enterprises such as Andres Dardon, Mariano Bedoya, Manuel
Ibarra, Juan Alvarado, and Jose/ Ruiz were members of the plot as
/

were the farmers Cayetano Bedoya and Mariano Cardenas, the merchant
Manuel Tot, the lawyer Ver.ancio Lo’pez, and Francisco Montiel, a
prison guard.
30lBumgartner, p. 72.
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Their plan, although extensive was unwritten and included
operations in a variety of sectors.

Grandiose in scope, the ultimate

goal was independence with the arrest of Bustamante and the take-over
of the military barracks as the immediate objectives.

302

Designed

to begin on December 24, 1813, it was upset by Lieutenant Yudice who
appears to have betrayed the plot on December 21.

303

Most of the

304
rebels were quickly rounded up as well as some unfortunate innocents.
Bustamante’s vengence was terrible and diverse.

After lan

guishing in jail for almost a year the conspirators were sentenced on
September 14, 1814.

Barrundia (who had escaped), Yudice, Ruiz,
t
/ j
t
Castrillo, dela Concepcion, de San Jose, Diaz, Castro, Dardon,
Fernandez, Bedoya, Ibarra, Cardenas and Tot were sentenced to death.
Fr. Miguelena was sentenced to ten years in an African prison in
addition to being exiled from the American colonies.

As severe as

these pronouncements sound, it is worthwhile noting that none of the
conspirators served their full sentences nor were the death sentences
carried out.
The year 1814 opened with an ominous note for Captain-General
/

Bustamante.

Not only was the Conspiracy of Belen still fresh, but he

soon received news that in Remedios, two prison guards and a soldier
302

Vela, ’’Bosquejo," p. 181.

303

"Relacion de los Autos Pasados por la Capitania General
Relativos ai Proyecto de Conspiracion que se Forulaba en el Convento
de Belen," Anales de la Sociedad de Geografia e Historia de Guatemala
11 (September, 1934): 15.
304

Parker, del Valle and the Establishment, p. 36.
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had attempted to incite the local military to rebellion.

305

Also,

in January, a rather serious disturbance occurred again in San
Salvador.

Quickly suppressed, the area was then placed under the

charge of Colonel Jose Mendez v Quiroga, the former president of the
Tribunal de Fidelidad, who quickly instituted a reign of terror similar to that which was then underway in the capital.

306

In light of Fernando's return to the throne in mid-1814 and
the fear created by the "terror bustamantino," the decline of inde
pendence-oriented disturbances continued.

Confined to secret clubs

which were organized, the next rebellion would not take place until
1816.^^

In that year a plot of potential dimension was uncovered

in Guatemala City.

Called the Conjuracion del Meson de Dolores, or

the Gathering of the Inn of Dolores, after the place where the con
spirators met, it was led by Fr. Juan de Salvatierra and his brother
Jose, a weaver.

In their plans, the brothers had hoped to include

not only the weavers of the suburb of San Sebastian but also certain
military elements as well.

308

Unfortunately, poor judgment resulted

in the recruitment of a loyalist who subsequently betrayed the con
spiracy to o f f i c i a l s . A l s o in 1316 Jose Santiago Milla, the former

^^Valdes Oliva, Centro America Alcanzo', p. 85.
"^^Valladares Rubio, "Manuel Jose de Arce," p. 40.
'Frederick, Crowe, The Gospel in Central America (London:
Charles Gilpin, 1850), p. 118.
^^Melendez, Textos, p. 130.
^^Valdes Oliva, Centro Am/rica Alcanzo', p. 89.
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deputy to the Cortes from Honduras, unsuccessfully attempted to bring
to mutiny selected military units in that province.

Thwarted, he

again surfaced a year later in Honduras where he tried to persuade a
group of tobacco farmers to rebel.

310

In 1819 the Captain-General

was notified by Intendent Tinoco of Honduras of the detention of
persons for subversive activities.

Little is known of this disturb

ance except that it did pose an obvious threat since it involved a
number of government employees.

Nevertheless prompt action by the

government defused any possible threat the plots may have had.
The final disturbance of note occurred in the district of
Totonicapan near Guatemala City where, in 1820, an Indian rebellion
of "alarming character” took place.

There, the complaints seemed to

be directed mainly towards the oppressive tributes which had been
imposed when Fernando returned in 1814.

311

In proper fashion, the

Indians eventually sought redress of their grievances by sending
emissaries to the capital.

Unsuccessful, the Indians responded by

forming a kind of loose confederacy among nearby towns.

In July,

they crowned Atancio Tzul King, and appointed Lucas Agailar as
president.

A constitution was also written and ail collected tribute

was returned.

312

Although the Indian kingdom endured for less than

310
Mayes, p. 38.
311

Ibid., p. 26.

312
Ricardo Falla, "Conflictos^ Limxtrofes /de Comunidades
Indigenas del Corregimiento deSololay Totonicapan (Siglos XVIII y
XIX), Anales de la Sociedad de Geografxa e Historia de Guatemala
45, (1972): 149.
j
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a month it was nevertheless able to repulse the initial forces which
were sent to suppress it.

Unfortunately, the superior strength of

the government prevailed, forcing the rebels to surrender.

313

In retrospect then, the Guatemalan rebellions have few con
sistent points.

Other than frequently being unhappy over government

commercial policies and the discrimination in employment shown creoles,
there are few threads of uniformity to be noted.

An exception to this

might be the involvement of the clergy, who may very well have been
frustrated parish priests, in every important insurrection where in
many cases they were the leaders.

Yet it would be a mistake to assume

that all religious, especially the top-most levels, desired independ
ence.

There were numerous instances where the bishops did all in

their power to frustrate any rebellious activity.

A good example of

this was in Leon where Bishop Garcia ordered the use of force against
any rebellion.

Of special importance, Rodolfo Baron Castro suggests

that in Guatemala City, Archbishop Casaus1 "intransigent attitude"
created untenable situations with subordinates who were "intimately
tied" to the Constitution of 1812.

314

As a confirmed monarchist

Casaus may also have "encouraged Bustamante's suspicions about the
loyalty of the creoles because of his earlier experiences in
Mexico."

315

When he ordered all the priests in El Salvador to preach

313Valdes
‘ Oliva, Centro America
'
' p. 93.
Alcanzo,
^^Baron Castro, p. 106.
315

t
/
Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 115.
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out against the insurgents there, Fr. Miguel Ignacio Carcomo of Santa
Ana responded by calling the rebellion of 1812, sacrilegious, subversive, seditious, insurgent, and unfaithful.

316

Finally, one can

note the Vicar of Granada who in 1812 wrote a proclamation attacking
the rebellion there as anti-Christian and that the rebels were trait„ „ , 317
ors to God.
Thus the French invasion of 1808 served to initiate certain
events which would lead indirectly to Central American independence.
Unobservable at first, the mentality of liberty, incubated through
the enlightened ideas espoused at the Uni .rsity of San Carlos, was subliminallv encouraged by occurrences on the Iberian peninsula.

The

freedoms granted by the Cortes and the Constitution of 1812 fostered
even further the psychology of independence which in all probability
was not even consciously accepted or acknowledged by the Central
Americans themselves.

While it has been oftentimes repeated that

the French invasion did serve to draw the Spanish Empire together,
it can also be speculated that at the same time it served to pull the
individual colonies into each other.

In an isolated area such as

Guatemala, long neglected by the crown, the sense of aloneness was
only aggravated.
Colonial leaders were not oblivious to the obvious impotence
of the Spanish throne in the face of a superior force either.

Nor

were they blind to the ease with which the occupation and imprisonment

316
317

Baro'n Castro, p. 139.
Melendez, Textos, p. 139.
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of their sovereign was completed-

Even so, actual separation from

Spain remained a nebulous ideal and probably not seriously considered
by the vast majority of colonials.
The appointment of a new, and ruthless, Captain-General,
which paralleled the era of rebellion further complemented the still
nascent sense of Central American sovereignty.

It is probable that

had Bustamante maintained his initially moderate posture towards the
rebels, and had he been more permissive towards the inevitable and
constitutionally authorized changes, a separation from Spain may have
been significantly delayed.
Nevertheless, and even considering the severity of many of
the revolts, the actions taken by the Captain-General did help to
defuse the spirit of rebellion that appeared to be growing.

The re

turn of Fernando to the throne in 1814 effectively sealed the fate of
any serious movement towards freedom.
Still uncharted, the interim between the first and second
constitutional periods (1814-1820) seems to have been one of fer
mentation.

A time in which the lessons learned under Bustamante

plus the wisdom gained through secret deliberations were to be the
foundations of Central America's separation from Spain.

Ail that

was lacking was an event significant enough to force the Guatemalans
into accepting the inevitability of independence.

This was not to

be long in coming.
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CHAPTER IV

CENTRAL AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE AND ITS
IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS

There seems little doubt that the iron-fisted tactics employed
by Captain-General Bustamante and the untimely reappearance of Fer
nando effectively thwarted any Central American drive towards inde
pendence, conscious or otherwise.

And, in the final analysis, it

may prove that the creole elements in Central America did not in fact,
desire full independence but rather a more egalitarian society ex
tensively modified but still under a Spanish monarch.

Under any

circumstances though, the creoles had to resign themselves to biding
their time until Bustamante was inevitably transferred and to this
end many influential colonials worked vigorously.
In 1817 Bustamante did leave Guatemala to assume an honorable
post in Spain.

In his place came a far more pliable executive whose

favor the creoles immediately began to cultivate, undoubtedly hoping
to regain and maintain their former position of influence and domi
nance.

That they were successful and possibly content with the out

come of that venture is suggested by the relatively tranquil atmos
phere that was preserved until 1820 when the repromulgation of the
1812 Constitution occurred.
In that year, Central America once again, as in 1312, became
the scene of feverish political activity.

The struggle for power in

both the ayuntamientos and Provincial Deputations was intense,

109
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especially since the new Captain-General obeyed the die turns of the
Constitution and freely allowed the development of an ambiance con
ducive to the creation of political parties.

Intuitively, the creole

leaders recognized the need for, and actively sought to control, both
the Ayuntamientos and the Provincial Deputations even though the
aristocrats' informal status remained secure under the protective eye
of the Captain-General.
Therefore, in the eighteen months or so between the reprom
ulgation of the 1812 Constitution and Central American independence,
one notes the growth of increasingly sophisticated political organi
zations.

A critical appendage to this phenomenon was the equally

important development of competing periodicals which complemented
either the conservative or liberal parties.

Compounding this un

settled atmosphere came the disruptive news of the Mexican declaration
of independence in February of 1821.

With Mexico's immediate prox

imity to Guatemala it became impossible for the Central American
leaders to ignore that happening and it subsequently played a large
role in their future deliberations.
Creole spokesmen who had seen the 1812 Constitution as a
chance to achieve all that they had hoped for, were thus faced with
a new dilemma.

Whereas they had anticipated a secure return to their

favored position, and despite the guarantees offered by Mexico, that
nation still remained an unknown ingredient to the Central Americans.
Especially disturbing was that in Guatemala, the faction which favored
total independence was vocal and gaining strength daily.

Further

more, this same group leaned heavily towards a republican form of
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government and not one ruled by a king.

These facts, and the pos

sibility of a mass revolt forced colonial aristocrats into declaring
independence although it appears that from the beginning an immedi
ate annexation to Mexico was planned.
unfortunately, the latent yet incredibly intense factionalism
which surfaced just prior to independence, plus Mexico's own instabil
ity spelled doom to the short lived union with Guatemala.

After the

Mexican authorities left Central America, the internal rivalries they
had sought to extinguish only blazed even more fiercely than before.
Central America soon entered an era of petty civil wars which would
eventually destroy what appeared to be a most promising future.

Political Party Development
The growth of a discernable political system in Central
America was an observable phenomenon from 1811 forward which owed
its existence to a number of factors.

Of primary importance was the

state of the educational programs in the colony.

It will be recalled

that although good elementary instruction was very often difficult to
obtain, an excellent education could be had at the University of San
Carlos.

There, the introduction of new methods and discussions

stimulated the questioning of the old and a more ready acceptance of
unorthodox ideas which might have been considered threatening under
other circumstances.

In light of the many excellent educators avail

able, it is not surprising that in the highly critical years, 17751799, no less than 666 degrees were granted, more than twice as many
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as had been granted in the preceding 25 years.

318

The Sociedad Economica was another important channel for the
dissemination of ideas.

As noted elsewhere, this organization had

promoted a number of innovations dealing with education, commerce,
and social issues.

Not confined philosophically to any one particular

class, social barriers were often transcended as when such traditional
opponents as the Spanish hierarchy and the creole aristocracy rubbed
elbows in their numerous discussions.

Although suppressed in 1799,

many important issues which it had helped reveal and openly consider
could never again be ignored completely.
Although more limited in scope than the Sociedad Economica,
the Consulado de Comercio also contributed to enhancing the sense of
growing expectations.

Even though limited to an elitist membership,

certain modifications in their former position soon became necessary.
The simple fact that their dominance was threatened by the free ex
change of ideas prompted this.

Colonial merchants did not ignore

the obvious benefits gained from adapting new methods nor fail to
note the advantages to be gained from policies still considered
illegal in Spain.
The inherent weaknesses from which Spain suffered became
especially noticeable after the Napoleonic invasion and prompted
questions regarding faults in other areas.

Privately, and publicly,

Central Americans began to question Spain's policies and even the
traditionally close relations between king and subject came under

31S.
.
,n,
canning, p. 203.
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scrutiny.

Even though a definite character has yet to be satis

factorily applied to the 1808-1820 rebellions, common preferences of
a conservative or liberal nature did nonetheless surface.

Also,

Bustamante's harsh attitude and demeanor forced many into considering
alternative points of view.

Especially important was his conduct

toward rebels from Granada and El Salvador, many of whom were members
of the local aristocracy and thus highly influential.
While the above characteristics did contribute to the growth
of political ideologies in pre-independence Central America, it
should not be assumed that these positions were sharply divided or
obvious.

While it mus-t be admitted that in some instances there

were true conservative, liberal, or even strongly independent senti
ments, quite often these feelings were determined by personal inter
ests, a problem which would become more evident after independence.
Nonetheless, it appears probable that some political views were held
by a number of important persons before 1810.
A large-scale coalescing of political philosophies is first
noticed by Rodriguez in the Bustamante-Ayuntamiento split in late
1811.

319

Woodward goes somewhat farther and suggests that at approx

imately this same time two definitive political parties emerged.

The

first being the government party which grew up around Bustamante and
consisted of pro-Spanish merchants in the capital and provincial
textile producers.

The second party, which grew around a personal

mistrust of Bustamante, was made up of a strange conglomeration which
319
/
Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 107.
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included the Guatemalan aristocracy, the lower classes, and some
, 320
other intellectuals.

The government party was, as with its

counterpart, also based on personal grounds as these persons hoped
that a continued association with Spain would maintain profitable
monopolies.

A case in point was their opposition to the introduction

of English cottons which would hurt both merchants and weavers.

321

The Constitutional Elections-1812
At the same time that sentiments toward the Captain-General
were bringing on the coalescing of political amalgamations, the 1812
elections provided an ideal forum on which to bring the various
positions into the open.

As ordered by the Cortes, the first elec

tions of this sort were for Ayuntamiento and Provincial Deputation
offices.

But before the elections took place, and to insure uniform

adherence to regulations, a Preparatory Junta was formed whose re
sponsibilities were to interpret the rules and to disseminate them
to the various parts of the colony.

It was decided that the first

elections were to be held on November 22, 1812, and be applicable
only to the Ayuntamiento position.

At this time the citizenry voted

only for electors, not for the councilmen themselves.

322

In Guatemala City at least, it appears that the election
mechanism worked surprisingly well.

In that city an acceptable

320
Woodward, "Economic and Social Origins," p. 559.

3')1Ibid.
“Rodriguez, The Ca'diz Experiment, p. 105.
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balance between creoles and Spaniards was attained with a majority of
those selected being graduates of the University of San Carlos.

More

specifically, the results were, for mayor, Sebastian Melon, and for
vice-mayor, Francisco Salomon.

The councilmen were Antonio Juarros,

Lorenzo Moreno, Domingo Pavon, Juan Bautista Asturias, Pedro Batres,

Jose Franciso Valdes, Franciso Barrundia, Jose Maria Granados, Manuel
del Castillo, Jose Urrela, Eusebio Castillo, and as secretary, Juan

x

Franciso Cordova, a principal antagonist of Bustamante.

323

almost two-thirds had aristocratic connections of some sort.

Of these,
324

Even so, one respected Central American scholar considers that it
was the first collective manifestation of a liberal orientation in
Central America.

325

Francisco Gavidia, in the same vein, comments

that in San Salvador, a similar event occurred when the Ayuntamiento
seats there were also won by liberals.

The results there were,

interestingly enough, contested unsuccessfully by Intendent Governor
326
Peinado, one of the authors of the famous Instructions.

The avail

able information thus suggests that in two critical Ayuntamientos,
those of Guatemala City and San Salvador, a liberal majority pre
vailed, an obvious setback to Bustamante.
323

Salazar, Historia, p. 161.

324
"’Strobeck, p. 5.
3’5
Facio E., p. 27^
326, ...
,
oavidia, 1:13.
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The Captain-General's policy of restricting by every method
possible the Provincial Deputation elections suggests a strong fear
of its potential strength.

Because of these practices the deputies

to this promising institution did not meet until September, 1813,
barely eight months before Fernando's return and his suppression of
all constitutional decrees.
fully carried out.

Nevertheless, the elections were success

Here, the results were that Fr. Jose/ Maria Perez

from Quetzaltenango, Buno Medina of Comayagua, Eulogio Carrea of
Chiapas, and Manuel Jose Pavon of Sacatepequez, were elected.

327

Due

to its short tenure, little evidence exists to pinpoint a political
philosophy although a probable aristocratic orientation is suggested
by the close cooperation noted elsewhere with the Guatemala City
Ayuntamiento.

Thus the unfortunate Bustamante found himself in the

unenviable position of being almost completely surrounded by legally
constituted antagonists.

Fernando1s Return
Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig in October of 1813 set the stage
for the return of the Bourbon monarchy to Spain.

Unfortunately, it

also set in motion certain acts which would completely reverse the
positive liberal reforms of the Cortes.

It caused Spain and her

dominions to regress politically and brought on a denial of the 1812
Constitution.

This state of affairs was to exist until 1820 when a

further upheaval would reinstitute the above changes and Constitution
Meanwhile, the extraordinary Cortes, author of many new and
<3 o

7

Rodriguez, The Ca'diz Experiment, p. 117.
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advanced laws, dissolved itself on October 1, 1S13.

Its successor,

a general Cortes, was selected and entered Madrid a few months later
on January 15, 1814.

328

It is generally accepted that in certain

respects the general Cortes promised to be as liberal as the old one
had been.

For example, in a step that would eventually lead to

Fernando's suppression of the 1812 Constitution, the general Cortes
decreed that any act of his was void as long as he was surrounded
by the "armed forces of the usurper of the crown."

329

It also or

dered, on February 2, 1814, in anticipation of his return, that
Fernando could not exercise any royal power until he swore allegiance
to the 1812 Constitution.

330

Because of these reasons and others,

when Fernando entered Sp a m on March 24, 1814 he was not <^urte sure
as to what route to take.

Royal vanity mandated a challenge to any

restriction of his powers but self-preservation dictated a wait and
see attitude, at least initially.

331

However, after receiving seri

ous assurances of support from powerful military and political leaders,
he decreed that the Constitution and all other laws promulgated by
the extraordinary Cortes were null and void.

As an epitaph to the

Acts of 1812, on May 10 he went so far as to order the arrest of all
the liberal leaders who at that time included the deputies Larrazabal

328
329

Lovett, 1: 413.
Ibid., p. 377.

^"^Aguado and Alca^zar Molina, 3: 568.
331

Carr, p. 118.
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and Castillo from Central America.

332

Thus,

the popularly elected Ayuntamientos were replaced by
others whose offices were inherited, the constitutionally
responsible ministers were succeeded by the old cabinet;
the Council of State and the Supreme Tribunal disappeared
and were replaced by the Royal Council, the Council of
Castillo and the Inquisition, which had been suppressed
by the Cortes only to return immediately by virtue of
Fernando's decree of July 21, 1814.^33
In Central America, Bustamante, who had been feigning illness
in order to ward off the continuing demands for his dismissal, greeted
the news of Fernando's return with obvious relish.

Forgetting his

infirmities, he "initiated the 'Terror' with a savage vengeance."

334

As might be expected he was especially wrathful toward the creoles
and the Ayuntamiento of Guatemala City.

All copies of the

Instructions were ordered removed from the archives, important refer
ences to the year 181C were to be segregated and forwarded to che
government, the paintings of deputies Pavon

and Larrazabal plus

that of the Marques de Aycinena were removed to a lesser room, and
most ominously, a list was to be compiled of all those who had signed
^
335
the Instractions.
The same order which disallowed the Constitution also removed
all elected councilmen and reinstated those who had held office in

352.
Ioid.
333

Pio Zabala y Lera, Espa'na Bajo los Borbones, 5th ed.
(Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 19oo), p. 278.
334
/
Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 127.
335

Salazar, Historia, p. 184.
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In Guatemala City however there were only four surviving

councilmen and two of these, Aycinena and Peinado, were occupied
elsewhere.

The two that were left, Isasi and Juarros were reassigned

to their former positions with all other vacant posts apparently
filled through an as yet uninvestigated election in 1815.

336

A by

product of these actions was Bustamante's authorized harrassment of
any creole aristocrats who were somehow connected to the signers of
the Instructions. Furthermore, these same persons were prohibited
from holding any political position until 1817 when a royal pardon re
j their
v
stored
privileges. 337

In Spain however, Jose/ de Aycinena, who had been appointed to
the Council of the Indies, faithfully continued to report Bustamante'
overly-zealous methods.

Due in large part to his efforts, both the

Council and the king modified their position not only toward the
Guatemalan creoles but to the Instructions as well.

A ce'dula dated

June 13, 1817, rescinded the 1815 order which authorized che harsh
treatment of the colonial leaders and, noting a certain royal displeasure towards him, also recalled the hated Captain-General.

338

Bustamante informed the Guatemala City Ayuntamiento on August 19,
1817, that he had been ordered to leave and that General Carlos de
Urrutia y Montoya was to replace him.
336

Rigid to the end, he refrained

Ibid., p. 181.

337
Woodward, "Economic and Social Origins,' p. 559.
338

Valdes Oliva, "Fueron Determinantes," p. 87.
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from mentioning the new royal attitude toward the Instructions or
that many of the still imprisoned patriots had been pardoned.

339

A final note concerning the Bustamante era was the residencia
conducted on him by the Guatemalan Audiencia in 1820.

Related docu

ments indicate the true extent of his alienation from every social
level, high and low.

He was charged with being unnecessarily venge

ful toward and plotting the ruin of the houses of Aycinena and
Beltranena and in general being an illegal hindrance towards the wellto-do from any background.

His distrust of, and animosity towards,

both the Ayuntamiento and the Audiencia were recorded as was his
practice of partiality in employment.

340

He was accused of censoring

the mail, abusing prisoners, of having a lax attitude toward crime,
of not supporting those laws which were favorable to the Indians,
and even murder.

341

Even though the Audiencia found him guilty on

almost all counts, he retired semi-honorably to a lucrative position
in Spain.

Political Development After 1S20
In January, 1820, two junior officers in the Spanish army
began a rebellion which would shake the Empire to its foundations.
The units involved in the revolt had been destined to relieve the
weary royal forces in the colonies.

However, rather than go, they

^"^Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 129.
340

Salazar, Historia, p. 195.

y
Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 129.
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apparently decided to rebel rather than face an uncertain future in
a far land.

This was a precipitous,

if inadvertant act, for although

it did force Fernando into accepting the 1312 Constitution, momentum
towards this same end had been gathering ever since he had returned
in 1814.

For example, Spain had experienced a number of serious

popular revolts which "reflected the post-war depression" and "a
restrictive monetary policy."

342

Compounding the presence of such

obvious governmental instability were the colonial wars which were
well on their way to attaining their final victories.

Thus, it ap

pears that the military, faced with a king who stubbornly refused to
accept the disintegration of his empire and who was even calling for
further sacrifice, felt compelled to withdraw their support of him.

343

Although Fernando continued to intrigue against it, he never
theless swore obedience to the 1812 Constitution on March 17, 1820.
News of this event reached the Captaincy-General of Guatemala in the
early summer of that same year.

Urrutia officially accepted it on

July 9, 1820, and shortly thereafter it was proclaimed throughout the
colony.
With the reinstitution of the 1812 Constitution in 1820, new
elections for the Ayuntamientos, the Provincial Deputations, and the
Cortes deputies were also authorized, but with some noticeable dif
ferences.

Of paramount importance was the attitude of Captain-General

Urrutia who, unlike Bustamante, appears to have placed few obstacles

^^Carr, pp. 122, 126.
343

Ibid., p. 124.
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in the way of the free exercise of Constitutional rights.

Under him,

the Central American political scene matured markedly and a more re
sponsible and journalistically sophisticated press emerged.

Both of

these institutions quickly became tools to be used by the various
vested interest groups.
Whereas in 1812, modem political philosophies were still in
embryonic stages, the events since then had allowed for the appearance
of relatively mature political foundations and practices.

Bumgartner

gives credit for this to the combination of freedom of the press plus
the constitutional elections from which the "lines of two political
groups commenced to form."

344

Yet even so, political ideals do not

appear to have been of principal importance.

Rather, as both Bum

gartner and Thomas L. Karnes note, the major issue was most probably,
the simple control of Guatemala based

upon the promotion of personal

. 345
interests.
Even though other factions

or splinter groups may have

formed, there were only two of any significance.

346

On one side were

the Cacos, a group which had years before been in opposition to
Bustamante.

Opposing them were the remnants of Bustamante's favor

ites who were referred to as the Gazistas. Respectively, each of the

344

Bumgartner, del Valle of Central America, p. 106.

345
Karnes, The Failure of Union, p. 17; and Bumgartner,
del Valle of Central America, p. 107.
Gordon Kenyon, "Gabino Ga^nza and Central America's
Independence from Spain," The Americas 12 (January, 1957): 249.
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above groups would come to espouse liberal or conservative ideologies.

347
/

The philosophical leader of the Gazistas was Jose Cecilio del
Valle, a Honduran creole with close connections to the Spanish
hierarchy.

As a high government employee he had been Bustamante's

secretary and personally coveted an Audiencia judgeship.

Called

"espanolistas" by Salazar, the other principal Gazistas were Dr.
Mariano Larrave, Antonio Robles, and Ignacio Faronda, all of whom
were creoles.

348

Probably because of his well-deserved reputation as an in
tellectual leader, Central American historians generally refrain from
criticizing del Valle. Rodriguez, however, does note that his enemies
considered him a traitor, and accused him of being arrogant, egotistical, and eccentric.

349

He also calls him an "opportunist" when

he attacked the "family" since he knew very well that many persons
resented their dominance.

350

Nevertheless, he was a tough adversary

who was able to forge a varied group of malcontents, artisans, mer
chants, and provincials into a viable political entity.
The Cacos meanwhile were led by a creative gToup at whose
head was Dr. Pedro Molina, a future member of the Executive Triumvirate

347Mayes, p. 34.

348

Salazar, Historia, p. 209.

349
✓
Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 134.
350

Ibid., p. 135.
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which ruled Central America for a short while in the mid 1820's.
Closely associated with him was Fr. Jose Matias Delgado, the Sal
vadorean patriot, Mariano Galvez and Juan Barrundia, both future
chiefs of the province of Guatemala, Mariano Bedoya, and Jos^ Francisco Cordova.

351

The Cacos' alliance was truly a universal one as

shown by the inclusion of Galvez, who may have been the ill-timed
offspring of a "family” daughter.

352

Also deeply involved were

Mariano and Juan Jose Aycinena who, for the time being at least, felt
that their interests would be best served by casting their lot with
the Cacos.

Strangely enough, the lower classes, perhaps drawn by the

Cacos' anti-government position, also joined them.

353

This cooper

ative effort, however, was destined to collapse after independence
was declared in 1821.
Evidence of the growing political sophistication can be seen
in the efforts expended to marshal the artisan confidence.

But even

though both sides made noteworthy attempts at winning this bloc of
votes, only the Gazistas were successful.

The artisans had been hurt

financially due to the Constitution's free trade stipulations to the
point where their number had been reduced from near three thousand to
approximately one thousand.

351

354

Espousing a conservative platrorm the

Bumgartner, del Valle of Central America, p. 117.

"^Jose A. Lemus, "Biografia del Doctor Mariano Galvez,"
Anales de la Sociedad de Geografia e Historia de Guatemala, 2 (July,
1926), p. 364.
^^Mel/ndez, Textos, p. 182.
354

Salazar, "Mariano de Aycinena," p. 116.
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Gazistas played upon their fears and when the Cacos came out in favor
of free trade the artisan vote fell inevitably to the Gazistas.

Journalism in the 1820 Elections
A development parallel to that of the political parties in the
1820 elections was the introduction of the two competing newspapers,
El Amigo de la Patria, edited by Jose Cecilio del Valle, and El
Editor Constitucional, edited by Dr. Pedro Molina.

Such a "two

party press" was fundamental to a national political maturation thanks
to their wide circulation "throughout Central America."

355

This was

true even though as Gordon Kenyon suggests, neither side, as yet,
really knew how to use the press as a truly effective tool.

356

Never

theless, their effort was pronounced and, as Zelaya states, the two
periodicals "exercised a great influence over the entire colony and
came to create the necessary climate to produce some form of politi,
..357
cal change.

They effectively served as powerful instruments in

spreading the ideas of the Enlightenment "and thus conditioned minds
toward independence."

358

One newspaper, El Editor Constitucional, evolved from the
discussions of the Tertulia Patr^otica, or Patriotic Gathering, which
was formed shortly after Bustamante's departure in Guatemala City.

^^Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 133.
356
357

/
Kenyon, "Gamza," p. 243.
Zelaya, p. 88 .

353
/
Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 134.
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The Tertulia was initially considered as a platform to promote the
deliberation of new ideas, some of which undoubtedly came to represent
separatist sentiments.

Among its more reknown members were many

liberals and included Pedro Molina, Fr. Jose7 Maria Castillo, Manuel
and Juan Montufar, Marcial Zebadua, Jose Beteta, Vicente Garcia
/
359
Granados, and Jose Francisco Barrundia.

For those participants

whose prior inclinations had not included much more than a mainten
ance of the status quo, any discussions led by the republican Molina,
or for that matter by most of the above mentioned persons, must have
proven especially stimulating if not outright threatening.
El Editor Constitucional made its initial appearance on July
24, 1820, with Molina, Montufar, Fr. Castillo, and Barrundia being
the major literary contributors.

360

As to its effect, one scholar

notes that it fell like a "bomb among the espanolistas" especially
since it quickly became evident that it was to support an independ, • every manner possible.
-V, 361
ence platform
m

An examole, in response

to official government reports which tended to distort information
on the Mexican and South American rebellions, and indicative of
Molina's pursuit of any idea supportive of independence was when he
established agents in southern Mexico who were able to provide more
reliable data.
354

36 2

The Caco newspaper also attacked Spain and

Vela, "Bosquejo de la Vida," p. 182.

"^Salazar, Historia, p. 204.
361

Salazar, "Mariano de Aycinena," p. 118.

"^Kenyon, "Gainza," p. 244.
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Spanish policies more venomously than did its more conservative
counterpart.

363

When it argued that Central America stood little

chance of ever having a fair constitutional government it took ir
reversible steps towards becoming "reknowned as the champion of
Central American independence."

Writings were published on the

emancipation of the colonies, civil liberties, and even anti-monarchial themes even though a number of its supporters were still
constitutional monarchists.

364

Weekly items of world importance

were reported as were the debates in the Spanish Cortes and some
bitter commentaries on Spanish-creole inequality.

365

El Amigo de la Patria first appeared on October 6, 1S20, and,
as befits its editor, it dealt in facts, logic, and a search for what
was fundamentally good for Central America.

366

It spoke of the ad

vantages of civilization and pursued scientific topics, especially
political economics, while at the same time trying to combat Molina's
statements on independence and the injustice of Spanish rule.

367

Yet

del Valle was not necessarily against personal freedom or constitu
tionally guaranteed rights.

363

He did, however, maintain stronger

Ibid., p. 243.

364
Franklin D. Parker, "Jose Cecilio del Valle: Scholar and
Patriot," Hispanic American Historical Review 32 (1950): 521.
365
Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 17.
^^Parker, "del Valle: Scholar and Patriot," p. 522.
367

Salazar, "Mariano de Aycinena," p. 118.
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interests in property and its protection and the belief that progress
would indeed come, but he preferred them to emanate from evolutionary
changes in existing institutions.

368

Not without its muckracking side,

in the third issue of El Amigo de la Patria he published a list of
fifty-nine members of the "family" who held no less than sixty-four
government positions with a total salary of almost 90,000 pesos.

369

Indicative of how Spanish officialdom viewed El Amigo de la Patria,
a Minister of the Treasury in Guatemala referred to its contributing
«j
n-370
autnors as ■tgood, Spaniards.

Ayuntamiento Elections
As mentioned above, a Preparatory Junta had been formed to
establish the formal rules regarding the 1820 elections.

One of their

decisions was to hold two elections, the first being for the
ayuntamiento seats whereas the second would be for the Provincial
Deputation and the Cortes deputies.
The ayuntamiento elections took place in July of 1820 and
represented a struggle between the Cacos and the Gazista forces with
free trade, at least in Guatemala City, being the principal issue.
Exactly why this was so remains unclear but it appears that it was

368
369

Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 18.
Salazar, "Mariano de Aycinena," p. 173.

370.Melendez, Textos, p. 155.
371Ibid., p. 181.
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due to multiple causes.

First, both parties were probably searching

for a cause celebre and the arguments on free trade could be either
effectively pro or con.

Second, the influential weaver artisans

were no longer "passive," but were instead stubbornly unwilling to
allow any class to dominate Central American commerce and permit the
importation of English textiles.

372

Third, there may have been

true ideological differences between the two camps regarding open
trade policies and their potential effects.

Finally, personal inter

ests cannot be totally ignored with feelings on the issue being ap
parently quite strong as can be seen when Caco authorities sent a
military force to disrupt an artisan Gazista meeting.

373

On a coarser level, both parties hurled charges which may or
may not have been accurate.

The Cacos charged the Gazistas with cor

ruption, outdated economic views, and self-interest.

The Gazistas on

the other hand attacked the aristocrat's traditional privileges, and
the dangers of free trade while at the same time defending orderly
rather than radical change.
The elections themselves produced mixed results wherein no
one party became totally dominant while a few victories were even won
by candidates who were of no particular political philosophy.

For

example, in the Guatemala City Ayuntamiento, the Gazistas gained a

372
Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 133.
^"^Melendez, Textos, p. 181.
374
Woodward, "Economic and Social Origins," p. 562.
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small but workable majority when both del Valle and Jose Francisco
Cordova were elected to high positions.

However, two highly influ

ential Cacos, Mariano Aycinena and Francisco Arrivillaga were also
elected which served to neutralize somewhat the Gazista position.
On the other hand, the Cacos were more overtly successful in the
battle for seats on the Provincial Deputation.

There, they gained

a slight majority which was made even more secure by the election of
the influential Beltranena.

375

Provincial Deputation Elections
The national elections for the two Provincial Deputations,
one seated in Leon and one in Guatemala City, and for the Cortes
deputies were held in late 1820.

Rodriguez mentions that in compari

son to the elections held in 1812, there was more agitation, more
candidates, and more voters than before.

376

Also noted was a sense of

importance that had not been previously apparent.

By 1820 the im

portance of the Provincial Deputation was recognized as indisputable
by both parties who in turn fervently sought its domination.

Perhaps

a result of this new significance is the fact that the Indian vote
is recorded as having been strongly pursued, and thus, perhaps for
the first time, true rural elections were held.

Unfortunately, unlike

the more closely controlled ayuntamiento elections, a number of ir
regularities by local authorities were noted which served to detract
375

Bumgartner, del Valle of Central America, p. 119.

^'^Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 137.
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from the luster of the moment.

377

And, in an ominous prelude to the

future, the Ayuntamiento of Comayagua began discussing the possibility
of selecting its own Provincial Deputation.

378

With the development of dual political parties in Guatemala
there surfaced a marked difference in the character of the Guatemalan
Provincial Deputation in its attitude towards the Guatemala City
Ayuntamiento.

No longer evident was the egalitarian air of cooper

ation and harmony with stubborn clashes sometimes resulting from an
overlapping of responsibilities.

379

On a personal level, there were

disagreements between Mayor del Valle of the Ayuntamiento and
Deputation Secretary, Domingo Dieguez.

380

Also noted were a number of

petty differences such as when del Valle suggested the use of uniforms
on policemen to help control crime only to have it rejected by the
Provincial Deputation.

The strength and subsequent importance of

this body can be seen when it was successful against both the Audi
encia and the Guatemala City Ayuntamiento in obtaining more district
. .
381
judges.
The two party system personified the deep-seated social schism
between creoles and Spaniards.

377

Suggestive of this was the suspicious

Ibid.

378
Mayes, p. 39.
379
Woodward, Central America, p. 38.
380
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Bumgartner, del Valle of Central America, p. 138.
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attitude held by the Provincial Deputation towards any Spanish domin
ated institution including the powerful Guatemala City Ayuntamiento,
the Audiencia, the Cabildo Eclesiastico, and even the Royal Treasury.
Concerning this last institution, and bearing in mind the Provincial
Deputation's support of free trade, clashes became inevitable.

A

case in point was the Treasurer's resistance to dismantling the inter
ior customs houses, a step the Provincial Deputation felt necessary
to help foster trade.

332

The Consulado de Comercio was also alienated

when the Provincial Deputation petitioned for its suppression because
the "guild was inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution and
that its functions corresponded to those of the Deputation and the
Ayuntamientos."

383

The Nicaraguan Provincial Deputation was installed on October
25, 1820.

One problem that it faced was that, unlike its earlier

counterpart, and suggestive of a condition parallel to that in
Guatemala, the previously noted cooperation with the Intendent was
no longer in evidence.

Unfortunately, the new Provincial Deputation

in Leon was also beset with numberless local aspirations which were
in reality impossible goals, destined to erupt periodically, and even
help bring about the dissolution of the promising United Provinces of
Central America.

On a national level, Nicaragua continued to call

for a separate Audiencia and Captaincy-General which was to include

Ibid., p. 140.
383
Woodward, "Economic and Social Origins," p. 563.
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Costa Rica.

384

This demand, as with others of the same kind, appears

to have been made without consulting Costa Rica.

Indeed, Costa Rica

came to openly resent Nicaraguan dominance and even lobbied in Spain
for its own Provincial Deputation.

The above examples serve to sup

port the claim that the "process of disintegration was well underway
by the time that Independence came to Central America."

385

Portentously, a similar situation was evolving in Honduras.
As in Costa Rica, the patriots there were strongly inclined towards
a greater independence of Guatemala.

To this end-, the Ayuntamiento

of Comayagua, on November 6, 1820, elected their own Provincial
Deputation, arguing that such a move was guaranteed by the 1812
Constitution.

386

In response to this, the authorities in Guatemala

pleaded with the Hondurans to cease such activities.

To no avail,

however, for a military force eventually had to be sent which re
sulted in the disbanding of the Honduran Provincial Deputation and
the election of proper deputies to the Guatemalan body.

387

Independence
On March 28, 1818 3ustamante handed the reigns of government
over to Carlos de Urrutia, the last royal appointee to hold the posi
tion of Captain-General of Guatemala.

Having a "benign disposition"

384
Karnes, "The Origins," p. 261.
385
Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 142.
336

Mayes, p. 39.
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and being over sixty-five years of age he initiated a much needed era
of calm to the troubled colony.

388

Guatemala was the twilight as

signment in a career which had been long and diverse.

No stranger to

the pan-Caribbean lands, he had previously served as IntendentGoveraor of the province of Veracruz in New Spain and he had just
finished a command in Santo Domingo as a Sub-Inspector.

389

Suggestive

of his desire to promote a policy of conciliation, one of his first
official acts was to comply with the royal decree of April 13, 1S17,
which in part remedied the injustices committed against the Ayuntamiento officers of 1810.

390

Even so, Urrutia faced serious problems.

By this time, the

attitude of Central Americans was being affected by news of the on
slaughts of Bolivar, San Martin, Sucre, and others in South America
which were bringing the Spanish Empire to its knees.

To the north,

the situation in New Spain was ominous and about to boil over com
pletely.

Nor could the example set by Haiti, free since 1S04, be

viewed in isolation.

Posing an even more immediate threat was the

supposed presence of pirates and the possibility of an invasion by
one of the newly-liberated areas of South America.

391

Internally Urrutia faced a citizenry sharply divided by

388
389
390
391
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jealousy and animosity.

On one hand, the Spanish hierarchy antici

pated the continuance of the royal mandate, or at the most, nothing
more than a slightly modified monarchy.

On the other hand were the

creoles, long weary of the interminable wait for equal opportunities.
Even though seriously factionalized, only the most capitalistic seemed
content with a maintenance of the status quo or were naive enough to
expect that it would remain so.

This would become especially true

once the situation in New Spain began to change.
Compounding this uneasy state, and a fact that was destined
to become important in Central America's independence, was that
Captain-General Urrutia was ill and suffered from a paralysis on one
side or his body.

392

Spain was aware of this and, on January 30, 1820,

decreed that in the case of an illness or an absence, Field Marshall
Alejandro de Hore, Commanding General of Panama, was to take over the
Captain-General's duties.

393

This order was shortly changed however.

Brigadier General Francisco Pino was substituted for de Hore and in
fact was named to the second highest post in Guatemala in anticipation
of a problem.

394

At approximately this same time, early 1820, Gabino Ga{nza y
Fernandez, destined to be the colony's last Captain-General, arrived
in Guatemala.

Gainza was a Spaniard of noble birth and married to a

392

Enrique del Cid Fernandez, Don Gabino de Gainza y Otros
Estudios, (Guatemala: Imprenta Universitaria, 1959), p. 25.
■^^Manuel Rubio Sanchez, "Don Gabino Gafnza y Fernandez
Medrano," Anales de la Sociedad de Geografia e Historia de Guatemala
43 (1973): 30.
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Guayaquil creole.

He had seen extensive service in the Caribbean,

Florida, and South America where he had taken part in the Tupac Amaru
revolt.

395

He was in his fifties when he was assigned the position of

Sub-Inspector General of Infantry and Cavalry in Guatemala.
Meanwhile Urrutia continued to quietly conduct the affairs of
the colony and under him the "family's" fortunes mended rapidly as
evidenced by his making some youths in the Pavon and Ayciena clans
cadets.

396

Even though Urrutia's relations with the creoles were

probably cordial, their jealously guarded pockets of strength re
mained vigilent.

Noticeable in this respect was when on May 5, 1820,

Gainza was advised of Fernando's acceptance of the 1812 Constitution,
he mysteriously delayed notifying the local Ayuntamiento of this until
June 27.

The Ayuntamiento then censored him for this lapse while at

the same time requesting that the confiscated records of 1810 be returned to them.

397

But Urrutia was not to be led blindly and, in a

threatening tone, warned the councilmen that he would hold them re
sponsible for any disturbances resulting from the re-implementation
of the Constitution.

Exhibiting what may have been an unexpected dis

play of stubborness, he continued some form of censorship even though
the new laws guaranteed freedom of the press.

This was so effective

that Molina was forced to establish his own reporters in such turbulent

395.,..,
ibid., p. 23.
396
397
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Salazar, Historia, p. 20^.
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areas as southern Mexico from where he would be sent non-censored
information.

398

Urrutia's concerns were not unfounded, however since

independence sentiments were becoming more pronounced.

He knew, for

example, that Molina had sent two accomplices to New Spain where they
were to solicit some type of an accord with a certain General Bravo
who was then conducting military operations near the Guatemalan
border.

399
In addition to other pressures, the Guatemala City Ayuntami

ento, once aware of the re-implementation of the 1812 Constitution,
demanded that it be put into effect immediately.

In addition, it

ordered that it be read, in its entirety, throughout the colony and
that 500 announcements of its proclamation be printed.

Also, the

Captain-General was requested to speed up the establishment of the
Junta de Censura, or Censorship Board, so as to better put into effect
the freedom of press laws.

It also suggested that the old 1814 Provin

cial Deputation be reinstituted until a new one could be elected.
As with Bustamante, Urrutia may have been intimidated by the
new set of Ins truetions that had been written for the Guatemala City
deputy to the Spanish Cortes, Julian de Urruela.

Composed by Mariano

Aycinena, Domingc Diequez, and Father Antonio Larrazabal, they called
for all persons, regardless of their racial background, to be granted

398t. . .
Ioid., p. 207.
399

/
Ferez Valle, p. 306.

^^Rodrrguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 131.
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full citizenship status and that the newly activated Council of State
in Spain have twenty American members.

They also requested that half

of all government positions be given to colonials, that free trade
be established, and that some modification of the monopolies be in
stituted.

Rodriguez called the Instructions an "ultimatum to the

Spanish government" and considers them proof that "the process of
alienation was reaching a point of no return."

401

Not without his devious side, Urrutia made a critical political
appointment in Costa Rica.

That province was long a scene of con

flicting loyalties wherein the citizens were more faithful to Spain
than to either Guatemala City or Leo'n.^^

This was a problem which

would surface later, unfortunately at a time when Central America
needed as much unity as it could muster.

In any event, Urrutia only

contributed to Costa Rican discontent when on June of 1819, he named
the despotic Juan Manuel de Canas as a temporary governor of Costa
Rica.

The people there, long accustomed to sympathetic governors,

resented his rough manners and coarse actions.

Nevertheless, he was

very successful in silencing those few who "had timidly spoken out
in favor of a more liberal regime."

403

Thus, Urrutia, while exhibit

ing a rather mild demeanor, may have been capable of defusing a
politically volatile situation.

401
402

Long pictured as a sickly, humble

...
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figure, it appears that he was just as firm a believer in power and
a royalist system of government as Bustamante had been.

The outcome

was the same, only the tone was different.
By January of 1821, Central American independence was but
nine short months away.

Yet even as late as that, "independence ap

pears to have been little more than a desire in the minds of a few
men who apparently were without any notion of how to transmit the
404
desire into reality."

Nevertheless, thanks to the newly liberated

press, Central Americans were all to follow the rebellions in New
Spain and South America while at the same time noting that El Editor
Consti'tucional was leaning more and more to a separatist solution.

405

While such activities, plus the above-mentioned party rivalry did in
deed promote independence, there was still the lack of an impulse which
would force Central America into taking irrevocable steps towards de
claring her separation from Spain.

Exactly how immobile the Central

America patriots were can be seen in early 1821 when the Guatemala
City Ayuntamiento received an anonymous letter from Spain which in
vited the colony to claim independence since "it could not expect
justice from the Spanish government.

..406

As this communication ar

rived shortly after the receipt of yet another note from a Guatemalan
deputy to the Cortes which noted the unequal treatment afforded the

404

Bumgartner, del Valle of Central America, p. 136.

^^Ibid., p. 137.
406«
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American representatives in Spain, one wonders why no action was taken
by Guatemalan leaders.

Yet, as Karnes suggests, these events were

nevertheless additional steps which served to weaken Spain's hold on
the colony while at the same time discouraging the loyalists.

407

In New Spain meanwhile, the conservative faction, made up of
royalists who had previously abhorred the thought of independence,
began to demand national sovereignty.

Fearful that a renewed and

radical Spain would be more dangerous to their traditional position
of dominance than an independent country, they were ready to establish
"a government contrary to their every interest.

Their champion

was to be the wealthy, religious creole, Agustxn de Iturbide.

Under

his leadership, an accord was soon reached with the guerrilla chief
tain, Vicente Guerrero, in which their armies would unite under the
Plan of Iguala which was signed on February 24, 1821.

409

Among its

twenty-four articles were the famous three guarantees which stipulated
that Catholicism was to be the state religion, that New Spain was to
be independent and governed under a constitutional monarchy, and that
there was to be equality between creoles and Spaniards.

410

In an unrelated, but equally important circumstance, on

^^Kenyon, "Gaznza," p. 244.
^^Donald E. Worcester, and Wendell G. Schaeffer, The Growth
and Culture of Latin America, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1956), p. 496.
^^Herrarte, p. 127.
410
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March 10, 1821, Captain-General Urrutia voluntarily, and temporarily
resigned his powers to Sub-Inspector Gabino Gainza, an act which has
evoked considerable speculation.

411

Guillermo Mayes, who personally

maintains that Urrutia stepped aside for health reasons, notes that
the historian Alejandro Marure suggests that he was forced to resign
by the Guatemala Provincial Deputation.

412

In a similar vein,

Alberto Herrarte claims that the patriots saw Gainza as more pliable
than Urrutia and to achieve their ends, they applied pressure on him
to resign.

41 3

Yet even he poses the possibility that it may have been

done for reasons of health, as does Enrique del Cid Fernandez.

414

Both theories are relative and the truth is probably somewhere
in between.

That there was independence sentiment seems undeniable.

However, exactly how strong it was remains undetermined and to what
extent it penetrated into the Ayuntamiento of Guatemala City and the
Guatemalan Deputation is subject to debate.

That Urrutia was ill

seems fairly well established and therefore it is possible that it
played a role in his resignation.

Nevertheless, his decision was made

under the advisement of Doctor Pedro Molina, an ardent separatist,
thus forcing one to question the entire affair.
411
412

415

✓
Also, Gainza, as

Parker, del Valle and the Establishment, p. 43.
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has been pointed out, was, in comparison, probably more pliable than
Urrutia.

He was also supported, to a certain degree, by such well

known patriots as Barrundia, Molina, and Cordova who urged afterwards
that he be given the title of Captain-General.

416

As acting Captain-General, one of Gainza's first acts was to
issue a manifesto on the rebellion in New Spain.

417

Dated April 10,

1821, he referred to Iturbide as a faithless, ungrateful thief and ex
horted the Central Americans to remain faithful to Spain.

He called

for them to stay "united with a government that loves and protects
them."

He counseled an obedience which would find him "a peaceful

leader, a father, and a compatriot who would guide and defend them."
Disobedience however would find him "a resolute and firm soldier who
would proceed against his enemy even unto death," explaining that he
had "been charged with conserving the peace," a mandate he had
promised unswervingly to obey.^^

Not only did he denounce Iturbide,

but he also ordered the arrest of all those Guatemalans who had
previously urged him to declare independence.

419

Iturbide's actions clearly brought to the forefront the pros
pect of a total separation from Spain.

It provided, as Gordon Kenyon

416
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417
/
,
Rubio Sanchez, "Gainza," p. 32.
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notes, a "catalyst in precipitating Central American independence."

420

As the events in one foreign country had shaken Guatemala, so had the
conduct of yet another people forced her leaders to the point of
seriously considering autonomy.
Politically, the Mexican situation was custom-made for the
Cacos who, as a group, began pressing vociferously for independence.
In this, they were supported by members of the "family" who were now
convinced that their future lay in the self-governing Guatemala.

The

Gazistas meanwhile chose to remain cautiously loyal.
Gainza on the other hand continued a tightrope act in which
he tried to pacify both groups.

However, some scholars note that

around this time, and perhaps even from the beginning he had privately
supported the Cacos.

Woodward suggests that he worked with them and

may even have encouraged the development of popular independence sentiment.

421

Another source implies that while he may not have collabor

ated with the separatist movement he did nevertheless accept the inevitability of independence.

422

/
In any event Gamza's actions were

never serious enough to stave off the inevitable separation.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1821, Central America en
joyed her last peaceful days for years to come, with few indications
of the turmoil that lay ahead.

By May, El Editor Constitucional,

^20
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still under the increasing vitriolic Molina, had adopted an alarm
ing attitude.

In resorting to a slightly veiled anagram which, when

unscrambled, read "the tyrant" and was applied directly to Fernando,
he wrote something that a few years before would have gained him a
severe punishment or even death.

423

Almost comically, this act caused

the newspaper to be brought before the Censorship Board.

That it

would be absolved of any crimes was a foregone conclusion since three
members of that same Board were none other than Pedro Molina, Juan
/
424
Francisco Barrundia, and Juan Francisco Cordova.
Exactly how un
important official recriminations were to the patriots is seen on
September 3, when El Editor Constitucional changed its name to El Genio
de la Libertad (The Spirit of Liberty).

425

Nevertheless, in all of

this an atmosphere of colonial continuity was present as shown when
Gainza initiated another subscription to pay for the tiling of.the
sidewalks in the capital.

426

Events in the Guatemalan province of Chiapas renewed with
startling swiftness
dependence.

the continually encroaching possibility of in

In the city of Comitan certain leaders formed a decision

making body, a Sala Capitular, which on August 28, 1821, declared

423
424
425
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Chiapan independence and their adherence to the Plan of Iguala.
They claimed the
laudable sentiments that caused New Spain to claim her rights
from Spain, to peacefully declare independence, to firmly
maintain the Catholic religion and its ministers, and to
protect the rights of citizens under just and moderate laws
are the same which caused us to claim similar indisputable
rights.^27
Decisions such as this one were followed by others of a similar vein
in the other Chiapan cities of Tuxla and Ciudad Real.
Why the Chiapan leaders decided on such a course is unclear.
There may have been an unheralded sense of independence there, but
the lack of documented extensive anti-Spanish activities suggest that
this was not the case.

Manuel Rubio Sanchez implies that the close

proximity of Iturbide's forces may have caused the Chiapans to volunteer for this course rather than be forced into it.

428

What is even

more probable is that the province of Chiapas, like Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, and especially El Salvador, was intensely jealous of Guatemala
dominance in their administrative, economic and religious affairs.
Therefore, the Chiapans may have considered a future under New Spain
more attractive than one under Guatemala.
Closer to home, Gainza was faced with unrelated but similar
problems.

On August 31, 1821, Mayor Larrave of Guatemala City an

nounced that a
certain unrest among all classes in the capital was sensed
which was getting worse every day and that violent crimes

427,. „
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were on the increase; that there were anti-Spanish and antiAmerican sentiments seen on prominent walls, and that in
view of this, the Ayuntamiento should dictate the most
rigid means to evade the problems that such things might
bring about.
Indicative of the growing but uneasy drive towards freedom was coun
cilman Ariza's response to Larrave's suggestion.

Not only did he

denounce the Spaniard in front of the Captain-General but he also
called such actions subversive.43^
A further problem that Gainza faced was that about this time
he received reports that certain persons were gathering signatures
on a petition calling for independence.

In some cases these persons

had visited schools in an effort to excite the students there.
Gainza requested of the Ayuntamiento that it investigate this problem; a request that it promised to honor.

431

It is generally accepted that the Chiapan resolutions were un
known in Guatemala City until September 13, 1821.

This may not have

been the case, however as when Sanchez implies at least a hint of un
rest in quoting a note to the Captain-General from the Guatemala City
Ayuntamiento.

In requesting the reestablishment of the Oaxacan mail

delivery it argued that such prohibitions were no longer necessary.
Perhaps recalling the bloody Hidalgo rebellion, it stated that

429
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the revolution to the north does not have the same character
istics as before: the bitter hostilities are not seen, the
people have been respected, and the rights of man have not
been violated. If the lines of communications are cut, the
ancient relations between the inhabitants of Guatemala with
independent peoples are also broken, and a disturbance will
begin whose consequences will not be able to be hidden.
This will be an act of an enemy, a complete break, an act
of war, which is neither convenient nor conforming to the
general prevalent feeling among the people. On the other
hand, it is indispensible to know exactly and punctually
the state of the Kingdom of Mexico in order to consider
our own. Such censorship is dangerous in these circum
stances and will cause public disconfidence, something un
seen until
^2
n o w .

Not only is the tone threatening, but it also implies that Gainza
caused the mail disruption and if so, he may have suspected imminent
problems.
Also, the Ayuntamiento, on September 4, discussed the
"schismatic effects of the Mexican events" during which some newer
events may have been considered.

Indicative of this was the petition

presented to Gainza, probably from the Ayuntamiento, that requested
he "put himself at the head of the free citizens of Guatemala."

433

So open and heated were some of these .discussions that councilman
Aycinena spoke up and openly admitted that the colony wanted inde
pendence and that the appropriate steps should be taken.

Hopeful of

containing a possibly irate Gainza he also noted that no one had, how
ever, considered a change in leadership.

To this the Captain-General

demurred and went as far as charging the Ayuntamiento with the

43Z
/
Rubio Sanchez, "Gainza," p. 37.
433

Parker, del Valle and the Establishment, p. 44.
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responsibility of maintaining peace.

434

Quietly, on September 13, 1821, Captain-General Gainza re
ceived two dispatches from Chiapas.

Both of these were dated Septem-

435
ber 5 and both declared Chiapas independent of Spain and Guatemala.
The following day Gainza notified the Provincial Deputation of what
had happened in Chiapas.

The Provincial Deputation, upon hearing this

news, declared itself incompetent to debate the consequences of such
an issue and instead called for a Junta de Notables, or a Gathering
of Prominent Citizens, to decide.

After receiving a list of those

to be on the Junta, Gainza called for a meeting to be held on
September 15, 1821.

The list contained fifty-four names and was

representative of public, civil, and religious institutions.

There

were members of the upper echelons of the religious orders including
the Archbishop, the Provincial Deputation, the Audiencia, the local
Ayuntamiento, high government and military officials, the Consulado
de Comercio, and of course, the Captain-General.

Of the fifty-four,

one-third were priests and one-third were of the "family."

436

The evening before the meeting was to take place, certain
members of the Cacos party, including Aycinena, Molina, Barrundia
and the Bedoyas, began to actively agitate for independence.

434
435
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Salazar, Historia, p. 221.
Bumgartner, del Valle of Central America, p. 144.
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Not wanting to leave a stone unturned, they pleaded with the public
to attend the following day's activities, hopeful of surrounding the
meeting place with persons clamoring for independence.

438

The next

morning, September 15, 1821, as the Junta deliberated the future of
Guatemala, the Plaza outside the Government Palace did indeed fill
with people, at least initially.

However, one authority claims that

after a while many began to drift away.

Upon seeing this, Basilio

Parros and Dolores 3edoya, Molina's wife, brought in an orchestra
and set off some rockets, actions which were successful in re
activating the crowd and its enthusiasm until independence was de. 439
clarea.
Remarkably, the discussions as to what to do are favorably
reviewed by historians.

It was remembered by the conservative Manuel

Montufar as a "free discussion and a rare spectacle in which Spaniards
and creoles were united under the chief executive in deciding if
Guatemala was to be independent or not."

Examples of this can be

seen when the arguments of the loyalist Casaus were opposed by his

f

/

friend and subordinate Father Jose Maria Castillo.

440

Another prin

cipal royalist, Jose"1 de Valle, properly suggested the need for a
colony-wide decision and not one from Guatemala alone.

As logical as

^3g
^
David Vela, "Jose Francisco Barrundia," in Proceres de la
Independencia Centroamerica, ed. Carlos Melendez (Ciudad Universitaria Rodrigo Facio, San Jose: Editorial Universitaria, EDUCA, 1971):
195.
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his statements were, they were doomed to insignificance next to the
arguments of the patriotic Miguel Larreynaga.

441

Significantly, the military response was neither strong nor
threatening.

Coronel Felix Lagrava, perhaps the most important mili

tary official outside of Ga/nza, reacted calmly and, out of his love
of Guatemala, decided not to foreceably oppose the declaration of
independence.

442

Karnes notes that the mild military attitude was
/

due to the fact that the royal troops were, in fact, under Gainza.

^43

Nevertheless, when the call to vote came, the inevitability
of the events in Spain and Mexico, the public clamour, and the numer
ous happenings of the past fourteen years all contributed towards the
outcome.
voted.

One by one, and speaking for the entire colony, the Junta
Not surprisingly, in the end Central American independence

was declared.

441
442
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Zelaya, p. 90.
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CHAPTER V

EPILOGUE

The schismatic tendencies of Central America were
an element in the life's blood of the conquerors and
it fermented with the colonial order and its laws.^^
When the fifty-eight notables declared Central America to be
independent of Spain, they did so without consulting the other prov
inces.

And even though the Provincial Deputation representing Hon

duras, El Salvador, and Guatemala did take part in the deliberations,
it was not empowered to take under consideration such decisions.
Also noticeably absent was representation from any Ayuntamientos other
than that from Guatemala City.

But even though this act triggered an

appalling number of local disturbances, in reality no firm decisions
were made as to the form of government that was to evolve.

Rather,

and to the credit of those involved, the establishment of a provin
cial congress of representatives which was to determine the form of
government was instead provided for.

While there has been consider

able discussion on the audacity of a few individuals in determining
Central American fate, it does nevertheless appear that an independ
ent course would have been the one that most persons would have
chosen anyway.

That they allowed for total representation to decide

other issues which may have been just as important indicates at least
a hint of republican tendencies.

/[/-[ A

Vela, "Bosquejo de la Vida," p. 175.
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Yet, the problem of what to do immediately after independence
was not ignored.

As early as the day of independence, and probably

even sooner, two opinions were discemable.

One side, comprised of

some of the former separatists, who had joined with the old loyalists,
favored annexation to Mexico.

The other side was composed of those

who preferred a republican form of government.

During the initial

deliberations a consensus of opinion could not be found among those
present, subsequently, it was decided to consider only the issue of
independence.

445

The declaration, which was written by Jose Cecilio del Valle,
bears some scrutiny since it established certain rules which would
be followed for the next few months.

In declaring that independence

was the general desire of the people it stipulated that a congress
was to be called so that "the form that the government will take and
the fundamental laws which would govern" could be determined.

The

deputies to this congress, who were to meet on March 1, 1822, were
to be chosen by the same electoral junta which had previously named
the Cortes deputies and were to be proportioned at the ratio of one
representative for each 15,000 "individuals."

Gafnza, who signed the

document, was to continue as Jefe Politico, or Political Chief, and
would preside over a Junta Provisional Consultiva, or Provisional
Consulting Junta.

The Junta was to be composed of "members of the

Provincial Deputation" and consisted of Miguel Larreynaga for Leon,
Jose7Cecilio del Valle for Comayagua, the Marquis de Aycinena for

445
Parker, del Valle and the Establishment, p. 45.
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Quetzaltenango, Jos^ Valdis for Solola and Chimaltenango, Angel
Maria Candina for Sonsonante, and Antonio Robles for Ciudad Real.^^
As written, the declaration of independence was a provisional
statement and probably meant to set forth temporary measures since
the main objective was to obtain a separation from Spain rather than
anything else.

Kenyon refers to the document as "irregular" and

thus demanding quick action to make it legitimate.

447

Supportive of

this position, the Guatamala City Ayuntamiento quickly swore loyalty
to it and by September 17, the information was on its way to the
provinces.
With the young patriot, Mariano Galvez as "Prosecretario"
or Protosecretary, the Provisional Junta began its sessions soon
after independence was declared.

448

Its initial, euphoric meetings

were soon "filled with persons of all classes."

449

The republicans

were notably active at this point and probably used the masses to
emphasize their petitions to the Junta.

However, since most of the

Junta members were monarchists, and therefore drawn to the prospect
of annexation to Mexico, it is worthwhile to note that the meetings
were declared secret on September 29.

450

From this point on, the

446

"Acta de Independencia de la anti^ua Capitama General de
Guatemala," Anales de la Sociedad de Geografia e Historia de Guatemala
2 (September, 1925): 3-7.
^^Kenyon, "Gainza," p. 252.
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idea of a union with Mexico began to prevail.

451

The evidence suggests that when the news of the Guatemalan
actions was received in the provinces, it was viewed suspiciously.
The news reached San Salvador on September 21, but leaders there,
many of whom were the same ones who fought so valiantly for independ
ence in 1811 and 1814, delayed a full week before following Guate
mala's lead.

In Leon, the Nicaraguan Provincial Deputation began

to debate the issue soon after it learned of the Guatemalan action
on September 22.

There, although independence was declared, a serious

qualification was added in the form of the Acta de los Nublados, or
Provision of the Clouds.

452

This stated that Nicaragua would be in

dependent until "the clouds of the day clear up" but until then, all
would remain as it had been before.

453

This was in reference to

Nicaragua's desire to maintain its independence of Guatemala as was
implied through the establishment of the Provincial Deputation.

In

Costa Rica, the Guatemala decision was not known until October 13
when the monthly mail brought it to Cartago.

454

Cautiously, the

response there was to follow Nicaragua and adhere to the Acta de los
Nublados.

451

Salazar, "Mariano de Aycinena," p. 121.

4527
1
os
Zelaya,
p. 95.

453
454

Ibid., p. 99.
/
Fernandez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, p. 5.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

155

These relatively calm first responses were soon to give way,
almost overnight, to animosities which had long been dormant.

The

jealousies which had probably caused Chiapas to secede, began to
surface everywhere.

Granada, for example, accepted the Guatemalan

declaration but denied the authority of Leon as implied in the Acta
de los Nublados. Thus began the strife between those two cities
which is apparent even today.
In Leon, meanwhile, the Provincial Deputation, which was
composed mostly of royalists, at one point decided not to accept
Guatemalan authority and instead contacted Spain directly and offered
their help in returning Central America to the Spanish Empire.

But

even this position was momentary as on October 11 the authorities
there decided to join Mexico instead.

At this point, Granada also

changed its mind and decided to join with Guatemala and to accept
whatever decisions it would eventually make.

In yet another Nicar

aguan city, Masaya, the authorities decided on October 16, to join
the Leonese camp and thus declared for the Plan of Iguala. Confused,
ten days later, Masaya changed its mind and decided to accept
Guatemalan authority.

By late October the Nicaraguan atmosphere

was so electrified that the commanding officer in Granada contacted
Gainza and implied that hostile acts against them by Leo^ were imminent.

457

455
456
457
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A similar situation existed in Honduras.

There, the tra

ditional animosities between Comayagua and Tegucigalpa caused each
city to enunciate its own loyalties.

In this case Comayagua chose

to accept Mexican authority while Tegucigalpa elected to follow
Guatemala. 4^
In Costa Rica meanwhile, and with the blessings of the
Leonese, a Junta Gubemativa Superior, or Superior Governing Junta,
was established in its capital, ostensibly to maintain control until
the situation stabilized.

459

But in a sense, the acceptance of the

Leonese approval was a facade covering the true antagonisms that
Costa Ricans felt towards thqir neighbors.

Long suspicious of both

Leon and Guatemala, Costa Rica had developed a strong sense of
unique identity based on its suspicions.

Of this, Thomas L. Karnes

notes that independence "intensified separatism and grossly compounded
it by freeing the forces of localism in individual towns and vil
lages."460
Things were not necessarily calm in Guatemala City either.
There, the republicans intensified their call for an independent
Guatemala in the chambers of the Provisional Junta, and in the pages
of El Genio de la Libertad, all the while tentative flames of anarchy

458

Gordon Kenyon, "Mexican Influence in Central America
1821-1823," Hispanic American Historical Review 41 (May, 1961): 177
459

Zelaya, p. 137.

46°Karnes, "The Origins," p. 249.
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spread to the point of street fighting.

461

In light of events such

as these, and after receiving reports of the chaotic situation in the
provinces, Gainza moved up the date of the opening session of the
Central American congress one month to February.

462

On another level, the Treasury had but sixty pesos in it plus
a weighty debt to Mexico of over two million pesos.

463

Also concern

ing Mexico, and the source of no little consternation to the CaptainGeneral, a letter from Iturbide had been received which invited
Central America to join Mexico under the banner of the Three Guar
antees.

Apparently hoping to increase the size of his empire even

further, Iturbide had taken this step only after his agent in Central
America, General Manuel Mier y Teran had offered the opinion that the
Guatemalan situation was favorable to independence.

464

Back in Nicaragua, it seemed as if all political cohesion
was rapidly disappearing.

By November, certain interior cities such

as Granada, Masaya, and Managua had consolidated and were outrightly
refusing to accept Leonese domination.

To achieve some sort of

political independence, they instead proposed that a Junta Gubernativa
Subalterna, or Subordinate Governing Junta, be established.

On

November 22, 1821, this proposal was forwarded to Guatemala where

^^Kenyon, "Mexican Influence," p. 179.
462_, . ,
,__
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464
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it was subsequently approved.

Zelaya claims that from this point

"the country divided not only territorily, but also economically,
politically, and socially.
As in El Salvador, where difficulties were arising over the
selection of delegates to the Central American Congress, so in Costa
Rica many diverse opinions continued to prevail.

Although independ

ence was declared there on November 1, no decision as to the prov
ince's relationship with Guatemala was made.^^

There, in fact, in

dependence itself came as a surprise since Costa Rica had tradition
ally maintained close ties with Spain.

Even so, with a frustrated

clergy and nobility maintaining a strong opposition to independence,
little change was probably expected.

467

While Costa Rica would

eventually join briefly with Mexico, in reality the ayuntamientos in
the larger towns would debate alternative forms of government for one
u
and one-half
years more. 468
In late November Gainza received a further communication from
Iturbide who had by then been crowned Agustin I of Mexico, which re
stated his previous invitation to join Mexico.

More ominous however,

was the news that a Mexican army of 500 men had been ordered into

^^Zelaya, p. 118.
^^Karnes, "The Origins," p. 263.
^^Femandez Guardia, La Independencia y Otros Episodios, p.
10; and Fernandez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, p. 3.
^^Karnes, "The Origins," p. 263.
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Chiapas close to the Guatemalan border.

Gordon Kenyon is undoubtedly

correct when he surmises that this was done to influence a Guatemalan decision in favor of a decision to join Mexico.

469

Upon re

ceipt of this information Gainza and the Provisional Junta decided
to consult with the provincial ayuntamientos on the issue.

In this

instance however, the actual decision on what to do in regards to
Mexico was, as before, deferred until the Central American Congress
v
470
met m- February.
Violence in the capital continued to be a problem.

Gainza,

who was now more openly advocating an annexation with Mexico, began
to disrupt any known gatherings of republicans.

So strong were his

feelings on this point that he even ordered a troop of soldiers to
suppress a public manifestation of non-annexation sentiment.

Un

fortunately, the ensuing clash only resulted in the deaths of two
persons:

Mariano Bedoya, who was active in the pre-independence

developments, and Remigio Maida.

Salazar is of the opinion that

this was a preconceived plan especially since other measures, includ
ing a move to stop publication of El Genio de la Libertad were pro471
posed. '

In fact, on December 1, the now confirmed monarchist,

Mariano Aycinena, led a demonstration which requested that Gainza
expel all anti-annexationists.

472

^^Kenyon, "Mexican Influence," p. 132.
470
471
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By January, 1822, the encroaching Mexican army, which caused
"a true panic all over Central America" was under the command of
,
1+12,
Vicente Filisola.
Threatening movements by the Mexican troops,
plus the continued political deterioration in the provinces was tak
ing its toll.

For the monarchists, such as Aycinena, this proved to

be a godsend, while for the republicanists it was disastrous.

As the

inability of Gainza and the Provisional Junta to effectively govern
became apparent, it was correspondingly obvious that an alternative
power, and one that could take over quickly was necessary.

To fore

stall imminent anarchy the only possible answer then was to accept
a political agreement with Mexico.

To this end, on January 2, 1822,

Gainza and the Provisional Junta did decide to join with Mexico with
both Iturbide and Filisola subsequently being informed of the
Guatemalan choice.
Interestingly enough, the resolution was this time not based
on an arbitrary discussion in Guatemala City.

Rather, it was founded

on replies that were requested by the former Captain-General to what
appears to have been most of the local governments in the provinces.
The responses were:

104 for annexation, 33 preferred that the Junta

should decide, 21 wanted the February Congress to decide, 2 were
475

against any union with Mexico, and 27 did not answer.

In light of

^^Zelaya, p. 129.
474

Ibid.

475
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this then, Gainza did correctly gauge the opinion of the provincial
leaders.

Most had in fact, resigned themselves to the fact that

unity "could be regained only by annexation to Mexico, a measure
that had proved itself to be more popular than any other course of
action.

,,^76
However, even though a large majority of the municipalities

had decided in favor of annexation, exactly which towns these were re
mains unclear.

In other words, to a large degree, they could have

been small centers of population and therefore not truly indicative
of the large majority of Central American leaders.

An even more im

portant unknown is whether the decisions represented the will of a
complete Ayuntamiento, or merely that of a single appointee.

It

will be recalled that in Costa Rica there were difficulties in even
locating enough persons to make up but one Ayuntamiento.
Of the large towns, it is important to note that the author
ities in San Salvador vehemently remained against union.

Also, since

many nearby centers voiced similar sentiments, the Salvadorean leaders
felt secure enough to forcefully attempt the take over of certain
areas still loyal to Guatemala.

477

Contributing to the provincial chaos was that in January some
important cities in Nicaragua and Honduras had communicated with
Mexico and voiced their dissatisfaction not only with Gainza but with
476

.
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the entire Guatemalan government in general and their "desire to be
responsible directly to the imperial government" in Mexico City.

478

So insistent were their demands that on February 16, 1822, Iturbide
made Honduras answerable to the Captaincy-General of Puebla and Leon
responsible to Mexico City.

479

Costa Rica meanwhile continued to be wooed by both Granada
and Leo^ who were in direct competition for allies.48^

In fact, the

Provincial Deputation of Leon approached the Costa Ricans sometime
after January 1, 1822, with a
lish an independent government.

written proposal
481

in order to estab-

Continually unsure, the Costa

Rican leaders had communicated with Mexico, stipulating at one point
that any acceptance of the Plan of Iguala would have to be based on
their continued commercial relations with Panama, and a number of
other considerations.

482

This fact seems to support Woodward's con

tention that after the decision to join Mexico had been made,
483
"politics in Guatemala focused again on commercial policy."

478
479

Zelaya, p. 132.
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481Karnes, "The Origins," p. 263.
482Ibid., p. 266.

483
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At about this same time, important changes were becoming
visible in the political parties.

The truth is that actually two

new parties were emerging even though many of the personalities in
volved were the same.

Labels also changed with serviles, or the

servile ones, and fiebres, or the feverish ones, taking the place
of the old names, Cacos and Gazistas.

The serviles who favored a

continuation of royal institutions, were in many cases members of
the ''family” who had finally made a break with the former liberals.
The fiebres in many cases favored an independent Guatemala, freetrade, and religious reforms.

As might be expected the fiebre party

contained Molina, Galvez and many of their colleagues.
In Mexico meanwhile, the seating of a Constituent- Congress
was proceeding.

The late selection of the deputies from the distant

provinces, including the former Captaincy-General of Guatemala, had
been anticipated and allowed for.

As before, and in order to comply

with the date of opening, temporary delegates were selected from the
provincials resident in Mexico City.

484

Unfortunately the selection

of the permanent deputies from Central America was seriously compli
cated by Gainza's not allowing all twenty-four districts to elect
their representatives.

His reasons for doing this were uncharacter

istically vengeful and based on the fact that certain regions refused
485
to recognize his "jurisdiction over them."

Nevertheless, a total

484

Nettie Lee Benson and Charles R. Berry, 'The Central
American Delegation to the First Constituent Congress of Mexico,
1822-1823," Hispanic American Historical Review4 (November, 1969): 681.
^®^Ibid., p. 683.
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of sixteen representatives to the Mexican Congress were chosen.
Among them were such luminaries as Jose/ Cecilio del Valle, Pedro
Molina, Mariano Larrave, and Mariano Aycinena.
All the while, the central government in Guatemala City con
tinued to be beleaguered by reports of hostilities.

On March 19,

1822, Gainza was compelled to send an armed force of Guatemalans to
El Salvador to put down its continuing rebellion against annexation.

487

Delays by the Guatemalan commander would mean that three

months later the problem in El Salvador still would not be solved.
Nor did the situation in Nicaragua appear to be on the mend.

On

April 30, an uprising occurred in Granada wherein the authorities
4gS
there were overthrown because of their pro-Leo'n sentiments.
In all probability, Filisola knew of these problems when he left
Chiapas for Guatemala City where he arrived as commander-in-chief on
June 21, 1822, only to find the Salvadorean rebellion still going
on.^^

For humanitarian reasons, he prudently decided to refrain

from a show of force.
achieved.

486

An accord and eventual armistice were shortly

490

Ibid., p. 687.

/
^^Valladares Rubio, "Manuel Jose de Arce," p. 52.
488t
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In reality, however, his choices may have been limited since
most of the old jealousies continued to violently manifest themselves.
In late May for example, the Intendent of Leon reported an impending
revolt in that city by a group which included a number of prominent
citizens.

491

As reported, the suspected disturbance did indeed take

place, albeit unsuccessfully, on June 4 closely followed by another
in August and yet another in Granada in October.

492

All the while,

in Costa Rica, there was so much confusion over the election of
deputies to the Mexican Congress that the electoral board annulled
the results.

493

Filisola could hardly have failed to have been surprised at the
intensity of the confusion and factionalism, for in reality, it
probably seemed that hardly a single peaceful locality existed in
any province.

As the year wore on, the difficulties only increased,

as in November when it became necessary to commence open military
operations against El Salvador.

Even though an armistice was tech

nically in effect, Manuel Jose/ Arce, the Salvadorean military com
mander, had continued in his attempts to overturn nearby governments
which had decided to join Mexico.

494

The pacification campaign,

although lengthy, was successfully terminated in February of 1823

ttQ

1
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with the Salvadorean patriots remaining ominously dissatisfied.

In

a bizarre incident, perhaps born out of desperation, on December 5,
1822, without any formal negotiations, El Salvador fruitlessly annexed itself not to Mexico, but to the United States.

495

There seemed to be no abatement in the disturbances and Central
America at times almost appeared bent on self-destruction.

By January

the atmosphere had become even more dense in the light of unsettling
political rumors out of Mexico.
problem-ridden.

Nicaragua; continued to be especially

In Granada for example, on January 16, an uprising

took place which only served to ignite similar movements in nearby
towns.
Nevertheless, after a number of successful military operations,
Filisola was able to inform the Secretary of State in Mexico City on
March 20, 1823, "that he had reassumed complete control of Guatemala."

496

Yet little more than a week later, and being cognizant

that high-ranking officers in Mexico were close to rebellion against
the emperor, he issued a decree on March 29, which called for a
Central American assembly to decide on the adoption of a structure
of government that the provinces could accept.

497

Coming as a com

plete surprise, provincial leaders were for the first time faced with
the difficulty of making truly fundamental decisions.

Thankfully, the

wisdom was found to quickly acquiesce to the dissidents' call for a

495
Kenyon, "Mexican Influence," p. 193.
496Ibid., p. 196.

497

Ibid., p. 197.
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representative assembly which temporarily served to end most of the
provincial squabbles.

All districts were ordered to hold elections

in which the deputies to the new assembly would be chosen.

To these

actions little resistance from Mexico was anticipated since Filisola
had been informed by the Mexican Congress that as far as they were
concerned, Central America 'was free to choose their own course as
they themselves should decide."

498

It was originally intended that the Central American assembly
was to meet on June 1, 1823.

However, it was necessary to delay this

until June 29, when the sessions did indeed begin.

499

Yet even at

that late date, the discussions had to commence without any repre
sentation from Honduras, Nicaragua, or Costa Rica.^^

Nevertheless,

with little fanfare, the recommendation was made to dissolve all bonds
with Mexico and on July 1, 1823 the assembly declared absolute inde.
501
pendence.
Filisola was asked to remain until a replacement could be
found, but he was gone by August.

With Gainza not there either,

Central America was for the first time on her own.

Unfortunately,

her leaders were incapable of binding the wounds of 300 years of
colonial rule.

Yet even so, a promising beginning was made when the

^^Chamberlain, Francisco Morazan, p. 14.
499
Kenyon, "Mexican Influence," p. 200.
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nation called the United Provinces of Central America was organized
z
/
under a temporary governing triumvirate of Manuel Jose Arce, Tomas
O ’Horan, and Jose^ Cecilio del Valle.

Disappointingly, the problems

which had confronted Filrsola would continue to disturb the United
Provinces for years to come until its dissolution in 1839.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Central America gained its independence from Spain without
bloodshed on September 15, 1821.

How this happened, and an examin

ation of some of the factors that contributed towards that event have
been the subject of
It has been

the above narrative.
suggested that although there were

attachments

with the Mother Country, there were also Spanish policies that led
to the neglect to which the colony was subject and as a dominion of
only periodic importance, an attitude of self-sufficiency had been
apparent since its inception.

As such, this was in reality, the

very beginning of the inescapable rupture between colony and crown.
Providing nourishment to such
was the practice of

nascent pre-independence point of view

shackling an already impoverished area with ad

ditional unfair commercial laws.

By 1800, the colony, especially

in the remote areas such as Costa Rica which had always operated
semi-autonomously, almost intuitively developed a psychology of
separation.

It would appear then, that the ties binding Central

America to Spain, which in many cases were traditional rather than
substantial, could be easily severed.
In the context of religion, a great deal of research needs
to be conducted on the activities of the Central American clergy.
While the priests actively supported the introduction of innovative

169
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commercial measures and techniques, their participation in the lib
eral reforms and rebellions after 1808 is quite astounding.

Note

worthy also is that these activities were confined not only to the
regular clergy but also involved members of the hierarchy as well.
Such an attitude is not easily explained and indeed, those
reasons which motivated one priest might not have been the same as
those which caused another to act.

It may have been that certain

threatening gestures were responsible.

For example, anti-clericalism

was rearing its head most inauspiciously as early as 1767, when the
Jesuits were expelled from the empire.

Later, the Spanish Cortes

itself was marked by overtones which pointed to a dissolution of
traditional church power.

There may also have been some discontent

resulting from the unmet need for reform.

In fact, a Council on

Diocesan Reform had not been held for three centuries in Central
America.

This possibility seems especially pertinent in light of the

many enlightened priests in the colony.
One might also note the possibility that the accumulation of
earthly riches had assumed such disparaging proportions that it was
no longer acceptable to many of the less fortunate priests and laymen.
Mecham provides a good example of this vast gulf when he notes that
many "prelates enjoyed incomes of from 200,000 to 650,000 pesos"
while "nine-tenths of the clergy did not receive more than 150 to
300 pesos annually."

502

One might also note that frequently the

local priests were physically isolated.

For example, Costa Rica

^^Mecham, p. 48.
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at one point had not seen its Leonese-based bishop in thirty-five
years.
Like their temporal brethern, creole priests may also have
been sensitive to their lack of representation in the upper echelons
of the church hierarchy.

In fact, only nine creoles had been named

to noticeably high positions of leadership in the religious affairs
of Central America as of 1821.

In any event, "the evangelization of

the New World created a new entity:

an American church" and the

priests from all parts of the Empire "became part of the fight for
emancipation or at least showed partiality for a total reform.
Although colonial education on an elementary level was
limited, there was, at San Carlos, an exceptionally fine university
staffed by many learned men.

Proof of its efficiency in producing

respectable leaders can be noted by glancing over a partial list of
its graduates.

It quickly becomes obvious that it reads like an en

cyclopedia of Central American independence, and includes such names
as Marure, Bergano, Molina, 3arrundia, Cordova, Larreynaga, Ruiz,
Galvez, Delgado, Arce, del Valle, and Herrera.

One might consequently

note that in the years immediately prior to independence a number of
university papers were submitted which espoused revolutionary the
ories and their defense.

For this reason and others, it has been

suggested that the University of San Carlos was a "democratic liter
ary republic, a living reflection of an independent entity which was
capable of transferring the spirit of university independence into a

503
/
Baron Castro, p. 105.
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Central American political reality."

504

Some scholars have submitted that Central American independ
ence was primarily due to economic causes and the evidence would in
dicate that such an interpretation may very well be correct.

There

are strong suspicions that in both Costa Rica and in El Salvador
economic calamities caused popular disturbances to which the govern
ment responded with some ineffectual and largely unsucessful efforts.
For example, it authorized the reduction of import duties, new ports
and roads, and the establishment of organizations such as the
Sociedad Economica and the Consulado de Comercio.

Even so, by 1808,

most serious Central Americans were not yet considering a complete
separation from Spain but instead continued to maintain their tra
ditional loyalties.

Nevertheless, the obvious impotence of both

Carlos and Fernando in the face of Napoleon's audacity probably
caused some to question their existing ties.

Although most colonials

reacted negatively towards the French actions, the ease with which
the two Spanish monarchs had given up their royal duties must have
severely cracked the psychological allegiance that was traditionally
given the Iberian leaders.
But even then, there were still strong possibilities that the
situation was salvageable.

When the 1812 Constitution and its ac

companying reforms was promulgated, many undoubtedly considered that
it legally emanated from the imprisoned regent Fernando.

These hopes

were rudely crushed when, upon his return in 1814, Fernando restored

^^Mele^dez, Textos, p. 188.
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everything to its 1808 status.

After this

momentary burst

of liber

ality which was so suddenly torn away, the

colonists could

not

logically expect much in the way of fundamental reform or change.
Importantly, it must not be forgotten that at this same time the
royal admission of equality between Spain and her colonies was also
revoked.

By late 1814 then, the Central American patriots had de

veloped an attitude conducive to independence born of frustration and
desperation that would not allow any continued calls

of loyaltyto

Spain to be listened to in 1821.
Compounding the above difficulties was the fact that Central
America at this same time was under the control of the iron-willed
Bustamante, a person who viewed the liberal reforms of 1812 with the
same degree of disdain as had Fernando.

Although his initial at

titude appears to have been properly firm, he had undoubtedly enter
tained some prior suspicions of one magnitude or another.

Eventually

feeling as if he was surrounded by adversaries, he soon struck out
against anyone of dubious loyalty.

Of supreme importance here was

his harsh conduct towards many prominent creole leaders, most notably
those of the "family1' and those belonging to the powerful Ayuntamiento
in Guatemala City.
It is possible that Bustamante's merciless vendetta, the
terror generated by his all too efficient spy system, plus the sup
pression of the 1812 Constitution, were so disturbing to the Central
Americans that a violent, independence orientated, uprising was im
possible.

Even more ominous for the future of Spain in the colony
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may have been that the spirit to resist, while not broken, was
frustratingly manacled.

To a proud people this was an unacceptable

situation.
Thus it would appear that by the time the reins of
government had passed into the relatively soft hands of CaptainGeneral Urrutia, colonial animosities were deep-seated and a sep
aration from Spain was probably inevitable.

When the 1812 Consti

tution was re-promulgated in 1820, it only served to ignite a volatile
combination of frustrated expectations and demands plus long pent-up
local and national animosities.
Exactly how determined colonial liberals were about a complete
severance of the ties with Spain is hard to assess.

While it may have

happened eventually one way or another, the hard lessons learned under
Bustamante did dictate at least some delay which may

explain why a

more immediate attempt at independence was not attempted after 1817.
Nevertheless, when Urrutia accepted without reservation the reforms
of 1312 it did serve to irritate the rapidly accelerating creole de
sires for freedom.

All that was needed at that point was the trigger

to set everything off.
Such an event did occur with the Plan of Iguala. Under any
circumstances it would be difficult to argue that the independence
of New Spain and the subsequent secession of Chiapas did not force
an important political decision on Central America before it was
ready to assume the responsibilities of an independent government.
Disaster proved inevitable as personal ambitions and interests plus
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overwhelming factionalism forced its leaders to make continually
immature decisions.
As has been suggested elsewhere, a fundamental cause of
colonial emancipation from Spain was the creole's desire to modify
the economic and political conditions under which he lived.

In

Central America the creoles placed a major emphasis on their partici
pation in the Ayuntamientos and the Provincial Deputations and their
requests for individual Provincial Deputations suggest that the above
was indeed the case.

Although Bustamante's difficult posture towards

those two important bodies certainly aggravated creole sensitivities,
Spain's lack of sympathy for their complaints over his obstruction
ist policies, and other issues, is even less understandable.
Under a more benevolent and enlightened leader, the perhaps
heady attitude assumed by the defensive creoles might have been more
readily accepted.

In the face of 3ustamante's regalistic and super

ior demeanor, this proved to be an unwise posture to have assumed.
The mutual antagonisms between creole and Spaniards, the new reforms,
and the creole-led revolts caused their every move to be suspect.
This in turn was viewed by them as just another example of Spanish
harrassment and inequality.
Other warnings of creole discontent abound and the cries
against inequality as stated in the Instructions are especially
pertinent.

One might also consider that in almost every serious

revolt, one of the most consistently voiced demands was the removal
of peninsular Spaniards from government employment.

While these de

mands may not have been the most serious, the mere fact that they
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were almost universally called for indicates that it was one of the
most wide-spread areas of discontent.
An important, yet little considered, factor in the independ
ence movements has been that of the fear of the masses as felt by
the upper classes.

A number of scholars have commented briefly on

this topic, but perhaps because of its nebulous nature, their refer
ences are few and not overly specific.
As early as 1811, there was government concern over unemploy
ment, vagrancy, homicides, and other serious crimes.

Rodriguez notes

at this point the fear of the "advanced elements" of society that the
lower classes might "go on a rampage against t h e m . B u s t a m e n t e
used this fact when he established a military unit made up of the
"scum of society" for use in the Salvadorean p a c i f i c a t i o n . M o r e
recent was the report by the mayor of Guatemala City that an atmos
phere existed among the lower classes which was becoming "more bloody
and fearful each day" and which caused fear among the aristocracy. ^ 7
From these comments then, one detects a long-standing sus
picion of possible mass revolt.

As long as Spain maintained some

form of discipline, even though it might have been only psychological,
those segments cf society which had the most to lose felt secure.
However, once it appeared that independence was unavoidable, a

^^Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, p. 133.
506_ ...
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Gavidia, 1:14.
^

Bumgartner, p. 142.
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control vacuum was created which could have allowed the dreaded
’’rampage” to take place.

As in other instances, an acceptance of

the Plan of Iguala seemed to offer a remedy.

The close proximity

of a large Mexican force must have been tempting and difficult to
ignore for the threatened aristocrats.
In closing then, it might be said that Central American in
dependence was not the result of any one causal factor but rather a
number of interrelated causes.

There were tangible reasons such as

economic problems and stagnation, the desire for equality, and a
tightly controlled society.

But there were also concerns that are

more difficult to identify.

Of these, perhaps the most significant

were rising expectations among the elite based on a greater knowledge
of both practical and philosophical ideals.

One also suspects a

great deal of frustration based on the continual denial of those same
expectations.
Only to be surmised also is the degree of fear in the hearts
of the upper classes.

That there was some cannot be denied even if

it had its origins in an awareness of the excesses of the French
Revolution.

And finally, it would be foolish to claim that personal

interests of a temporal nature were not part of the picture.
As a final note, in light of the above study, it should not
be surprising that the current difficulties now extant in Central
America are occurring.

It is truly unfortunate that in such a

magnificant land of potential abundance, so little attention has been
paid to the lessons of the past.

It is also regrettable that a warm
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and noble people have chosen a route not substantially different than
the troubled one traveled bv their forefathers almost 160 years ago.
Hopefully, studies of this sort may contribute to their cultural ful
fillment and our understanding and acceptance of them.
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